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POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Status of Russians in Latvia, Citizenship Issue Examined

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[Article by LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA special correspondent Yu. Gribachev, Riga-Moscow, under rubric: "Pertinent Topic:" "Overboard: The Fate of Russians in the Former Republics"]

[Text] By the will of the fates, millions of Russians were born, were educated, worked, and brought up their children not in Russia, even though they were very close to it—in the former union republics. They were not to blame for this—for the time being. To the best of their ability they worked for the good of the land that had become their homeland; they worked side by side with the people who had been the owners of that land since time immemorial and their work was in no way worse than anyone else's, and therefore they considered themselves to be the owners of the land too. But they had miscalculated! In the stormy sea into which the former Union has changed, they have proven to be cast overboard by life—and that statement is made without any exaggeration. Tens of thousands of them are currently fleeing from the trans-Caucasus, from certain regions of Central Asia, and from the Baltic area. As they flee, they leave behind their homes and all their possessions. As they flee, they have actually canceled out all their previous life and are now hoping to begin it anew in their Big Homeland. But no one here waits for these "borderlanders." No one wants them... "Borderlanders"... How many of them, in a year or in two or three years, will keep showing up on the threshold of the Russian authorities, pleading for housing and work! I do not know whether attempts are being made on a governmental level to forecast the intensity or the size of the streams of refugees from Azerbaijan or Tatarstan where nationalists are building up greater and greater strength, but I am already familiar with one terrifying figure. I was given that figure by those who, most probably, will become components of it: more than half a million Latvian Russians in the very near future are in danger of becoming refugees. In July the legislative act governing Latvian citizenship and naturalization will go into effect and a great exodus will begin... Incidentally, I also heard the term "borderlanders" for the first time in Riga—and from Russians.

... + ... + ... = Russian

Conversation in the Moscow-Riga train.

With a nervous chuckle: "You don't think they're going to tear our suitcases apart at the border, do you?"

"Not yet..."

Then, with the same chuckle: "But what if I'm on the street or in a trolleybus in Riga and I ask in Russian about something? Will they give me the right directions?"

"No, they won't. So far..."

In order to hound a hated neighbor out of a communal apartment, there exists a simple but well-tested set of means: constant pointless squabbles in the kitchen, in the corridor, near the bathroom or the communal telephone in the passageway—in general, everything that is called small-minded dirty tricks.

The driving out of "strangers" and "foreigners" also begins with dirty tricks, with the "indigenous inhabitants" and "owners" doing everything in the attempt to emphasize their dislike—that is at best—or even their hatred: nationalism manifests itself first of all at the personal level, in everyday life.

As a "foreigner," you might be degraded by a Latvian saleswoman who, after hearing your question in Russian, suddenly becomes deaf.

Or if you, a "stranger," pick up an official telephone and answer in Russian, the person on the other end of the line might bellow at you imperiously, "Why don't you speak Latvian?"

All these things, of course, are surprising and offensive, but you can tolerate them.

The next stage in nationalism and your undesirability in Riga is demonstrated to you by the city authorities. Riga is a city with people of many nationalities. Moreover, there are simply fewer Latvians here than there are Russians. The contribution made by the latter to the city's economy and to its urban amenities continues to this day to be exceptionally great. The beauty of Riga, which one can admire endlessly, was protected and preserved for future generations by the Russian citizen: during the postwar years there arose in the "ruling circles" the idea of destroying Old Riga as testimony to the Germans' colonial dominance, and that would have occurred but for the intervention of Vera Mukhina, a Russian who had been born in Riga. If there had not been any Vera Mukhina, there would also have been no Freedom Monument, of which the Latvian city dwellers are so proud.

But let's take a stroll through present-day Riga, where, I repeat, most of the population are Russians, and just try to find, among the street signs and among the signs identifying stores and institutions, the Russian name alongside of the Latvian one. Even those Russians who are fluent in Latvian feel psychologically uncomfortable in this situation: how can that be so when, so far—once again that "so far"!—they are citizens of the Latvian Republic, and the fruits of their intellectual and physical labor are enjoyed by absolutely all the inhabitants of the republic, without any division based on nationality, but at the same time it turns out that there are no longer any Russians in Riga. Are they no longer needed? Are they in disfavor? A clear answer to those last two questions is provided by the rallies that are held from time to time near the already mentioned Freedom Monument. In order not to be suspected of being prejudiced or of

distorting the facts, I call the readers' attention to an article published in the **BERLINER ZEITUNG**, which was reprinted by the **BALTIYSKOYE VREMENYA** newspaper in Riga:

"Every evening, in front of the Freedom Monument in Riga—the symbol of the first Latvian Revolution of 1918—the nationalists loudly discuss the problem of the unloved Russian newcomers. Their fighting cry is 'Russians out!'

"Eighty-year-old Kheynis Lama is one of the most extreme patriots... Lama hates the Soviets—not only because, after the war, he was sent to Siberia for several years. 'The occupiers, these bandits,' he says, 'do not have any right to remain here. If the Russians leave our country, things will improve for the Latvians,' the venerable old man asserts. The people in front of the Freedom Monument nod in agreement.

"Lama is a member of the Riga Citizens Congress" (what the article obviously has in mind are the civil committees that are subsequently mentioned), "a kind of shadow parliament of nationally-minded Latvians. Its members do not recognize the parliament of Latvia, since it was elected with the participation of Russians and they are also represented there."

The political "shadow people" do have a specific recommendation concerning the specific place to which the Russians should be evicted. According to a report in the same German newspaper, Congress deputy Aygare Irgens and those who share his views think this way: "Extending to the east of Latvia are vast oblasts that are uninhabited as though after an epidemic of the plague. That is where the Russians from Latvia could resettle."

(As I read this, I remembered—how could I not remember!—about the former test range that B. Yeltsin proposed as a home for Russian Germans. Like many other people from the Russian Federation, I want to say strongly that I would like to find out whether he himself gave birth to that idea or whether someone else suggested it to him. I would like to find out and to make the appropriate conclusions. Although, wait a minute. Could it have been specifically A. Irgens who advised the Russian President in a personal letter?... By analogy.)

I asked my new Riga acquaintances whether the Latvians understand that not only they themselves, but also the Latvian Russians, used to walk, as though united under God, under the same Center, and that it was only infrequent stoics or chronic loafers who, day by day, failed to lay their little bricks in the walls of the building that currently we so boldly call the totalitarian regime. "How can they fail to understand?" "Well, then..." "Well, they remain silent. They are afraid that they will be accused of being traitors to the national interests." "Who, then, is doing all the shouting?" "The ones who are shouting loudest of all are those who, on the wave of nationalism, are dreaming of ascending to the helm of power."

It is terrifying to imagine what will happen if those loudmouths manage to carry out their dream! But even now the Latvian Russians have become accustomed to being considered "migrants" and "occupiers." They are also beginning to be accustomed to, and not surprised at, the third graphic definition that was recently invented by the rightist radicals. That definition has already been quoted in the Moscow press, but in a somewhat incomprehensible manner. I might recall that not too long ago the enthusiastic supports of a "pure" Latvia organized a "wolf hunt"—the area around the headquarters of the Baltic Military District was surrounded by a rope with small black and red flags. Among all the other slogans that rose above the "hunters'" heads, one said, "Russia—take away all the Russian shit that you have strewn here." Russian Rigans realized in a flash that the nationalists had in mind not only, and not so much, the military, but had all of them in mind. They understood and... shrugged their shoulders, telling themselves, "Well, really, they've surprised us." I personally think that this indifference to insults is just for show. It does not proceed from a habit, but, rather, from a sense that has already become habitual—the sense of powerlessness to change anything.

So, does "migrant" + "occupier" + "Russian shit" equal what Russians are in today's Latvia?

Nevertheless, the attitude taken to the verbal slaps in the face should, by virtue of habit, be one without any special emotions: most of us, walking along the street, can ignore with almost complete indifference a person who is giving vent to filthy talk. But in Latvia, people are beginning to hit the Russians in the stomach.

So it has turned out that the Latvians in Riga are living in the historic downtown area, while the Russians are living in new buildings on the fringes of the city. Recently the city soviet decided that there is no reason for Riga to have large-panel construction, although all the production capabilities for that kind of construction exist. As a result, approximately 90,000 people on the waiting list, the overwhelming majority of whom are Russian laborers and technical workers—have been deprived of every hope of having their own housing. This was done, as the expression goes, in a very simple but tasteful way. Yet another tiny step was taken in converting Riga in the not-too-distant future into the ethnically pure city that the nationalists are dreaming about.

But what if some of the Russians dig in their heels and, continuing to live comfortably in their own little "corner," remain in the capital of the Latvian Republic? How will these stubborn individuals be dealt with? Correctly, by depriving them of the means of existence. The following is from a story told by a Russian jurist, a specialist in the field of economic activity:

"A purge based on nationality is occurring at enterprises. It began with the firing of Russian directors and deputies for economics and personnel. The pretexts are primitive: because of nonfulfillment of the plan (and that at a time

that is so crazy for us), or because the plant has been transferred from one subordination to another. Sometimes the people are fired first, and then a pretext is sought. Then they are replaced by people who have no serious knowledge either about production or about economics. An anecdote has even appeared: 'What do you do for a living?' 'I'm a Latvian.' True, the process has temporarily stopped: people have understood that with this personnel policy, they will remain in a scorched-earth situation." Then, after a pause, he said, "So far, it has been stopped."

Once again those words "so far." No matter what Russian you speak to, those words arise almost always.

"So far our neighbors say hello to us..."

"So far I am working quietly..."

"So far we're not being chased out of the country by people kicking us in the behind..."

But soon people will begin kicking the Russians out—with the kicks having been legalized in the 15 October 1991 Decree of the Supreme Council of the Latvian Republic concerning the restoration of the rights of citizenship in the Latvian Republic and concerning the basic conditions for naturalization. That decree is supposed to go into effect in July 1992, and then you had better watch out, "migrants" + "occupiers" + "Russian shit"! As the words of a certain song go, what will happen then is ow-ow-ow!...

Please Swim Into My Net

In one of its December issues the Riga OPPONENT newspaper published, under the rubric "Promises, Promises, Promises...", an excerpt from the Latvian People's Front (NFL) and quotations from statements made by NFL deputies with which they had gone to the election to the republic's Supreme Council. I would like to permit myself to provide you, the Russian reader, with a few quotations from that article.

NFL: "...Independent Latvia must become a state in which there is political balance and freedom. The Latvian state must guarantee to its inhabitants socioeconomic, political, and personal rights and freedoms, irrespective of the individual's nationality, religion, or party."

Ivars Godmanis: "With complete responsibility, I assert that there will not be any refugees from Latvia."

Currently the NFL rules the political ball in Latvia, and I. Godmanis is the prime minister. So let's take a look at the previously mentioned Decree, and compare it with the pre-election promises made by those who strove for power and got it.

In accordance with the legislative act governing citizenship, there is no law. A law can be enacted only by the Diet, but not even the currently fashionable Pythians cannot guess when the Diet will be elected. So, in

accordance with the act, without any discussions, citizenship is granted to those who lived in Latvia prior to 1940. Those who have been living in Latvia for less than 16 years will have to undergo a process of naturalization in order to reacquire the rights that they had here all these years. Here are a few points in that law governing naturalization, with comments that suggest themselves.

Persons who will not be able by any means to squeeze through the fine openings in the law's net are those who "by unconstitutional methods fought against the independence of the Latvian Republic, the democratic parliamentary state system, or the existing state authority in Latvia, if that has been established by a court sentence."

My dear Russian who falls within that 16-year category! Judging by the fact that you are not sitting behind bars alongside of Rubiks, you were not acquainted with unconstitutional methods and you were in favor of Latvia's independence. Can you breathe calmly? Oh no! Keep swimming into the next opening in the net.

People who will get caught in this side of the net are those who "serve in the USSR Armed Forces" (not even the devil himself knows whose forces they are now), "in the internal forces or security service of the USSR" (once again we pity that poor devil), "as well as persons who, after 17 June 1940, chose the Latvian Republic as their place of residence after demobilization from the USSR Armed Forces, the internal forces, or the security service of the USSR, and who, as of the moment of induction into the service, had not resided permanently on the territory of Latvia." (Good God! it was specifically those naive individuals who genuinely felt that they were spilling their blood in order to free mankind—including the Latvians—from fascism. But now they are being invited to "get the hell out"... And what will happen to their wives and to the children who were born here?)

Also caught in the net were those who "committed crimes against humanity, international or war crimes, or participated in mass repressions, if that has been established by a court sentence."

All this is completely just. But there is a certain nuance that has already attracted the West's attention. The republic's Supreme Council enacted a decision that allows dual citizenship for Latvian emigres. They include 235,000 officially registered collaborators who left Latvia in 1944-1945, that is, those who collaborated with the Hitlerites and participated in the murder of 80,000 Latvian Jews and 200,000 Jews from other European countries. All things considered, they will not have to worry about their citizenship or to delve deeply into the naturalization law.

Incidentally, let's discuss genocide. The republic's Supreme Council enacted a Declaration concerning the censuring and inadmissibility of genocide and antisemitism in Latvia. But in Latvia the Hitlerites and their Latvian accomplices annihilated approximately 400,000 Soviet prisoners of war. When Supreme Council deputy A. Alekseyev proposed enacting a similar declaration

with regard to this crime, the parliament "failed to have a self-interest" in enacting it.

Well, then, reader, let's keep swimming farther into the net.

Others who will not become citizens of Latvia are those who "spread the ideas of chauvinism, fascism" (and it serves them right!), "communism, or other ideas of totalitarianism, or ideas of class dictatorship..."

What has the NFL promised here with regard to political freedoms irrespective of the party to which a person belongs?

Still others who will not receive citizenship are persons who "were sent to Latvia after 17 July 1940 as cadre workers of the CPSU or the Komsomol."

(And yet all of them, like tens of thousands of Latvian Communists and Komsomol members, were executing the highest will! So why not, in this instance, deprive these Latvians of their citizenship? If this is not a legislatively formalized division on the basis of nationality, then exactly what is it?)

I have dwelt in such detail on the decree because, even if people in Russia know about it, their knowledge is only approximate, and based on hearsay. But that decree corrupts and completely shatters the life of hundreds of thousands of Russians.

And not just the Russians. In accordance with this decree, the only persons who can become "naturalized" are those who, in addition to everything else, "have assimilated the Latvian language at the level of conversational speech," but the document does not specify exactly what that level is or how it will be defined. So I would like to return to the article in *BERLINER ZEITUNG*. That article mentions the fate of a 64-year-old German woman, Lidiya Marienfeld, who had lived almost her entire life in Latvia. The language spoken in Lidiya Marienfeld's home was always German or Russian. She knows only a few words of Latvian. Now she says, "At my age it's not so easy to learn... In my heart, Latvia is my Homeland. I am at home here, so why do I have to go through the entire procedure of acquiring citizenship now?"

How many thousands of Russians are there who can repeat that statement word for word! How many thousands, because of a multitude of reasons, did not have the necessity, the need, or sometimes even the opportunity to learn to speak Latvian! And yet that did not hinder them from being honest citizens of Latvia...

And so the number of possible refugees turns out to be half a million people.

Push and Pull

One cannot say that in the republic's Supreme Council or in the government there is no one who fails to understand the antidemocratic nature of the "naturalization"

of those who are thinking carefully about the consequences of the mass exodus of Russians from the country: because it is specifically they who constitute the majority of the industrial workers and the technical intelligentsia. The same I. Godmanis, all things considered, would like to see Latvia as a bridge between West and East, with all the economic advantages that accrue to the republic as a result.

But there has appeared on the political scene a force that is pulling both the government and the parliament to the right and that is simultaneously pushing it toward the enactment of "firm" solutions of the "national question." That force has the modest name of the Civil Committees.

Here are some more quotations, since they are more convincing than the most emotional statements by the authors. The person with the floor is E. Veber, deputy chairman of the Civil Committees (I am quoting from *DEMOKRATICHESKAYA ROSSIYA*):

"America will grant credit to Russia for a resettlement program, because America has a self-interest in having stability in the Baltic area. Without repatriation that stability will not be achieved..."

"I would like very much for people to leave voluntarily. If they do not leave, we shall not have any stability. And, in the final analysis, there will be abundant bloodshed."

So let's cudgel all these hateful individuals!

The "committee man" also paints rosy prospects for the Latvians:

"It is necessary immediately to break all our relations with our Eastern neighbors and to strive to establish them with the West... There is no need to fear that we shall be left temporarily without oil or gas. We shall get through that somehow. It's possible to live without heat or light."

And once again a clear mental picture appears: school children and university students in an ethnically pure Latvia are leafing through their textbooks by torchlight, and Latvians are cooking their food on campfires right in the middle of their parquet floors at home. In general, one may fantasize happily about many things, but really this is no joking matter. And so the Civil Committees themselves have no intention of joking. They have seriously undertaken the "clearing" of Latvia. The *PILSONIS* ("Citizen") newspaper printed an appeal to prepare lists of undesirable elements. And the committees engaged immediately in the job, since, I have been told, their agents are situated in almost every home. (Doesn't this remind you of something? Personally, I am reminded of the Hitlerite system of informers.) These lists have approximately 15 points. Some of them repeat the Decree on Naturalization, and others supplement it. The Civil Committees have included in the undesirable elements the specialists in the national economy who were sent to Latvia from the Center, trade-union figures,

those of the same "origin," former party and state figures, etc. The Riga newspapers have printed computations: according to the lists, approximately 700,000 persons, including family members, should be deported from Latvia. The rosy dream of certain committee figures is, in one way or another, to get rid in the foreseeable future of 75 percent of the Russians living today in Latvia. There is also theoretical justification for this: the alarming demographic situation in the republic. The Latvians have a low birth rate, and they are afraid of becoming a minority in their own land. But as a certain wit pointed out, the question of the birth rate is decided not on the parliamentary podium, but in bed. Are we really supposed to believe that the Civil Committees do not understand this?

Do they really fail to comprehend that, if absolutely all the Russians are driven out, not only the apartments in Riga and other Latvian cities will become available, but there will be a complete emptying of the shops in the famous Radiotekhnika Railroad-Car Building Plant in Riga, and the textile factories where most of the workers are "occupiers"?

"They do not want to understand this," I was told by an experienced Riga economist. "The only thing that occupies their thoughts today is 'the Russian question.'"

"Okay, that's for today. But what will happen tomorrow?"

"Tomorrow they will begin to implement the idea of a 'bacon revolution.'"

"What kind of a revolution?"

"Bacon. They hope to break through to the Western market with agricultural output, but they fail to see the obvious: that market is crammed full of their own bacon, butter, and milk."

"Do you mean, then, that they are pulling Latvia back to the times when it was an agrarian country?"

"Definitely. They are pushing for converting it into a kind of 'banana republic.'"

Concerning Those Who Got the Doughnut Hole

For a long time demonstrators carrying placards have been picketing the building of the Supreme Court every Saturday. Usually there are about 30 demonstrators. The placards in Russian are different ones: "Freedom for Political Prisoners!", "Equal Rights For All Inhabitants of Latvia!", and the like. One placard caught my eye by its unusual nature: "What are you getting excited about? They promised that they would divide everything equally: one gets a doughnut, and the other gets the doughnut hole. That's what the democratic republic is."

At the present time there is probably not a single Russian in Latvia who would not feel that the idea of the doughnut hole applies to him. I spoke in Riga with the most different kinds of people, and each of them

admitted that he was living under the constant oppression of worry about his future. Some of them, in their hearts, would just say "to hell with everything" and would leave, but they have nowhere to go. Others intend to stay as long as they can on the land to which they have been emotionally bound. Still others are waiting, but no one knows for what. And every eight out of ten are attempting to cope with the impending disaster individually. All kinds of cultural and political Russian organizations existing at the present time in Latvia are either unknown to most of the Russians, or they are not attracting them. Judge for yourself: the Balto-Slavic Society (BSO) has approximately 2000 members; the Russian Community of Latvia (ROL), had slightly more than 700 members in December; the Riga Russian Community has approximately 200 members; etc.

Moreover, these Russian organizations themselves in the large disagreements among themselves do not believe in either the purity of one another's intentions, or in the purity of the sources from which a particular organization gets the funds for its existence, or, finally, in the purity of... the blood flowing through the veins of the leaders of the particular society or community. I was shown—obviously as a kind of guide—a newspaper article, the essence of which can be summarized as a naive idea: what kind of Russian community are you if your president has such a strange, obviously non-Russian, first name? Mentally—in order not to offend my well-wisher—I only shrugged my shoulders.

It would seem that, faced by the advancing events, it is necessary to unite (to unite not against anyone, but in defense of the Russians), but no! Everyone considers that he is the only person who possesses the truth in the last instance, and his opponent, at best, is a "useless person." Even about the Ulye Society, the basic goal of which is cultural-educational work, the illumination of the role played by Russians in the life of the Baltic republics, persons who never were parasites here—even about that Ulye Society that would seem to be remote from politics, I heard that the people there "do not burn, but only smolder."

"If I might say so," I attempted to object, "not everyone can go up onto the barricades. Somebody has to make the bandages."

"No, these are completely useless people," my opposite snapped back.

The small Russian faction in the Supreme Council had broken down, one of its members told me, into small groups. Recently the Supreme Council adopted a decision to discontinue the simultaneous interpretation of speeches into Russian. Was that a slap in the face? A parliamentary disgrace? The Russian parliamentarians limited themselves, as a certain Riga newspaper maliciously reported, to ostentatiously reading their newspapers during speeches that were being given in Latvian. Well, warriors... Although, of course, things are very difficult for them. Because if the members of the Civil

Committees publicly call the centrist Latvian deputies traitors, what is the name they give the Russian deputies? Sometimes you don't even want to say anything, so you keep silent.

So, is that how the Latvian Russians will fight individually for their rights? No, there already exist broad plans for creating a coalition that would unite, on the basis of the struggle for civil rights, the most diverse forces. As I was told by one of the co-chairmen of the Center of the Democratic Initiative party—incidentally, a party that is represented in parliament—work is being planned to unite the forces that are in opposition to the current governmental course, and to create a coalition of all the Russian communities. But this is proceeding at a snail's pace.

So far—once again those tiresome but inevitable words!—there does not exist any unified opposition to the forthcoming naturalization.

But even that would be a half-disaster. If all the Latvian Russians are unanimous about something, it is that Russia has never given them any kind of help and it won't now. It is as though, for Russia, they and their problems do not exist. Literally everyone says this. I asked plenty of people to recall a single action, even the very smallest one, that the Russian government had taken to put hopes in Russians in the Latvia "borderland" that the Big Motherland had not forgotten about them, and that it would defend them if necessary. But no one could name anything.

An electronics engineer with 20 years of work longevity, who has made official trips to Russia, recalled his conversations with people from RSFSR in which he had asked advice about where he could go when he was finally "kicked out" of Latvia. And he got that advice: there are plenty of remote villages with empty houses. He could pick any one of them and become a farmer there. Was he—a person with hands that had been precision-tuned to his occupation, an occupation that had greatly benefited the previous state, and, consequently, all of us in the present one—supposed to become a farmer? From a personal point of view that is a tragedy, and from the state point of view, a complete waste of money. Maybe official Russia, on behalf of which he had "occupied" Latvia all those years, could give him some other advice? Because the government is supposed to have analysts who, even now, are predicting an avalanche of refugees! There has to be, even now, a governmental program for providing specific assistance to the "borderland" Russians in finding housing and a job in their specialty! And, finally, does the Russian government know about Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that says, "Every individual has the right to citizenship. No one can be arbitrarily deprived of his citizenship..."?

If it knows it, then wouldn't now be the proper time MILDLY but CONVINCINGLY to remind the Latvian Supreme Council of this article...

One of the Rigans with whom I spoke practically grabbed me by my lapels and asked me, "What will happen if those half a million Russians who will possibly pour into Russia from Latvia prove to be completely unneeded there? To a man they will choose as their leader Zhirinovskiy. Do you want that?" "No, I don't!" But that was my personal answer. But what, actually, does our government want? Or is it hoping that the overwhelming majority of the Russians who have not undergone "naturalization" will still continue living in their familiar Latvia in the status of second-class citizens—without the right to participate in political life, without the right to own land?

"The fate that awaits those who remain here without receiving the rights of a citizen of the republic is the same as that of the West German 'Gastarbeiter' [guest workers] from Turkey," a Russian political figure and member of the Latvian Supreme Council predicted in a conversation with me. "That's a nice picture, isn't it: a Latvian-Russian Turk. He will be the last in line to find a good job and the first in line to be fired for any reason. His children will receive an abbreviated education—at the level of a rural-parish school in the boondocks. Even if, by some miracle, they succeed in forcing their way into a university or another special higher education by overcoming the barrier of examinations in Latvian, their diploma will be just a fake certificate: no one will give the person a good, high-paying job. It's amusing that at one time the Latvian intelligentsia got its higher education in the Moscow and St. Petersburg universities. Well, as people say nowadays, 'One good turn deserves another.'"

It Serves You Right...

Two final quotations.

In 1922 the head of the Orthodox Church in Latvia, deputy to the Latvian Diet Archbishop Ioann Pommer appealed to the head of the government with the following words:

"...Hundreds of thousands of completely legal, completely unsullied citizens of Latvia who heroically executed and who are still executing all their duties with respect to Latvia are being reduced to the status of stepsons of the homeland. Their rights are being violated in the crudest manner to the benefit of the privileged citizens who are allegedly of higher grade... Nor should we forget that persecuted Orthodox believers populate chiefly the border territory between small Latvia and large Russia, and that the wailing of the persecuted can also fly across the border and find a response in the hearts of brothers on the other side of the border..."

Four years later the same person wrote:

"You dare to cultivate hatred of everything with any flaw to the Russian, to the Russian language, culture, religion, everyday life, or even to those of their own

blood kinsmen who profess the same faith as the Russians. But... after that you must be ready to have the hatred also of the Russian nation being vented on you."

How necessary it would be for all the members of the Civil Committees, and all those who, in peacetime, are ready to fill up the Russian roads and byways with the unending stream of refugees, to look deeply into their own history... Alas!

More Excerpts From KGB Records of Domestic Spying Operations

924C1273A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian Nos 13, 15, Apr 92 p 5

[Further excerpts from archival documents: "Knock, Knock, Knock—I Am Your Friend...."]

[No 13, Apr 92 p 5]

[Text] Continuation. For beginning see ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, Nos 8-11.

We are continuing to publish materials from the KGB archives regarding the formation of agent networks within various institutions of our society.

1985

In accordance with the directives of the USSR KGB leadership, for the purpose of providing medical recommendations and a medical examination of "The Ascetic" (A.D. Sakharov), the cardiologist S.S.F., the specialist on nutrition Yu.I.I., and the oncologist, i.e., cancer specialist, L.V.P. have been sent from the USSR Ministry of Health to the city of Gorkiy (Holding 6, Catalog 8/16, Vol 4, p 135).

1986

Agents "Klimov" and "Remizov" have been sent to Canada on the staff of the USSR's all-star hockey team on an assignment involving the counterintelligence security of this collective. Information had been received concerning our opponent's hostile intentions with regard to certain Soviet hockey players. Attempts were to be made to influence these players not to return to their homeland.

Additional information has been received from agents "Moskovskiy," "Fedorov," and "Alfimov" regarding the ideologically unhealthy situation in the sector involving the problems of the ideological struggle and criticism of non-Marxist theories at the USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD [Institute of the International Worker's Movement] (Holding 6, Catalog 9, Case X-175, Vol 2, p 3).

APN [Academy of Pedagogical Sciences] Bureau Chief K.V. Bobrov has been removed from the official list of those persons traveling to the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] on business. This action was taken because cash k/m [crowns and marks?] was found on him. (Loc. cit. p 27).

[No 15, Apr 92 p 5]

[Text] We continue the publication of materials from the KGB archives on the formation of an agent network within various institutions of our society.

Continuation. For the beginning, see ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, Nos 8-13.

1986

In connection with the discovery of compromising materials, TASS staff members Dragunov and Kuznetsov have been removed from the official list of those persons scheduled to take trips on business to the capitalist countries. (Holding 6, Catalog 9, Case X-175, Vol 2).

According to a DOR [operational investigation case] on "The Hypocrite" (Shtilmark), in conjunction with the UKGB [KGB Administration] for Lipetsk and Murmansk oblasts, the following items were confiscated from those persons with close ties to the deceased subject: several copies of his politically harmful manuscript, more than 30 titles of antisocial and slanderous literature, a diary, and approximately 500 items of personal correspondence, as well as a number of other materials whose transport abroad or dissemination within the USSR could have been damaging to the interests of the Soviet state. (Loc. cit., p 37).

During the period when the 27th CPSU Congress was performing its work 16 persons were identified as being in Moscow with provocative intentions: 12 of them were escorted back to their places of permanent residence, while four (with obvious symptoms of psychological unbalance) were placed in mental hospitals for psychiatric treatment. (Loc. cit., p 37).

In connection with the upcoming Fifth USSR Cinematographers' Congress, reports have been received from agents "Moscow," "Nora," Nikolayev, "Polyanskiy," "Stepanov," and "Yezerskiy" concerning the situation among the cinematographers, as well as certain negative manifestations during the accounts-and-elections meetings in the Moscow sections. These reports have been submitted to the Administration's leaders. (Loc. cit., p 41).

Photographic materials confiscated by the customs office from foreigners going abroad—materials on the creative work of the so-called unrecognized artists—were sent for expert analysis to the Fine Arts Division Administration of the USSR Ministry of Culture, where they were recognized as subject to being banned from our country for ideological reasons. (Loc. cit., p 43).

A signal has been received from agent "Solovyev" concerning a leak of service information from the Council on Religious Affairs under the USSR Council of Ministers. A checkup is being conducted. (p 205).

For the period of preparing for and conducting the international competitions known as the "Goodwill Games" entrance to the Soviet Union has been closed to

90 foreigners under suspicion of having ties with Western clerical, i.e., religious centers. (Loc. cit. p 34).

Taking into account materials obtained with the sanction of Comrade I.L. Abramov, chief of the USSR KGB Fifth Administration, during the exiting by foreigners from the USSR, a meticulous search and examination were conducted. And they resulted in the discovery and confiscation of the following items among the women's toiletries of M.F. Vinizski: a notebook with addresses and telephone contacts in the USSR, along with brief notes on conversations with several "refuseniks," and two appeals with analogous contents concerning the poor and wretched situation of "refuseniks"—especially scientists—in the USSR. One of these appeals was addressed to participants in the Second All-Union Conference of Scientists on the Problems of Peace and the Prevention of Nuclear War. There was also a letter to be sent to Israel, addressed to N. and M. Drachinskiy with a request to hand an appeal to Professor Legal (France), president of the World Federation of Scientists. Photos were taken while the examination was being conducted. Entrance to the USSR will be closed for Mr. and Mrs. Vinizski. (Loc. cit. pp 187-188).

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Locomotive Repair Problems Scored

924A1024A Kiev RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian
14 Apr 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Who Needs Electric Locomotives?"]

[Text] (UKRINFORM)—Almost 300 electric locomotives of Czechoslovak origin undergo a major overhaul each year in the Zaporozhskiy Electric Locomotive Repair Plant. These locomotives pull passenger consists on the railroads of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and the Transcaucasus.

Deliveries of spare parts and materials from Czechoslovakia have ceased due to a lack of hard currency and this is understandable. However, it is difficult to understand why rolled metal products, lumber, varnishes, paints, and bearings are not arriving from Russia. You see, 68 percent, that is, more than 200 electric locomotives, are repaired for the Russian railroads. The Moscow Railroad alone sends 70 electric locomotives to Zaporozhye for repairs each year. They have a peculiar understanding of the single economic space of the CIS countries in the Cherepovetskiy Metallurgical Combine and the Saratovskiy Storage Battery Plant, who are not fulfilling their contracts. The Nizhnetagilskiy Metallurgical Plant has refused to send bands for wheel pairs with this argument: "Since you are 'independent,' extricate yourselves; there will be no deliveries."

It is interesting; what do the Russian railroad workers and Russia's government think about this?

Time is passing and the Zaporozhye people are not sitting idly. They are trying to solve even if only a part of the problems independently. They are expanding the production of their own spare parts along with imported ones, introducing advanced technologies in renovating items, etc. The collective nevertheless hopes to carry out its production program during this very difficult year.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

'Smena' Faction Leader Discusses Results of Congress

924C12454 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Apr 92 p 1

[Interview with "Smena" leader, Andrey Golovin, by Inna Muravyeva, under the rubric: "Something To Think About": "We Aren't the Worst Parliament in the World"]

[Text] And so, the 6th Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation, about which so much has been said, has come to an end. Great hopes were pinned upon it, its progress was predicted by various groups—some saying that, "The congress will name all those who led the country to ruin", others—that the congress, "which is most likely the last, by dying a natural death, will unbind the hands of the president and the government, so that they will be free to begin broad reforms".

Many were dissatisfied with the congress' results. Dmitry Volkogonov observed regretfully that "over a two-week period, the congress did not examine a single serious issue". Sergey Yushenkov made the statement: "The congress is tired of the confrontational attitude of 'Russian Unity'. No alternatives to this were proposed to the opposing blocs." And in general, "The congress demonstrated its own uselessness".

All of this is true. Yet one wonders, all the same, whether or not this is a stage of this long and at times awkward, jerkily proceeding congress, that, it is entirely possible, will be a decisive one in our political future.

For practically the first time in long decades, different blocs appeared at the 6th Congress of People's Deputies. A bloc supporting the reforms being conducted by the president and the government, which included representatives of parliamentary factions with a democratic orientation, a bloc of opposition forces, uniting the "Rossiya", "Communists of Russia", "Otechizna" [fatherland], "Agrarian Union" and "Russian Union" factions. And also—still a little shy, not yet announcing their presence "at the tops of their voices"—the politicians of the center.

We spoke with Andrey Golovin, coordinator of the "Smena—New Policy" faction on one of the days about the deployment of political forces in parliament and at the congress.

—The congress has demonstrated the presence of three orientations,—said Andrey Golovin, at the very beginning of our conversation,—right, left and center. These orientations can be seen even in the voting results.

In answer to our question about the opposition, I will say—yes, I agree: the opposition here is not very constructive, not very civilized. But, after all, the ruling

party is just as uncivilized. And where in our society, after these frightening seventy-some years, are we supposed to get civility? But we aren't the worst parliament in the world. So when they accuse us of holding endless meetings...

[Muravyeva] Excuse me, but I wonder, wouldn't it be the congress, not the parliament, that would be accused of holding endless meetings... It isn't the same thing at all...

[Golovin] Yes, I agree. The congress and parliament are unrelated phenomena.

As far as the Supreme Soviet goes, it runs like clockwork.

I, incidentally, was opposed to this two-level system, but now I see in it a certain kernel of rationality. It simply isn't worth calling the congress a parliament; it is something like a people's vechе [popular assembly in prerevolutionary Russia]. And of course, at the congress, it is impossible to adopt laws, especially those that require careful preparation. But certain declarations, landmarks—these can be observed. For this kind of observance, the congress offers an ideal opportunity. And this is very important for our time, for exactly this piece of history: after all, until now, when we have the opportunity to cross swords in the hall—it is easier to avoid doing it on the street. Now, it is important that we do not forget this.

[boxed item]

The Deputy Corps in Numbers

The congress marathon is nearly complete. Up until its last day, people were talking about the deputies' self-determination and predicting the future deployment of forces.

Judging by the available data, two groups have the greatest weight. They are the opposition "Russian Unity", numbering 310 deputies, or 29.6 percent of the total number of deputies (1049). It is opposed by a coalition supporting reforms, numbering 300 deputies.

The central bloc of creative forces has in its aktiv 154 people. The undecided deputies, called in parliamentary language "the swamp", also are a fair-sized force. They number 285 people. Perhaps it is exactly they who influence the final results of the vote, taking one side or the other.[end of box]

[Muravyeva] Andrey Leonidovich, in our society, unfortunately, for a very long time, we used only a black and white historical palette. People talk about the bloc whose formation was initiated by your faction—a bloc of creative forces, which includes besides "Smena", "Industrial Union" and "Working Union",—as an attempt, a first step towards the creation of a political center.

[Golovin] We would very much like that to be true. But centrism is a very delicate concept. Although, from the

moment we founded it, it was exactly the principle of centrism that we were counting on.

For now, we are completely aware that for centrism, for its social support, we need a stable society, which is exactly what we don't have. What concerns me is if, God forbid, something falls apart, and some kind of new elections begin. Extremists—and this is very likely—will come to power. From both directions. And they will yell at each other until they're hoarse. But when it comes time to adopt any sort of law, when they will be required to sit down and do scrupulous, painstaking, boring work every day, when the endless amendments start coming... "amendment 125 to article 35, part 3...", I'm afraid that the extreme forces will not be up to it.

But all the same, on the birth of a center... We do have a certain optimism.

The various social levels are waiting for stability to be established in our society once and for all. Even the mafia groups that evade taxes, make bribes and that sort of thing, have suddenly realized (and before that, calculated) that in fact, a stable and normal situation would be far more advantageous even for them than all this confusion.

So our optimism is not ungrounded. Society is coming to the understanding that the center—as a guarantee of stability—is a necessity. Therefore, we will believe that soon we will have more support,—said Andrey Golovin, concluding our conversation.

Yes, and we will believe that our society will acquire, in the near future, all the attributes of civilized polities—both a constructive opposition and a stabilizing center.

Results of Russian Congress Viewed

924C1286A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Apr 92 p 2

[Commentary by Professor B. Pugachev: "The Authorities Are Fragile. But They Are All We Have"]

[Text] Now is the time to sum up results. Over 14 days of work the Congress has adopted three decrees of a constitutional nature—on a Federative Accord, a draft of the Russian Federation Constitution, and on the political position of the Russian Federation in the CIS. Amendments to the existing Constitution were also adopted. All the remaining decrees of the Congress directly or indirectly concerned economic and political policies of the government. A bitter dispute also arose which ended in a fragile compromise between the representative and executive powers. The fruit of that compromise was a decree of the Congress on the course of economic reform and a declaration in support of those reforms. The fundamental issue of an evaluation of the tactics and strategy of those reforms was postponed by the Congress until November-December 1992. Likewise postponed for three months was a solution to the question of approval by the Russian Federation Supreme

Soviet of the candidacy of the chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers (the government) and adoption of a Law on the Council of Ministers. In other words, the dispute between the legislative and executive powers concerning a fundamental question, constitutional limitation of their authorities, was not resolved at this Congress.

The rulings of the Congress on the draft of the Russian Federation Constitution are also of a compromise nature. Having approved a general concept of constitutional reform and a draft of the Constitution drafted by the Constitutional Commission of the Congress, the people's representatives simultaneously recommended that the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and the Constitutional Commission take into consideration the remarks of the president of Russia on Chapters 16 and 17 of the draft, fundamentally changing relations between the authorities in favor of the executive power; in other words, the presidential power, which radically changes the entire "authority" content of the sections of the approved draft of the Constitution. In other words, even here the compromise is of a temporary nature.

By a decree the Congress also approved on the whole the policy for the creation and development of the Commonwealth of Independent States. And there were no alternatives to this under today's political conditions. However even here the Congress, not undertaking ratification of the agreements concerning the CIS, occupied a constitutionally indefinite position. Numerous constitutional amendments resulting from the conclusion of agreements concerning the CIS were not coordinated with this fact, which constitutionally changes the status of Russia. Moreover, the Congress was unable to give clear constitutionally binding recommendations to the government for negotiations with its partners concerning the CIS. Such key questions as guarantees of the rights of Russian citizens beyond the borders of the federation dating from the former USSR, territorial claims, and protection of the right to self-determination of the multi-million-strong Russian population residing in states of the CIS were circumvented by the Congress.

Finally, even the amendments to the existing Russian Federation Constitution that were adopted are of an indeterminate, compromise nature. Undoubtedly the very fact of the Congress' approval of the Federative accord and its incorporation in the text of the existing Constitution is entirely positive. Important also is the de-ideologization of that document, which was performed by means of amendments. However in such an important issue as the distribution of authorities between the legislative and executive powers, the Congress was at an impasse. The inability of the Congress to clearly chose a parliamentary or presidential type of Constitution enforced the unsteady status quo between these powers.

On the whole, the Congress of People's Deputies could be characterized as a congress of postponed decisions. For the first time, the Congress demonstrated with full

clarify the impossibility of successful constitutional legislation given the numbers of people involved and the varied levels of the qualifications of the various deputies for purposes of legislative work. But we have no other congress. Therefore it would be extremely dangerous politically, and simply unconstitutional as well, to demand the dissolution of the Congress and the formation of new "constituent" organs of power. New elections to the representative organs under present political conditions would lead to their failure by virtue of the growing political apathy of the citizens or to a sharp movement to the right of the entire spectrum of political life. The leaders of both the representative and the executive powers understand this well. Thus, let us respect the existing representative authorities in Russia. They are garrulous and unproductive. But however fragile they may be, they are a guarantor of our rights and freedoms controlled by the citizens. The weakness of the representative power restricts the political field of the power of the people and opens an opportunity for the activities of adventurists and dictators. But these same authorities, if they are strong and effective, will not give rise to dictatorship. Let us remember this and do everything to strengthen the representative power—the power of the people. Let us do everything so that it will in full measure become the power of the people. I am convinced that the Government and the President understand this well.

Poll Findings on Popularity of Government, Russian Leaders

924C1239B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 7 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Khlopev, deputy director of the Analytical Center of the Institute for Sociopolitical Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences: "A Sociologist's View"]

[Text] The Institute for Sociopolitical Research [ISPI] of the Russian Academy of Sciences [RAN] conducted a survey of the population in 19 regions of the Russian Federation. Only one out of 18 of the respondents today associates improvement of his material position with the present government; 68.7 percent look to their own activity and enterprise.

On whom do the respondents pin their hopes? According to the data of the survey, the scale of preferences in public opinion is very broad. The highest rating goes to B. Yeltsin (60.4 percent). Then the respondents mention the names of A. Rutskoy (33.5) and R. Khasbulatov (27.1).

Along with A. Sobchak (18.7), who traditionally has held a rather high place in polls, the survey also recorded increased attention being paid to S. Shikhray (13.6) and Ye. Gaydar (19.7).

ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Rutskoy Irritation Over Congress Decision on Land Ownership

924C12494 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Valeriy Konovalov, IZVESTIYA correspondent, under the rubric "Events and Commentaries": "Why Rutskoy's Agrarian Program Frightened the Deputies-Agrarians"]

[Text] After the congress refused to pass into law the unconditional right of private ownership of land, in a television interview A. Rutskoy, Russian vice president, did not conceal his exacerbation—for quite understandable reasons. After all, it was his own agrarian program that the deputies were essentially invalidating.

For the vice president, who takes responsibility for agriculture, this is obviously becoming a turning point in his relations with the main and conservative segment of those who hold chairmanships and whose positions are expressed by the agrarian faction in the congress and the Agricultural Committee of the VS [Supreme Soviet]. Defenders of the kolkhoz system have pinned significant hopes on Rutskoy, who more than once has let it be known in public that he does not approve the "antikolkhoz campaign" and the radicalism of the economic reform in general.

But the strategy he has proposed for agricultural transformations has also given advocates of the kolkhoz system a pretty good scare. Only two or three of the deputies from agriculture responded to Rutskoy's invitation to discuss his program. Probably the vice president did not take this so much as an insult as it convinced him of the categorical reluctance of the deputies who hold chairmanships and their allies to listen to logic, to reason, and to worldwide experience.

After that, a majority in the congress supported the position of the agrarian faction: not to allow the buying and selling of land so that it is squandered and becomes the object of speculation. All the sound arguments to the effect that private ownership does not threaten the land at all, but, on the contrary, could be a guarantee of its reasonable use if the legal and economic mechanisms known throughout the entire civilized world are put into operation, had no effect here.

One of the versions of this mechanism was in fact included in Vice President Rutskoy's program. Its key provision is this: the issuance of certificates granting the right to possess land and sell them through the banks to those who want to possess land and work on it. The terms and conditions would vary: from transfer of certificates without compensation to their purchase at market prices.

The procedure with the certificates was spelled out in considerable detail in the program. The certificates

differentiated by the category of the land, the size of the plots, and the value based on the land register, would be distributed among regional banks, including commercial banks. Rosselkhozbank would retain 20-30 percent of the certificates to carry out major investment projects. Experts of the banks, together with local administrations, would put together packages of land mortgage certificates for specific investment projects and credits of foreign and domestic investors.

Some of the certificates would be allotted to retired people, disabled persons, families with many children, and single mothers. These social welfare certificates could be leased, even to foreign businessmen, but not sold, and in case of the death of the holder or when children become adults, they would be transferred to other persons unable to work.

The other—larger—portion of the certificates would be sold to private individuals or collectives for immediate payment of the value or on credit. Those who have already received land by government enactment would be issued a certificate in addition. As soon as payment is made, the individual or collective becomes the owner of farmland or land for industrial or public works construction with all the relevant rights of ownership—the right to bequeath it, the right to sell it, the right to mortgage it, etc.

As for the sale of land (land certificates), this must be done exclusively through the commercial Land Bank, which appraises the land, pays the value to the owner, and then sells the certificate to the new owner. This procedure operates against speculation in land and its use for other than the assigned purpose.

"The right of ownership of land..." Rutskoy's program states, "precludes the interference of administrative structures in the reallocation of land, corruption, bribery, and mockery of the owner, who long ago should have been given the strong protection of the law." This statement makes a lot of sense, but for those who are the "commanders" of agriculture at present—it represents a significant threat. Which accounts for the reaction.

The land certificate system is only one of the components of the vice president's agrarian program. He is also proposing a different tactic of gradual reform for profitable and unprofitable collective farms, he believes that state investment policy for rural areas needs to be reviewed, and its principles and sources defined. In his opinion, there is also a need for new organizational structures to carry out the agrarian reform. They are the Center for the Land and Agroindustrial Reform (which would enlist leading scientists, our own and foreign, and agricultural practitioners), the International Financial Fund, and the International Association of Corporations. All of these structures, as Rutskoy understands it, must be of the market type.

Russia's vice president calls the program one of the possible versions of the agrarian reform. This document's constructive orientation is obvious, which certainly cannot be said about the position of the congress on agrarian problems.

Deputy Chairman Vasilyev On Privatization

Compares Piyasheva, Government Proposals

924A10584 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
No 4, 24 Apr 92 p 7

[Article by Dmitriy Vasilyev, chairman of the State Property Committee of the Russian Federation, under the rubric "Privatization": "Making Everyone Happy?"]

[Text] Taking into account the criticism on the part of the opposition, the government has made substantial changes to the privatization program. This is the subject of the article by Dmitriy Vasilyev, chairman of the State Property Committee of the Russian Federation.

During the past few months, economists have been attentively following the polemics between two well-known groups, and, correspondingly, two programs (concepts) of privatization: one by L. Piyasheva and another by A. Chubays. The bitter struggle between the ideologue of the "Moscow" privatization and representatives of the government has its own special flavor because of the way the "competitors" quickly modify their programs and approaches. It is a paradox, but the actual result has been to substantially bring the opposing sides together, although neither seems to be inclined to lower the heat of the polemics. This became especially noticeable in light of the latest events in the area of privatization: the president presenting a revised draft of the State Privatization Program in the last days of March to the Supreme Soviet, and a large group of authors—representatives of Piyasheva's group—publishing their revised draft for privatization on 7 April of this year in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA ("And Still, We Will Have to Return It Free of Charge").

In doing a comparative analysis of the two competing concepts in their current form, it is appropriate to first note the common points in the approach of the two groups—the government and the left-radical one.

Both groups believe that privatization is the last hope for the reform and that "the faster it is implemented, the faster and with fewer losses the economy will start to pull out of the crisis." Both groups agree that the final goal of the privatization is to increase the economic effectiveness of production.

In regard to the point which until recently has been most contentious—whether to transfer the property to the new owners for a payment or free of charge—the sides, at second glance, are not that far apart. Although in different wording, both say the same thing: A considerable part of the property will be distributed to the people in one form or another on a free-of-charge basis, and no

more than one-tenth of state property will be realized for cash—that is, about 100-150 billion rubles' worth.

Most effective are private enterprises, while "the effectiveness of joint-stock companies where property is transferred into the hands of the enterprise's labor force—for whom, as is known, the priority is higher salaries, and only after that the profit and development of the enterprise—in the beginning will be not much different from the effectiveness of state enterprises," that is, it will remain low. A considerable number of state and municipal enterprises are to be converted into joint-stock companies. In addition, since there should be an opportunity to buy and sell the stock freely, they will have to be mostly publicly traded joint-stock companies. (The latter requirement comes through less clearly from the Piyasheva group.)

A number of enterprises and branches that play a special role in our economy—for instance, railroads, armaments production—must be privatized under special provisions (this idea comes through especially strong in the government approach).

Both groups arrive at the conclusion that it is necessary to make changes in the legislation on privatization. In particular, to unquestionably permit the reselling of stock received free or on a preferential basis, and personal privatization accounts (checks, vouchers); to repeal the obligation to pay stable dividends on preferred stock temporarily in the possession of the state, which holds a threat of completely bankrupting enterprises; and to appraise the property in the simplest way—by residual book value.

In the opinion of both groups, the number of people receiving the stock of the enterprise on a preferential basis (free of charge) should include, in addition to enterprise employees, those who have retired from it and persons retaining the right to reclaim their jobs.

The opponents see eye to eye on the future development: employee stockholders will to some or other extent "shed" their stock received on a preferential basis, and this process will result in the property gradually shifting into the hands of effective owners.

Finally, the groups do not diverge on the issue that part of the stock should be transferred under any circumstances (because of the special role of the economic managerial corps in Russia) to administration officials.

Thus, there is much in common between the two "warning" concepts, which especially narrowed their differences after the government included in its privatization program the possibility of transferring the controlling share of stock to labor collectives and the promise of an accelerated introduction of personal privatization accounts on the one hand, and on the other—the acknowledgement by the Piyasheva group of the low economic effectiveness of a collective enterprise.

So where does the difference between the position of the Moscow group and the government concept now lie?

In our opinion, in the way they search for, or create, this effective owner. The government program looks for him among those who made a conscious decision to buy some stock for real money or for securities, that is, among the members of the labor collective who have acquired preferred stock (through limited subscription, at a discount, or free), or bought it with personal privatization deposits (vouchers). All these people make a conscious decision to buy stock of the specific enterprise that seems most effective to them (profitable for investment). In such a case, an effective owner appears rather quickly.

Representatives of the "opposition" Piyasheva concept, on the other hand, first forcibly, from above, endow all employees with the stock of the enterprise where they work. This is far from harmless. In doing so, first, they artificially preserve the existing ineffective structure of the economy. Second, they deprive the people of the opportunity to choose, that is, to invest their money in a different, in their opinion more effective, enterprise. The number of people unhappy with this arrangement will be rather great in practice, since the research shows that approximately one-third of employees do not want to invest in the enterprise where they work.

Next. The authors of the "opposition" privatization program assume a wait until the employee stockholders sell their stock, thus gradually opening the way to a more effective owner. It is quite likely that the process of the workers selling stock may be a protracted one, and in some instances may never take place due to resistance from their colleagues supporting collective ownership. This will make the advent of an effective owner quite problematic.

On the whole, one can generally appraise the two "competing" programs this way. The differences between them have been considerably narrowed. From the economic point of view, one must concede that the government program is much stronger. It reduces the risk of widespread collective property, and will lead faster to an increase in the economic effectiveness of production. From the point of view of social psychology, however, L. Piyasheva's program—as do all populist measures—looks more effective.

However, can we in the current conditions afford to orient ourselves towards more attractive but less economically effective measures? Apparently not, since the epoch of sweet speeches is over. It is now a tough time of bitter medicine.

Describes New Program's Aims

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in Russian 29 Apr 92 p 2

[Interview with Dmitriy Vasilyev, deputy chairman of the State Property Committee of Russia, by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent S. Bobrovskiy; place and date not given: "The Government Gives In. To Common Sense"]

[Text] Soon after the congress, the Supreme Soviet considered a new version of the privatization program for 1992. Our correspondent S. Bobrovskiy talks to Dmitriy Vasilyev, deputy chairman of the State Property Committee of Russia.

[Bobrovskiy] Dmitriy Valeryevich, we would like to hear from you what the main conceptual changes in it are, in comparison with the previous version of the program.

[Vasilyev] Actually, the main changes are not conceptual at all. For instance, we had not rejected the idea of personal privatization accounts (vouchers), although we did not plan to introduce them in 1992. However, having weighed all the sociopolitical and economic pros and cons, we decided to open personal privatization accounts for citizens of Russia this September.

Of the truly conceptual innovations, I can mention a substantial expansion of privatization methods. The previous program mentioned only auctions and commercial bids. It is already clear, however, that it is not always possible to hold an auction—for some objects there are too few, if any, contenders. Therefore, the number of options has now been expanded.

In addition to auction and commercial bid, it is now possible to hold noncommercial bids, or sell at auction only some of the enterprise's shares instead of the entire enterprise. Finally, there is now a choice of two options for converting to joint-stock holding. One envisages transferring to members of labor collectives free-of-charge 25 percent of nominal preferred (nonvoting) stock plus 10 percent of common shares at a 30-percent discount, paid for in installments over three years. Under the other option, the employees have a right to buy out 51 percent of shares, that is, to acquire a controlling share.

[Bobrovskiy] This is probably a good time to emphasize that the new draft of the program is unequivocally oriented towards the transformation of state enterprises into publicly held joint-stock companies?

[Vasilyev] Yes, this is a very important moment. The owners of both common and preferred stock will be able to sell and resell their shares right away without any restrictions. For us, it is a matter of principal importance, since privately held joint-stock companies (which restrict the sale of shares) will inevitably close the securities market and lead to an ineffective form of market economy.

[Bobrovskiy] Do I understand correctly that the value of state property being privatized will be determined by the residual book value of enterprises? And if so, why?

[Vasilyev] Because all other methods are unsatisfactory. Calculations of potential income, etc. produce sham results, since it is not known whether there will be income tomorrow.

[Bobrovskiy] But "residual value" is also a sham.

[Vasilyev] It is. There cannot be any other right now. Overvalued, undervalued—except nobody can tell to what extent.

[Bobrovskiy] Yes, of course; the real value can be determined only by the market, which does not exist yet.

[Vasilyev] That is why we see the residual value only as a starting point, at which the bidding starts at an auction or a bidding competition. With the first strike of the auctioneer's gavel, however, a market will appear. That is why we insist on an auction.

[Bobrovskiy] Dmitriy Valeryevich, somehow our conversation has taken an overly calm, lulling course. What will you say if I dare to contend that the new draft does not contain any substantial changes to the State Property Committee's position?

First, the multistage approach. It remains the same: first privatize the trade sector, then larger enterprises. Some day we will get to major production facilities. The coexistence of different economies is preprogrammed (which is dealing with a different rhesus factor!). Everything hinges on the end result (the private trade sector is ineffective under the state wholesale structure and production belonging to "no one"). And, finally, will the small privatization not change the social base of the "big" one?

Second, the preferences. It would seem that they have been expanded: 25 percent to the labor collective here, 30 percent there. But there is a caveat everywhere—"no more than 20 minimum salaries." At the current legislatively set "minimum," it is 7,000-8,000 rubles. Half a television set! Who will fall for these preferences? It is not even a matter of "social justice." Imagine what will happen when a "new broom" comes to the plant and starts a sweeping change? Nuts will start flying into assembly lines, or sand into railcar axle-boxes. Is the privatization of the Taganka theater not a convincing example? That is, despite the fact that the man who took over was not some uncle from the outside, but their own much-loved artistic director!

Third. Two options of converting to joint-stock holding are in reality one. The option of buying out 51 percent of shares does not envisage any preferences or discounts for employees. Where will they get the money? You suggest going to a commercial bank for credit. But we all know what astronomical interest rates they charge for credit.

Fourth, inflation. The money drawn in through privatization is not taken out of circulation (which, you have to agree, is a textbook requirement). On the contrary, it is siphoned out of deposits in savings banks and immediately thrown into circulation through social programs. The low-income people will say "thank you," but they will be expressing their gratitude—without understanding it—for a new jump in inflation. By the way, the inflationary danger of vouchers (privatization accounts) is also worth discussing.

[Vasilyev] First, was it the multistage approach? It is true, there is nothing good about it. The option of simultaneous privatization "across the board" did exist but, alas, it belongs in the past, in those "500 Days" that never took place. Currently, the price liberalization dictates the fastest possible privatization of trade—otherwise, we will have runaway prices. On the other hand, the analysis of effective demand for property shows that the population will only be able to buy out for cash small shops and stores. Privatization of enterprises demands the introduction of vouchers and, in addition, assumes preliminary incorporation, that is, conversion to stock basis. Both require time. So here you have two phases.

[Bobrovskiy] Excuse me, but let us put an asterisk there and come back to it a little later.

[Vasilyev] Yes. What was next? Two options? You assume that nobody will be able to buy out 51 percent of shares. Let us enumerate the sources the labor collective has at its disposal. First, personal privatization accounts; second, the draft program permits using a part of the enterprise's economic incentives fund; third, personal savings. Finally, fourth, the rest of the money will have to be borrowed on credit. But, mind you, credit not for risky speculative operations, as it is today, but against a collateral of real property, the shares—this is a completely different matter. It is unlikely that the banks will demand a 50-percent annual interest rate as they do now.

Finally, inflation. Of course, vouchers are dangerous in this respect. Therefore we are not defining now what amounts will be entered into personal accounts. Clearly, it will not be the entire amount all at once, but depending on the situation. Much will depend on whether we will be able to create quickly, and of good quality, a network of holding investment companies—intermediaries between voucher holders and the production sphere. I will say once again, there is a danger of inflation, but it is also possible to avoid it.

[Bobrovskiy] Let us go back now. Does it not seem to you that the problems and dangers related to vouchers, the multiphase approach, and price determination all have one and the same root—the initial decision to implement a pay-as-you-go "privatization," a destatization through a buy-out?

[Vasilyev] Oh, I see. You see, such a decision is not a result of the government's stingy inclinations. I personally have nothing against selling cheap. But selling! This is the only way to create an effective owner, who has something to lose, and therefore something to fight for.

[Bobrovskiy] To create the owner? In scale and responsibility it is almost a task for God. It is hardly something to be tackled even by the wisest, smartest...

[Vasilyev] ...functionaries of the State Property Committee? But we are not creating the owner. It is clear that no functionary will be able to identify the worthy ones

and place them properly. I would not undertake it, for instance. But we are creating conditions.

[Bobrovskiy] Exactly, you are the ones who create conditions. Specific conditions. Based on specific postulates. Where are the guarantees that the postulates are correct?

It seems to me that the current conditions favor those who can "contribute" cash. Are you sure that Borovoy (not the specific person, of course, but as a symbol of new entrepreneur) is in fact that most effective owner?

[Vasilyev] Not quite. So what?

[Bobrovskiy] I am simply sharing my doubts: If the ruble is unstable—which is a common knowledge—can it serve as a criterion in such an global undertaking as privatization? Can it be used as a foundation for tomorrow's entrepreneurship?

[Vasilyev] If we talk about equal starting conditions, the personal investment accounts are exactly the way to resolve this problem to a considerable degree.

[Bobrovskiy] Let me clarify this: Your organization—is it a committee managing state property or selling it?

[Vasilyev] We cannot manage the super-giant state property; we cannot put our directors and "emissaries" everywhere. This is obvious to everyone. Therefore, the current task is to sell it into private possession. Personally, I am convinced that a private owner is under any circumstances more effective than a collective one, let alone the state.

[Bobrovskiy] This is not exactly what I am talking about. At the end of the conversation, I would like to somewhat look ahead. Let us assume that the main phases of privatization are behind us. The trade sector is sold off; shares of enterprises are placed as planned: by one option, up to 35 percent, by the other—51 percent. This means that 49 to 65 percent remains in the hands of the state. Does the State Property Committee have a strategy for managing this part? Will it have enough resources and skilled cadres? Is there a clear notion of the goals of managing the state property in the new, market conditions?

[Vasilyev] Oh, this is what you mean! This is probably the least clear, least thought-through issue right now. Of course, some of the property will remain with the state. Generally speaking, I can tell that we will bring the ministries into managing it—they know the personnel, and they will (under our supervision) on behalf of the state sign contracts with directors. Of course, it is not good that another link—the ministries—will get wedged between the State Property Committee and the state property itself. But at this point, I do not see any other solution.

Instead of Comments

Thus, a new draft of the Russian Federation's privatization program for this year will soon be presented for the consideration of the Supreme Soviet. Clearly, it still contains disputable points. But one cannot fail to notice one unquestionable merit. In our opinion, the draft has a great variety of privatization forms built into it—practically a whole spectrum, from an auction to a giveaway of controlling shares (it all depends on the size of vouchers and personal accounts). It looks as if the government is trying to reserve the right in advance to choose any option depending on the concrete situation. And at the same time, by giving up its previous rigidly defined plans, it is demonstrating its ability to maneuver.

The logic of life will prevail anyway. God willing, the authorities will have enough wisdom not to fight it.

Unemployment Prospects for 1992

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[Report by Yelena Ivanova of the Russian Government's Economic Reforms Operations Center: "Unemployment in Russia: The Employment Forecast for 1992"]

[Text]

The State of the Market

The economic processes accompanying the reduction in work positions in late 1991 and early 1992 have become more active. From July 1991 to February 1992, unemployment increased by more than four times as much, reaching 93,100 (20 percent of these persons are receiving unemployment allowances). Formally, unemployment has not yet become a socially important phenomenon, although the very fact that this phenomenon is present has created a new situation in the employment field and has brought destabilizing social and psychological factors into the public's frame of mind. At present, about 30 percent of the urban residents in Russia are afraid of losing their jobs. Workers are being dismissed at a rapid pace in the state production sectors of the economy. The fact that there is an increase in the number of employed persons included in the lists for dismissal indicates that this trend is continuing.

Women (70 percent) and persons with higher and secondary specialized education (58 percent) predominate among the unemployed. More than one-third of those registered as unemployed are parents with minor children. Roughly every sixth person who is unemployed is under 22 years of age.

The demand for manpower from enterprises and organizations is still substantially greater than the number of persons who have expressed the desire to be placed in a job through the State Employment Service. In October and November 1991, the demand was eight times higher than the supply, in January the demand was more than

three times higher, and in February the demand was more than twice as high. In this connection, the unemployment may be viewed as primarily structural and (or) regional. The fact that the public is not kept adequately informed and the sluggishness of the employment services play a certain role in this as well.

At the same time, we see a pronounced trend toward reduced demand for new manpower in enterprises and organizations. The number of available positions and vacancies reported to employment centers in January and February 1992 was 40 percent less than the same period in 1991.

The growth in the supply of manpower when there is less demand for it reduces the number of persons who have jobs in the overall number who have sought job placement. In October 1991, 42 percent were placed in jobs, in January 1992 this figure declined to 22.9 percent, and in February it rose a little to 26.7 percent.

The number of persons who have been placed in jobs continues to be quite stable for the present (45,800 were placed in October 1991, 50,600 in December, and 48,900 in February). This is determined chiefly by the throughput capacity of the employment services, whose staffs were not increased. A certain balance is provided on one hand by the availability of vacancies, and on the other hand, by the threat of unemployment, which reduces the insistence on a possible workplace and promotes the fear that soon there will be nothing to choose from.

Groups at Risk

The employment forecast for 1992 is quite disturbing. The overall labor market may come up to 13 million. On the order of 1 million persons will be dismissed at enterprises in the VPK [military-industrial complex] alone. It is expected that about 7 million persons will find jobs by themselves. The State Public Employment Service organs have about 6.3 million persons registered as seeking employment. Of this number, roughly 2.5 million will be placed in vacant work positions with the help of the employment service, and the remaining 3.8 million will remain unemployed for one period of time or another. Of this number, 1.6 million will be able to acquire a new specialization in the vocational re-education and retraining system, and the remaining 2.2 million will receive unemployment allowances.

According to estimates, a surge of unemployment will come in the second half of 1992. By summer the total number of vacant work positions will be less than the number of applicants for them. There will be less opportunities for primary and secondary job placement.

The scale and nature of unemployment is linked very closely with the prospects for development of the different sectors of industry under the new conditions of economic operation. The sectors which turn out products for final consumption or those which are directly associated with them, as well as raw material sectors

producing for export (chiefly the oil and gas extraction industry), are in the best position now from the standpoint of prospects under market conditions.

Heavy industry and the extractive sectors oriented toward the domestic market and enterprises in the military-industrial complex will be in a more difficult position with respect to employment. From a regional viewpoint, the structural crisis may be most critical in the regions where enterprises in these sectors are concentrated. They include the Urals and East Siberian economic regions, some of the regions in West Siberia and the Far East, and individual regions in the European part of the country (Karelia, Tula and Rostov oblasts, Udmurtia, the KMA [Kursk Magnetic Anomaly] zone, and so forth).

The extent of the structural crisis at the regional level will depend on the extent to which industrial production has been diversified. Regions specializing in a single sector with a highly specialized production base have less opportunities to maneuver their manpower resources. In this connection, the Northern Economic Region and a number of regions in Western Siberia and the Far East (Kemerovo, Tomsk, Kamchatka, and Sakhalin oblasts and Maritime Kray) will be in a difficult position. Big problems will develop in the regions that are underdeveloped industrially as well (Kalmykia, Tuva). Chronic unemployment will develop first of all in all these regions, and this will become a powerful factor for social tension.

Unfortunately, the development of market infrastructures which create new work positions is proceeding at an extremely slow pace in the very regions and cities with a predominance of heavy industry and enterprises in the defense complex (St. Petersburg, Rostov, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, and Kemerovo oblasts; Krasnoyarsk Kray; and Udmurtia), as well as in the industrially underdeveloped regions (Kurgan and Amur oblasts and Tuva).

In this connection, state assistance programs which provide for the establishment of new work positions in the services field and which stimulate the development of entrepreneurial activity should be put into effect during the transition period in these very regions.

The search for a new job is intensified by interregional migration. Factors such as the aggravation of interethnic relationships within the Russian Federation and the exodus of Russian-speaking people from countries in the former union will have the same effect. According to certain estimates, the number of persons forced to migrate may be in excess of 1 million, and resettlement may take on the character of a national disaster. Providing the vital necessities for one settler and his family will cost 500,000 rubles [R]. In this connection, all legal and socioeconomic means have to be utilized to the maximum extent to hold back the interregional migration flows.

The Government's Measures

With the increasing unemployment, the government is planning to change the approach to the payment of unemployment allowances no later than 1 June 1992. The system in effect now, under which a person receives practically 100 percent of his wage for 3 months after he is dismissed, with a subsequent reduction for 12 months to the minimum wage level, does not provide incentives for him to actively search for a job. Two alternative types of allowance will be introduced—a higher allowance and a regular allowance. The higher allowance will be paid to those unemployed persons who were dismissed because their enterprises were closed or underwent a major reorganization. All other unemployed persons will receive the regular allowances. The higher allowance will amount to no more than 90 percent of the average wage in the past, and the regular allowance will not exceed 75 percent of the minimum wage. After 6 months, all persons who are unemployed will receive only the regular allowance.

The government has pursued an active policy in the employment field. Financial programs for retraining of unemployed persons and plans for stimulating entrepreneurial activity have been provided for. Labor-intensive public work will be utilized as an extreme measure.

In order to finance measures in the employment field, a special State Public Employment Fund which has two parts—the federal part and the territorial part—has been formed. The federal part of the employment fund will be utilized chiefly for overall needs, to form a reserve, and to provide financial support for territories with widespread unemployment and a shortage of employment funds. The territorial part of the fund will be spent strictly for the territories' needs. It is proposed to distribute funds between the federal and territorial parts of the fund on a 20 to 80 ratio.

In 1992, R24 billion will be put into the State Public Employment Fund. By way of comparison, R4.6 billion were spent in 1991 to provide social support for persons looking for work.

About R2 billion will be invested in 1992 for improvement of the public employment service (including its provision with up-to-date equipment).

Statistics on Consumer Goods Export, Import Noted

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[Reprint of article in KRASNOYARSKAYA GAZETA, by A. Vinogradov, economist, under the rubric "In the Mirror of Statistics": "Who Is Feeding Whom? And Where Did the Food Go?"]

[Text] Store shelves are empty, the press is wailing about enormous imports and negligible exports, and the people are accused of pathological laziness. Statistics which

attest to our foreign trade food transactions are extremely confusing. But nonetheless let us try to understand these virtual detective mysteries of bread, meat, and milk.

So then, grain! The mass information media have again, as in January 1992, reported to us that the country is 20 million tonnes short and so purchases in the West are inevitable. All right then, is it really true that only American farmers can save our "sloth-ridden" country, or is everything really not that hopeless?

In 1991 the USSR produced 194 million tonnes of grain; that included 29.5 percent of the world production of barley (or 5 times the U.S. harvest), 16.2 percent of the world production of wheat (or twice the U.S. harvest), 45.1 percent of oats (or 4 times the U.S. harvest), 55 percent of the world's rye (or 12 times the FRG harvest), 2.5 percent of the world's millet (or twice Australia's harvest), and so on, as well as a large share of the buckwheat and peas. Did our country need imported grain then?

It is most likely, they say, that we need feed grain in order to increase the amount of milk and meat for working people. But even here we encounter oddities—the country produces from 10.1 to 13.7 percent of the world's feed grain. The "pulse" of our grain purchases is altogether inexplicable, just as the fact is inexplicable from the standpoint of common sense that Soviet organizations responsible for purchasing grain tried to do it in Canada and Argentina while the powers that be were buying in the United States, Australia, and France. And openly announcing that this was being done to correct the trade deficits of these countries, as a "gesture of good will." What this charity costs our country is a separate subject of discussion. But as for American grain, first, up to a third of the wheat is made up of weeds, garbage, and infected grain. Second, in accordance with domestic standards and technologies the American corn imported to the USSR can be used only to fatten hogs for lard and as a poultry feed supplement, and in very small quantities (to avoid epizootic diseases). And third, in terms of its feed qualities 5 kilograms of American corn or 3 kilograms of wheat is equal to 1 kilogram of Russian oats, and our country produces 45.1 percent of the world's oats, as much as four Americas.

So there is a fine kettle of fish.

But sometimes simply miraculous things occur. Thus, in a Baltic port in 1990 a Soviet ship was loaded with Soviet wheat for the southern part of the USSR (although it could have gone by rail) and, rounding all Europe, it delivered "American" wheat to Odessa. It remains a mystery how the grain "changed citizenship." And on the whole it is very difficult to figure out the volume of this "import."

Why Have Rivers of Milk Dried Up?

Who of us has not been disturbed by the lack of milk and dairy products in our stores? Who has not stood in the

horrible lines? But after all, just a few years ago there was no dairy problem in the country. That is right, there was none. But, this was until the new capacities to produce dry milk went on line. And the rivers of milk abruptly changed direction—not to us simple Soviet consumers, but to the West. Official statistics on this are very meager. Thus, it is officially believed that the USSR did not export canned milk products to the CSSR, the GDR, the FRG, and Finland. But Soviet curdled milk is sold in Finland and it came straight from Russia to the CSSR, but with a German label. In the Altay, for example, with the launching of dry milk production for export, 75-90 percent of it is sent away, while everything used to go for local consumption. We produce 33.7 percent of the world production of canned milk products. But where are they? In the same place as all the rest and in the same place, incidentally, where the famous Russian butter is.

Cards (or coupons) for butter were introduced in many of the country's cities even back in the 1980s. During those years norms fell from 1 kilogram to 200 grams, while prices rose from R3.50 to R200 or more per kilogram. Can it be that production fell so drastically? Not so. Production of butter rose by one-third as compared with 1972. But in 1972 we did not have problems with butter, it was in all the stores. Nor was rapid population growth observed in those years. This is the general dismal picture: the USSR produced 1.8-1.9 million tonnes of butter, which was 21.4 percent of the world's production, with a population of 4.88 percent of the world's population. We account for 26 percent more butter per person than in prosperous Great Britain.

Official Soviet statistics confirm that from 200,000 to 450,000 tonnes of butter a year was imported to the USSR from other countries. It would be interesting to know from which ones. According to statistics, both the socialist and the capitalists countries themselves consumed more of it than they produced (in thousands of tonnes):

Excess of Consumption of Butter over Production

Country	More Butter Consumed	Country	More Butter Consumed
Bulgaria	6	Britain	141
Poland	90	Finland	3
Czecho-Slo-vakia	1	FRG	16
Yugoslavia	1	Japan	16
Hungary	14	United States	1
Italy	57	Belgium	10

Only Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand exported their own butter for sale on the world market.

All the upheavals of the international trade in butter seemed to be mirrored in our country. In 1972 there was certainly enough butter in the countries of Western Europe and the United States, and no one even dreamed

of a card system. In 1985 there was a shortage of 166,400 tonnes of butter on the world market. And coupons accordingly appeared in the Union, despite the growth in production. In 1990-1991 there was a 595,000-tonne shortage of butter abroad, and in the USSR, where its production had increased all the time, butter suddenly disappeared.

But what about our statistics? They modestly fail to mention a great many things. The delivery of butter to Great Britain, for example, was "not mentioned" by our statistics, but it was there in London stores.

There is approximately the same banal story with meat. In 1991 meat production in Russia remained at the 1986 level and made up 11.7 percent of the world production (only the People's Republic of China and the United States produced more). In the 1970s there was a surplus of 210,000 tonnes of meat on the world market, and meat was sold freely in the Union. In 1985 there was a 359,000-tonne shortage of it on the world market, in 1986—a 637,000-tonne shortage, in 1988—a 670,000-tonne shortage, and in 1990—up to a 1 million-tonne shortage. It is significant that even in 1988 the USSR consumed 668,000 tonnes less meat than it produced.

Sugar is yet another of our "painful" shortages. In 1990-1991 the USSR produced 15.7 percent of all the world's sugar, which is two times more than the United States and no lower than the 1980s production, when the "sugar problem" did not exist. But how can the abnormal situation which exists today be explained? It is explained by the fact that in the late 1980s world production of sugar declined, which accordingly caused prices to rise by a factor of 2-3. (Moreover, it became clear that the yellow beet sugar developed by Soviet technologies is useful, unlike the European cane or beet sugar). The following problem had to be solved: provide Western consumers with useful beet sugar, reduce the prices on the world market, and preserve both income and jobs in the West's sugar industry. The task was performed brilliantly. From the USSR 3.6-4.3 million tonnes of sugar was exported. Moreover, the Soviet Union sharply reduced purchases of sugar in Cuba. As a result of this transaction, Cuban sugar was thrown onto the world market and prices began to slide down. Instead of using the domestic sugar sold in the West to cover the shortage of it in our country, the authorities made purchases abroad, not from Brazil or the developing countries (which was cheaper), but from the countries of the West, who sold 700,000 tonnes of their sugar which had not gone onto the world market before because of low consumer qualities at a high price. In that way the Western sugar industry, and its income, was preserved and you and I paid for this "brilliant" transaction out of our own pockets.

In 1992 our "powers that be" again intend to buy sugar in Europe and the United States, and use our own sugar to pay accounts with the "civilized" world.

There is a similar situation with other types of products too. Our country produces 12.7 percent of the world production of edible vegetable oil—where is it?—and 30.7 percent of the world production of confectionery, three times the FRG level, and our children have already forgotten what candy and cookies look like. We produce 19.6 percent of the world production of chocolate (the best in the world), while our counters are crammed with not particularly good tasting Mars chocolate. The country produces from 15 to 20 percent of the world production of various types of canned goods (including 42 percent of the world production of canned fish). Last year, in 1991, Yugoslavia was literally overflowing with Saira Soviet canned goods. But did you see them in our stores? No. But then the residents of both capitals were favored with the honor of becoming acquainted with good tasting canned dog and cat food from the FRG, where it in turn arrives directly from a meat combine in the Northern Caucasus. Produced in the USSR in 1991 was 12.2 percent of the world production of margarine, which we do not have in our stores even though twice as much was produced as in the United States and just as much as in the FRG.

And, finally, vitamins—fruit, vegetables, and berries. How do things stand with them? Our country gathers an average 8-11 million tonnes of berries per year (30 percent of the world's harvest), 3 million tonnes of pears (27 percent of the world's harvest), 1 million tonnes of cherries (35 percent of the world's harvest), 2 million tonnes of plums (44 percent), 0.8 million tonnes of apricots (70 percent), 4 million tonnes of melons (80 percent), and from 29 to 45 million tons of vegetables. We add all the figures mentioned above and look at them and, of course, we say: "What an incredibly rich country!"

Will Foreign Countries Really Help?

Foreign countries are unlikely to help our country. The so-called humanitarian aid of the West is now being broadly publicized in our country; in 1990 it totaled 14,300 tonnes of foodstuffs—half a cutlet per person, 522 tonnes of medicines—3 aspirin tablets each, and 211 tonnes of old clothes and shoes—0.0001 of a boot per person.

Is that a lot or a little? To extricate ourselves from the crisis, we need 545 billion dollars during the year within the framework of the old system (remember that other countries' debts to the USSR total 424 billion dollars). And if someone wants to help us change to a Western system under the mildest German model, we will need 19 trillion 279 dollars.

No one has that kind of money! So then, we cannot expect help from abroad. And the experiment is doomed to failure. But that does not frighten the sons and grandsons of the "commissars in dusty helmets." For Aeroflot and Credit Lyonnais will save them from the risk of crossing the Romanian border with "packs" on their backs. And they will fly off to sunny Miami and Rio

de Janeiro and leave "common human values" behind in the country they have robbed, for "foreign countries will help them"! But what about us?

[Notation] Reprint from KRASNOYARSKAYA GAZETA. See also Nos 58 and 60.

[Notation] The author bears complete responsibility for the accuracy of the data cited.

Strikes Touching Professional Sector

924A1036A Moscow TRUD in Russian 25 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by V. Golovachev: "The Two Faces of the Strike: Social Tension Has Shifted to the Nonproduction Sphere in the First Quarter"]

[Text] Despite the gloomy prophecies which resounded here and there concerning the appearance of social cataclysms, in the first quarter on the whole Russia's population endured the start of economic reforms—an extremely difficult period involving an inevitable drop in the standard of living and harsh ordeals for tens of millions of people—with relative calm and courage. The materials of the State Committee for Statistics of Russia on the strikes in the first quarter of this year which were just received attest to this too.

The picture, incidentally, differs strikingly from the one a year ago. Let us recall: in late March 1991 in the former USSR some 220 mines alone and about 220,000 miners were on strike (according to data from the Independent Miners' Trade Union). The economy shuddered from powerful waves of strikes. In August, 10 days before the putsch, the Politburo of the CP Central Committee adopted a decree which, noting the rapid build-up of the workers' movement, proposed that party organizations "in labor collectives actively shape sentiments... in support of the progressive transformations being conducted in the country." The paradox was that some miners' collectives, instead of purely economic demands, proposed political ones and what they opposed was precisely the party diktat.

If we take only Russia rather than all the republics, then in the first quarter of last year strikes occurred at 120 enterprises and organizations of industry and construction. Losses then totaled 107 million rubles [R]. The opponents of the current course, judging from their predictions, hoped that after reforms began this year the explosion of strikes would be even more destructive and would make the situation uncontrollable.

But these hopes were not realized. Acute social conflicts were not avoided, but in industry, transport, and construction there were strikes not at 120 enterprises but at 35. And although the losses were not minor—R35 million, they were still only half those from the strikes in January-March of last year.

However, the point is not just the scale. One of the fundamental differences in the strikes this year as

opposed to those of the preceding year was that more than 90 percent of them occurred in the nonproduction sphere. That is, today the focus is to a substantial degree shifting from the workers' movement to labor conflicts in health care, public education, and the like. This year 22,000 teachers and 14,000 health care workers took part in strikes (in all 49,000 people struck in the economy in the first quarter).

The shift in the center of gravity of labor conflicts from the production to the nonproduction sphere attests, in addition to everything else, to certain biases in the government's social policy. Many teachers' wages are even lower than the minimum physiological standard. Medical workers are also in a difficult material situation. The situation is aggravated by the fact that hospitals are short of the most important things—medicines, dressings, and instruments. And it is significant that this time the basic demands of the strikers were not political but for higher wages and better social conditions.

Although I understand that since we are trying to resolve the crisis and economize most rigorously it is impossible to raise the wages of doctors, teachers, and other workers of the nonproduction sphere to the average level in industry, I think that all the same leaving these people on the verge of poverty is intolerable.

Of course, achieving social consensus in society through negotiation, without using extreme forms of opposition, would be ideal in this complex transitional period. The well-known principle of tripartism (interaction of three forces—the government, entrepreneurs, and trade unions) allows us, as world practice shows, to resolve the most acute problems in a more civilized way, if each party has the desire to reach agreement. Unfortunately, this mutual desire is by no means always manifested. For example, when drivers or workers demand that wages be raised to R8,000-R10,000 or even higher, without any compromise at all, then it does not accomplish anything except stepping up the inflationary spiral and continuing the devaluation of the ruble.

In this connection I remember one of the Italian trade union figures telling me in Milan about the trade union's struggle for the economic rights of working people. He talked of victories in this struggle, but ended unexpectedly: "But the demands must be made intelligently—so that the enterprise is not bankrupted. We have a saying: 'milk the cow as much as you can, but don't kill it.' In a different country, England, a responsible official of the British trade union congress essentially spoke of that too: 'It is as if a trade union sits on two chairs. We always have to think not only of the interests of our workers, but of the well-being of the entire economy. Otherwise we'll get hit by the boomerang.'"

Today it should be clear even to a noneconomist: the solution to the crisis is certainly not more pumping of worthless money into the economy. Is there much sense in the idea that the average wages rose during the year from R290 to R2,000, while the buying power of the

ruble in March was equal to the buying power of only 6.7 kopecks in December 1990? The important thing is not the quantity of banknotes, but the quickest resuscitation of the economy, inclusion of market mechanisms, privatization, and the revival of production.

So, in conclusion I will cite summary data on strikes in the past quarter. In all they occurred in 576 schools and health care, transport, and construction organizations and enterprises of industry. Losses of work time totaled 268,000 man-days. A significant trend is that the number of organizations and enterprises where strikes occurred and the number of strikers were at the maximum in January. But in February these figures were substantially lower and in March even lower.

The greatest losses of work time because of strikes were in the Komi SSR (102,000 man-days), Buryatia, Tver and Sverdlovsk oblasts, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), and in Kemerovo Oblast. This geography also provides considerable food for thought.

In a time of abrupt changes (and that is exactly the kind of time we are now experiencing), difficult ordeals fall to the fate of the people. Whether or not we follow this difficult path with dignity depends on those who are on the captain's bridge and on all of us.

Higher Pensions for Survivors of 1979 Anthrax Victims

924A1022A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Apr 92 p 6

[Text of "Law of the Russian Federation 'On Improved Pension Support of Families of Citizens Who Died as a Result of Contracting Siberian Anthrax in the City of Sverdlovsk in 1979'"]

[Text]

Article 1.

Pensions owing to the loss of the breadwinner to families of citizens who died as a result of contracting Siberian anthrax in the city of Sverdlovsk (now the city of Yekaterinburg) in 1979 are set in the manner envisioned by the RSFSR Law "On State Pensions in the RSFSR" and in an amount to compensate for actual losses, which is determined in accordance with the Rules for Enterprises, Institutions, and Organizations To Compensate for Damages Done to Workers and White-Collar Workers Through an Injury or Other Impairment of Health Related to Their Performing Their Labor Duties, ratified by the USSR Council of Ministers Decree No 690 of 3 July 1984, but no lower than the amount envisioned by Article 64 of the RSFSR Law "On State Pensions in the RSFSR."

Article 2.

Expenditures related to paying the pensions to families of the deceased citizens indicated in Article 1 of this Law are made through the capital of the Russian Federation

Pension Fund with the subsequent replacement of the sums paid before the end of each calendar year from the capital of the Russian Federation republic budget.

Article 3.

This Law goes into effect as of 1 May 1992.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin
Moscow, Palace of Soviets of Russia 4 April 1992 No
2667-1

Railway Performance Highlighted

March Activities Viewed

924A1022A Moscow GUDOK in Russian 18 Apr 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "A Difficult Climb"]

[Text] As we have already reported, March gave hope to railroad workers because of the increase in shipping volumes and growth in the amount of train traffic. Nevertheless, a percentage of doubt remained: Is this a temporary phenomenon? How will things go in April?

The first two weeks of operations of Russia's railroads show that the trend, which was noted, is being maintained. The average daily unloading of rolling stock exceeded the planned one by almost 2,000 railcars. A majority of the railroads accurately organized the handling of rolling stock and cooperation with clients.

However, the situation on some mainlines is as difficult as before. The Far Eastern Railroad has almost 5,400 unloaded railcars when the norm is slightly more than 3,000. The main reason for the shortfall is that the seaports are accepting freight poorly. They should handle more than 1,000 railcars daily but, in fact, their number does not exceed 800. A large part of the rolling stock is tied up with export metals. The port workers do not unload the metal due to the untimely arrival of vessels. More than 7,600 railcars have piled up in Nakhodka and no more than 100 are freed during a day. The port has vacant warehouse areas but the cooperating partners are not eager for a dual reloading—it will set them back a bit. It is more profitable to keep the products in the railcars so that they can then be unloaded directly into the holds.

The situation on BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline] is no less complicated, in particular, that at the Berkakitskiy hub. Almost 2,200 railcars with freight for Yakutia stand idle here; 300 of them with food. The products are not being unloaded in a timely fashion because of a shortage of motor vehicle transport: they handle only 80 railcars a day instead of 170.

The railroad workers themselves are letting things down. More than 2,000 railcars stand idle on the Sverdlovsk Railroad because of the untimely feeding of rolling stock loaded with local freight to the unloading fronts. The Kaliningradskoye Production Association keeps almost 500 railcars a day too long. Here, they will in no way find

contacts with customers, especially with commercial enterprises to whose address quite a bit of diverse freight comes. However, small enterprises and cooperatives are not hurrying to take them away. The present amounts of the fines do not intimidate them. They pay them with ease—even if the freight had been stored in warehouses on wheels.

April somewhat strengthened hopes for stabilizing transport operations. However, it remains shaky. Why? Here are reports from our correspondents on this.

North Caucasus Railroad

924A1022B Moscow GUDOK in Russian 18 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by N. Bastrykin: "The North Caucasus"]

[Text] Just as in March, the railroad successfully coped with its shipment plan during the first half of April. Freight turnover grew: it reached 301,162,000 tonne-kilometers when the norm was 294,500,000. The transport workers are making efforts to increase the average weight of a train: it is now 80 tonnes more than the planned one. The Rostov, Likhaya and Salsk divisions are working smoothly.

However, failures are haunting railroad workers on the Krasnodar and Tuapse divisions. Here, they are "unable to cope" with local freight and lag behind in freeing rolling stock—basically due to the fault of the port workers in Novorossiysk and Tuapse.

Matters are worse with the railroad's railcar turnover. One of the reasons for this is the fact that trains with valuable cargoes move only during daylight. At night, they are forced to stop at servicing stations awaiting armed security department riflemen for accompaniment. There is a catastrophic shortage of them and no measures have yet been taken to correct this situation.

South Urals Railroad

924A1022C Moscow GUDOK in Russian 18 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by V. Kolobov: "The South Urals"]

[Text] Last month, the South Urals Railroad dispatched 620,000 tonnes of freight above the plan and fulfilled all client requests for shipments. Freight traffic and passenger travel increased.

The first half of this month provides cause for optimism. According to the plan, daily shipments should have exceeded the March ones by 16,000 tonnes but it actually was 20,000. Almost 90,000 tonnes of coal, coke, metal, and iron ore were dispatched above the plan....

The dispatch of petroleum products is lagging behind. Of the 488 tank cars that were not sent to customers, 250 did not leave due to the fault of the railroad either because there were not enough containers or because they did not manage to prepare them for filling.

Kuybyshev Railroad

924A1022D Moscow GUDOK in Russian 18 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by V. Grechanin: "The Kuybyshev"]

[Text] Although the Kuybyshev has exceeded the shipping plan by 50,000 tonnes since the beginning of the month, this small amount of work done can melt away. The situation in the region's industrial enterprises continues to sharpen.

Before the beginning of the navigation period on the rivers, it would have been possible to accumulate amounts for dry cargo shipments. However, this did not happen. For example, the ore mining and processing combine at the station of Balasheyka regularly refuses empties that appear early since the price for sand has grown to such a degree that clients are not taking it.

The agricultural machinery plant in Syzran also has a fever for this reason. Since 5 April not a single one of the planned 20 plus railcars per day has been loaded. The enterprise has been forced to stop work and send its entire collective on indefinite leave. The tire plant in Niznekamsk and a number of other enterprises in the region are dispatching products on an irregular basis.

The export of petroleum products continues to be troubling. More than 100,000 tonnes of products ready for shipment have piled up in Bashneftekhimzavody Association enterprises. Although the need for fuel is especially great today in the village, a shortage of empties is holding up shipments. During the first half of the month, the railroad failed to receive more than 5,200 light tank cars—basically from the Moscow and Southeastern railroads and the railroads of Ukraine, Baltic republics and Central Asia. The navigation period is just about to begin on the rivers of Bashkiria and a large part of the petroleum shipments is being switched to water transport. However, such relief does not make the railroad workers happy. It is bad enough as it is that it is becoming ever more difficult to maintain shipments at the present level.

Gorkiy Railroad

924A1022E Moscow GUDOK in Russian 18 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by A. Yudanov: "The Gorkiy"]

[Text] On 10 April in an article entitled "Ship, Even if by Bucket," we talked about the fact that the Nizhegorodskiy Refinery was overstocked with fuel because of the untimely return of tank cars to the Gorkiy Railroad.

Yesterday S. Anishchenko, the enterprise's deputy general director, called the GUDOK correspondent center and reported: The shipping situation has become even more aggravated. During recent days, the amount of unexported products has exceeded all previous records. A total of 360,000 tonnes of gasoline, kerosene, diesel fuel, and lubricants have piled up in the warehouses. The

Commonwealth countries in the southern rayons are waiting for them; spring field work has begun there.

Whereas they are still managing to receive a portion of the empty tank cars from Russia's railroads, the southern states, in particular, Ukraine, are not hurrying to return the rolling stock. They are thereby not only inflicting economic losses on the refinery but are also dooming their own kolkhozes, sovkhozes and farms to a fuel famine.

Rail Institute Prorector Interviewed

92A1023A Moscow GUDOK in Russian 18 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with Ilkham Iskhakovich Galiyev, prorector of the Omsk Railroad Engineer Institute and full member of Russia's Academy of Transport, by R. Ioffe, journalist; date and place not given: "Three Stages to a Diploma"]

[Text] Omsk—It is impossible to achieve the prosperity and well-being of a state without freeing the intellectual potential of its citizens and training highly professional specialists. Is the present higher educational system capable of coping with such a difficult task? An interview with I. Galiyev, prorector of the Omsk Railroad Engineer Institute and full member of Russia's Academy of Transport, concerns this.

[Ioffe] Ilkham Iskhakovich, the reduction in the budgetary financing of VUZ [higher educational institutions] has placed them on the verge of bankruptcy. What ways to survive is your institute looking for?

[Galiyev] One must earn for oneself. We intend to use our own transport shop, printing house and production shops for this purpose. We are establishing a training, scientific research and marketing center where qualified teachers will coach and teach entrepreneurial activity for a fee. Today, our specialists are already conducting classes at various business schools successfully. An opportunity to organize such training on a wider level will appear with the center's establishment.

[Ioffe] Will the VUZ forget its real purpose in its search for a ruble?

[Galiyev] It is now a difficult time and it is necessary to do everything to support people materially. The salaries of many of our employees do not exceed a subsistence wage. Who does not know that a VUZ instructor receives considerably less than a specialist in production. The institute can simply be converted into a place for storing work books and their owners will be compelled to search for additional wages far and wide. If decisive steps are not taken, cadre can be lost little by little. We have one of the highest percentages of instructors with a doctorate and candidates of sciences among the branch's VUZ. This wealth must be safeguarded.

On the other hand, we are trying to orient ourselves on the changing state of affairs in the requirement for

engineer personnel. The Omsk Railroad Engineer Institute can provide good specialists to a city, for example, for its subway. Incidentally, our graduates staff practically the entire engineer body of the Novosibirsk subway. Last year, we began to train industrial thermal power specialists. Not a single city enterprise can do without them. Even plants for processing agricultural products need them. In the new academic year, we plan to increase enrollment in the automation and teleautomation department. The requirement for these specialists is not growing only in rail transport. Thus, we are not forgetting about our main purpose.

However, it would nevertheless be desirable for the organizations, for whom the VUZ is preparing specialists, to take a more active part in strengthening the institute's material and technical base. This could be demonstrated not only by paying for graduates but also by conducting classes using experienced specialists, allocating work positions in enterprises for on-the-job training, and paying nominal stipends. Why shouldn't rich enterprises organize educational trips abroad for instructors and students in the future?

[Ioffe] Alas, today forces one to think about completely different prospects. Production is falling and there are reductions everywhere. Is the VUZ preparing candidates for unemployment?

[Galiyev] No. The requirement for good engineers on railroads exists and will exist. In order to help the Kemerovo Railroad with personnel, the Omsk Railroad Engineer Institute and the Railroad Transport Scientific Research Institute have concluded a trilateral agreement with it for the training of specialists. We are opening an educational, scientific and production branch in the Kuzbass. In the future, when the rise in production begins, the requirement for engineers will increase. For example, such absurdities as the absence of a system for stimulating knowledge, will be corrected. The average salary of an engineer is now equal to the salary of an unskilled worker. Market relations will put everybody in their places. Competition and strict requirements for production efficiency and quality will force a search for knowledgeable and highly qualified specialists.

VUZ should provide talented young people an opportunity to obtain an education that corresponds to their capabilities and the requirements of production—not simply providing one engineer profession but laying a foundation for further independent study because a modern technical specialist should possess good professional mobility, that is, be able to pick up quickly the requirements of expanding production and effectively switch over, following the requirements of progress.

[Ioffe] Is your VUZ capable of coping with these complicated tasks?

[Galiyev] I am convinced that the answer is yes. We are now conducting a reorganization of the training process. We are considerably strengthening the computerization

of education and economic and practical training. Moreover, the future engineer will receive a work trade—even if only one. The benefit from this "plunging into production" is evident. A student will delve much better into questions regarding the organization of labor, supply and technical processes if he is familiar with them from his personal experience. For this purpose, the Omsk Railroad Engineer Institute is concluding contracts with city vocational training schools for the second year; with their help students will also receive a work trade.

For many years, our higher education was put on line and we "stamped out" specialists. The Omsk Railroad Engineer Institute is now shifting to a special purpose and differentiated education. Much more time is being allocated in training plans to independent work, electives and special courses. We will soon offer students an opportunity to obtain additional training in a foreign language, programming and entrepreneurial activity.

[Ioffe] People now frequently talk about the need for shifting to the multilevel system of education that exists in civilized countries.

[Galiyev] This academic year, we established a special academic commission. It worked on developing concepts for a multistage system of education conforming to our institute. Specific proposals have already been prepared and the heads of the departments are familiarizing themselves with them now. The Ministry of Railways is also interested because it is possible that this concept will—in time—lie at the base of a system for training personnel for the branch.

It is evident that we will accept a trilevel system of education. The first two years will consist of general educational and humanities studies. After this, a student will receive an incomplete higher education diploma. If he wishes, he can undergo additional professional training at the institute or a technical school and obtain a junior specialist diploma. One, who wants to continue his education after the first stage, should compete.

During the second stage, a student studies another two years on the basis of general educational and professional programs for one avenue in science and technology. Upon completion of the course, he receives a basic higher education diploma. This specialist can work in an engineer position. Transferring to the third stage also assumes competitive testing. Next, there is further thorough professional training combined with the carrying out of scientific research. One, who successfully completes the three stages, is given a complete higher education diploma. He can teach and work in a scientific research institute.

[Ioffe] Perhaps, the institute will receive elbow-room for such changes when its status is raised? Rumors are circulating that the Omsk Railroad Engineer Institute may become a transport academy....

[Galiyev] The establishment of a Siberian Academy of Transport is indeed being planned on the basis of the

oldest Siberian railroad VUZ—the Omsk and Novosibirsk—and the railroad technical schools and lyceums of both cities. There is justification for making this proposal: Both VUZ recently successfully underwent certification, a large scientific potential has been accumulated in each one, and important research is being conducted. Russia's Ministry of Railways and the Presidium of Russia's Academy of Transport have approved the idea of establishing the academy. Thus, these rumors are not groundless.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Report on Congress of Siberian Deputies in Krasnoyarsk

924C1240A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
1 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent in Krasnoyarsk Z. Milman: "Meanwhile, They Endure"]

[Text] As previously reported, the first Congress of People's Deputies of the Siberian Territories met in Krasnoyarsk during the period 27-28 March

According to forecasts made on the eve of the Congress, the Siberian forum of people's deputies was judged by many at various levels to pose the next potential threat to the national integrity of Russia. Neither apprehensions of this kind nor reports of them entirely disappeared in the press or radio and television. But Krasnoyarsk has not turned into another Kazan or Grozny.

Attending the congress were delegates from Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Tomsk, Omsk, and Novosibirsk oblasts, Altay Kray, and Krasnoyarsk Kray; there were also observers from Khakaska, Tuva, Buryatiya, Yakutiya, Gornyy Altay, Chita, Chelyabinsk, and Perm. It was not for the purpose of organizing opposition to the present regime that they gathered in Krasnoyarsk, nor were they driven by any desire to act as power brokers on this occasion. The members of the association called the Siberian Accord took upon themselves a coordinating role. All were united by a sense of painful concern for their native Siberia, which with its fabulous wealth over the decades had contributed untold billions of rubles to the state treasury, while remaining a mere appendage of the central government and eking out a living on its own.

Finished once and for all is the longstanding patience of Siberians, who have been held hostage to the unthinking conquest of nature, the dumping of nuclear wastes, and the unrestricted concentration of camps in no way intended for the pioneers. Under such circumstances, it is entirely understandable that while looking for a way out of this unnaturally destitute state, knee-deep in a swamp, more and more often salvation should be seen in the form of isolation; whether complete isolation (as Tomsk Deputy V. Perov envisions it), including a declaration of national independence, the establishment of a

Siberian Armed Forces, and deportation from the territory of convicts and persons in exile, or partial isolation in the form of autonomous status within Russia. Advocates of the latter choice, who also come from Tomsk, incidentally, cite a historical precedent in support of their proposal. K. Lebedev, chairman of the Human Rights Commission of the oblast council, passed out to correspondents of SELSKAYA ZHIZN and IZVESTIYA copies of a resolution, miraculously preserved in archives, by members of the First Siberian Congress, which convened 8-17 October 1917, outlining a similar status for Siberia. At this congress, however, the proposal endorsed by their descendants was not seriously discussed. Instead the participants tended to agree with the words of Vladimir Shumeyko, deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Vladimir, who reminded his listeners that however precious a stone might be in itself (as the subject of federation), once removed from its crown (Russia), it will lose half its luster.

Vladimir Filippovich also appeared to stir a certain glimmer of hope in congress participants when he expressed the opinion that the government had acted improperly in refraining from the direct management of what is still a state economy. He was convinced that the ideology of the present reforms must be worked out and adapted to the regions during a mandatory "break-in" period. For this, he said, the Supreme Economic Council had dozens of special brigades at its disposal locally. This approach, he went on to say, was in keeping with both the spirit and the letter of the Treaty of Federation, which granted the territories some rights that they had not even anticipated.

Will it turn out that the extraordinary passions generated in Krasnoyarsk have been in vain? Was the local procurator playing it unnecessarily safe in warning people ahead of time that certain points in the draft resolutions were illegal? I do not know—I do not know. Despite the superficial appearance of constructiveness in the resulting documents—which did not call for the government to step down or even propose an all-Russian congress to review the initial draft of the new Constitution—one is left with misgivings at heart.

Irkutsk Oblast has been officially declared financially bankrupt. A cry of despair may be heard from the agricultural workers of the Altay, together with their colleague farmers and kolkhoz workers in other areas of Siberia, that their sacred calling to feed everyone—whether they are red, white or blue—is being erased almost completely by fantastic credit rates, checks drawn on uncollected funds, and unbalanced price parity. There are children poisoned by industrial wastes in Bratsk, Norilsk, and Novokuznetsk. All this—let us be realistic—is not going to be corrected tomorrow.

Restriction on Caucasian Immigration by Stavropol Authorities

924C1239D Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 92
Morning Edition p 7

[Article by Nikolay Gritchin, journalist: "The People of Stavropol Are Not as Hospitable as They Were"]

[Text] As a result of negotiations and compromises, the authorities of Stavropol have managed to soften the confrontation that occurred in Georgiyevsk because of the "uprising" of cossacks, who at the end of February took control of the city television studio and communications center for a time, called for the people to arm themselves and rush to the central square, and then they threatened to storm the police station. The city's procurator and chief of the GOVD [City Department for Internal Affairs], who went out to the excited crowd, ended up as hostages, and the cossacks proposed exchanging them for one of their own, who had been locked up.

The action by the cossacks has an anti-Caucasian background. Their comrade, who is in custody pending investigation, has been charged with shooting and wounding young Caucasian lads. The cossacks resented the measure of preventive punishment. From what they have seen, people of non-Russian nationality have remained at liberty in the rayon until trial for similar or more serious offenses. The rebellious army has gathered hundreds of supporters, because for a majority this was an occasion to raise a more serious problem related to the flood of new settlers into the region.

In the last several years, inhabitants of the former Union have shown noticeably increased interest in heavenly Stavropol. The share of migrants in the population growth of the kray has risen from the already high level of 44 percent to 57. The trouble is that there are now two waves of migrants meeting head-on as it were with Stavropol as the crossroads. The traditional voluntary migrants from the northern latitudes of Russia have now been joined, as they are called here, by the forced migrants—from zones of interethnic tension.

According to official figures, which do not, of course, reflect the entire picture, about 30,000 people have come into the kray in the last three years. This is quite a bit for Stavropol, which has sufficient labor resources. The inhabitants of the kray, once known for their hospitality, are now displaying this quality less and less frequently. They are blaming the newcomers for the aggravated problem of employment (the number of job vacancies dropped over that period from 40,000 to 13,000, so that opportunities for finding jobs are sharply reduced), for the hiking up of housing prices (housing now costs more than in neighboring republics, although quite recently it was the other way around), and for the overloading of the densely populated environs of Stavropol and the area around the health resort.

Alarmed by the influx of new settlers, the authorities of the prestige areas, under pressure of demand of native inhabitants, are trying to restrict registration, and to confine the right to buy housing solely to local people. But these measures, whose claim to legality is slight, are not working well. They have been opposed both by purchasers and also by sellers, who do not feel excessive patriotism. Even those who have been unable to register are not in a hurry to pack their bags, but prefer to live out

of them, packing several families in one house. Because they have no opportunity to take employment, they go around buying up scarce goods in the stores and reselling them, which irritates the inhabitants still more.

In short, the former hospitality of the people of Stavropol has already been replaced by anger in a number of places. New settlers of the Caucasian nationalities have become the principal target of dissatisfaction. The Russian Patriotic Movement of Stavropol has been reminding them that they are no more than visitors here. On the demand of the cossacks, decisions are being made at gatherings in cossack and other villages prohibiting registration and the sale of housing to immigrants and deporting those who are not registered and not working. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the authorities to restrain the cossacks from taking the law in their own hands.

Under the pressure of anti-Caucasian sentiments, intensified by the flight of Russians from neighboring republics, even those diasporas that have been here for decades are feeling uncomfortable in Stavropol today. In January, giving in to cossack demands, the Armenian community of Georgiyevsk postponed commencement of construction in the city of its church and culture center, even though the Armenian church and Armenian schools have operated here since before the war.

It is not hard to figure out that the escalation of the confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the exacerbation of interethnic relations in other southern republics, will surely swell the stream of migrants into Stavropol, which is on the border. And if that stream should flow as out of control as it has in recent years, then the refugees will hardly find a peaceful refuge on the land here.

Even the cossacks, whom on the crest of a patriotic wave they are willing to accept in the crowded cossack villages, understand that even they could become a burden in such settlements. That is why the kray council of cossack chieftains has been trying to regulate the flow of cossack immigrants. They have chosen several underpopulated cossack villages for them to live in as a compact group. The cossacks intend to revive these settlements, relying on the aid of sponsors and their own enterprises.

But for the moment this is the only attempt to solve the problem at the level of the kray. The local authorities have neither sufficient authority nor the money to influence the process. Up to now, for example, the status of refugees, which would make it possible to obtain funds for fitting out and providing other aid to the forced immigrants, has not been adopted. It seems the wave of migrants might be restrained by adopting a qualification of years of settlement for such popular southern regions as Stavropol, the Kuban, the Don, and also a quota on acceptance of immigrants from the sovereign republics.

At present, there are no Russian laws on this subject. That is why they are inventing their own dictated by excited orators in local rallies and gatherings. After they

got the idea in one of the cossack villages of going from house to house to find and deport those who are not registered, I met the leader of the local Armenian community. He warned that if anything like that happens, the cart of enforcers would not get beyond the second farm. The refugees, once they have experienced the tragedy of moving out, will hardly consent to experience it again.

Ryazan Retail Workers Oppose Privatization

924C1249B Moscow TORGOVAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by I. Kogan, TORGOVAYA GAZETA special correspondent: "Is Storming Coming Back?"]

[Text] The Ryazan City Privatization Committee, headed by A. Yashkin, is doing everything to hurry up the sale of enterprises in the trade sector, the food service industry, and everyday services. Which it is doing through auctions and competitive bidding. This is causing dissatisfaction of the collectives of the enterprises themselves. They see in this haste the committee's desire, detrimental to their interests, to turn over the stores, cafes, beauty parlors, and service shops to new owners as soon as possible. This was the subject of a rally called by oblast trade union committees of workers in trade, food service, and private enterprise, and workers of local industry and municipal service and everyday service enterprises.

"Today, collectives in the trade sector face a question which has been clearly formulated by Deputy Pleshakov in TORGOVAYA GAZETA: 'How To Survive?'" said O. Golubkova, chairwoman of the oblast committee, who opened the rally. "Hotheads have emerged who are calling for destroying state trade as soon as possible, without thinking about the consequences. The small council of the Ryazan City Soviet adopted a program for privatization of enterprises in the trade sector and food service industry through competitive bidding or auction. But the work collective is not able to compete with the rich people who have just emerged. We will oppose in every way this unbridled privatization, which is threatening 1,200 women with unemployment. We are demanding that work collectives be guaranteed priority right to purchase their enterprises."

This demand was supported by the salesclerks T. Lepetyukha, L. Tarasova, and M. Sukhova, the barber I. Kazey, the photographer V. Serikov, and other participants in the rally. They insisted that enterprises should be sold to collectives at residual value, because they do not have the millions at which some stores, cafes, and hairdressing salons are assessed. They were all worried that the new owners would fire the previous workers.

There were posters to this effect: "Privatization—no!" "Let us buy our service shops ourselves!" "Today they are selling us, tomorrow they will be selling you!" "Stop the plundering of work collectives!"

A. Dashkov, deputy mayor and director of the Commercial Department, explained the line of policy of the city administration at the rally.

"Establishing a policy whereby enterprises are purchased at their residual value in practice means giving them away free," he said. "But all the stores, service shops, and hairdressers will not be put up for auction, only those that are unprofitable. You can purchase the others. We will let the collectives buy on the installment plan, they can take a loan from the bank. But if they operate badly, if there are complaints from customers, we cancel the permit and auction off the enterprises. The collectives that are able to find goods, to attract customers, and to achieve the necessary turnover will survive under the new conditions. But I agree with you: It is not permissible to be hasty, to turn privatization into just another campaign. We will sell the first enterprises, we will see how things go there, and if necessary—we will make the required adjustments in the privatization program."

N. Molotkov, the president's commissioner for Ryazan Oblast, spoke against haste and the campaign spirit in this important matter.

The participants in the rally adopted a resolution stating their demands, and they sent it to the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies of Russia.

Kaluga Oblast Agrarian Reforms Hindered

924A1036C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Viktor Ten: "Agrarian Reform: We Were Robbed, as Promised"]

[Text] In late March the representative of the president of Russia in the oblast, O. Savchenko, invited journalists to his office. Knowing how rarely Oleg Vitalyevich presents himself to the people and how this is always tied to significant events, the journalists set off for the briefing with interest. The event, to be honest, proved to be significant: in cautious terms the presidential representative explained a fundamental change in agrarian policy. A governmental telegram signed by Rutschko had come to the oblast; it recommended suspending the process of decollectivization in the countryside, and in any case trying to help preserve the strong kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

What was this? An attack by reactionary forces? A well thought-out temporary maneuver? Neither one. It was recognition that the methods selected from above of "converting to joint stock companies" and "converting to private farms" were hopeless and the government's acknowledgment of its powerlessness to break the agrarian knot in one blow.

In September 1991 A. Deryagin, appointed to be head of administration, came to Kaluga and announced from the very first days that he was a staunch supporter of private

ownership and considered Kaluga Oblast a test site for radical reform work. The governor did not spend long thinking when selecting assistants in the noble cause either: the apparatus of the oblast agroprom, which people in the oblast come right out and call the "oblapo" [oblast agricultural production association], and not without reason. The poverty of the Kaluga kolkhozes is comparable only to the wealth of the suburban villas built around Kaluga by the numerous inhabitants of this department.

So things got under way: A. Deryagin talked about private property from every possible podium and the bureaucrats did their work.

In December members of the oblast Association of Private Farms and 300 pensioners from the Non-Chernozem Region who had set up their own farms a bit at a time, and despite the agroprom rather than thanks to it, gathered in Kaluga. The appeal which they adopted should have been a warning to the oblast administration.

"Our brief but bitter experience has shown that the activism of the agroprom and its structures is not without reason," wrote the farmers. "The joining of the agroprom with the private farm system is an attempt to mate the grass snake and the hedgehog. We announce unequivocally that we no longer trust the bureaucrats of the agroprom and do not hope for their help." This critical appeal also contained something constructive:

"Private farmers understand that kolkhozes and sovkhozes certainly cannot be disbanded one after the other right now. Let them exist in the APK [agroindustrial complex] system. But market relations demand that the monopoly of the agroprom be eliminated. And new, constructive forms of enterprise such as private farms must get the opportunity to create their own infrastructure independent from the APK.

"We also understand that they must not mindlessly strive for large numbers of private farms without the material support this requires. That only helps openly undermine the private farm movement."

Private farmers understood. But the bureaucrats did not understand (it seemed) and went after numbers. They hastened to change the labels of the kolkhozes, assigning shares to peasants who were unable to run independent farms because they lacked the equipment. There is reason that the good proverb says: when people want to punish, they give too much.

For the entire winter the administration fussed around conducting endless conferences in Kaluga and "in the sticks" and kolkhozes and sovkhozes transferred tens of thousands of rubles to some guys for plans to change them from collective farms to... collective enterprises, and an inventory was hurriedly made, an inventory whose competence and honesty was very questionable because of the haste. As a result mountains were made into molehills: 45 peasant farms were formed. The basic result is the following: 78 percent of the farms remained

kolkhozes ("collective enterprises," in "newspeak"), and 17 percent were transformed into joint stock companies. But even here the bureaucrats protected themselves from every side: a peasant stockholder has fewer rights than the former kolkhoz member, who at least was protected by the trade union and had a constitutionally fixed right to housing. In the joint stock company the housing fund was fixed as "inalienable" (given that most of the chairmen of the kolkhozes had already privatized their homes), and furthermore the charter contains the following point: "A person who has left for an unacceptable reason loses his right to dividends by decision of the general meeting. His share is not transferred to anyone and he cannot receive it himself." Just imagine the number of opportunities for arbitrary action, even to the point of forced resettlement of unwelcome persons, this legally crude formula opens up, considering that no list of unacceptable reasons is given. Forming joint stock companies Kaluga-style essentially represents a second coming of serfdom and it is no accident that there are cases where meetings to disband kolkhozes are held after free beer has been brought to the village.

The main principle of any reform is "not to make things worse than they already are." This "red guard attack" of the bureaucracy has done an enormous amount of damage. Every day the oblast loses R1 million just from the reduced production of milk, while the general drop in production as compared with the corresponding period last year has reached 18 percent. Even the presidential representative O. Savchenko has acknowledged the "opposite" result of the reform and said: "Under the pretext of reorganization, the peasants have been driven into even harsher structures than the kolkhozes and sovkhozes." It only remains to add that this was done under the direct control of Oleg Vitalyevich.

Beginning in the month of October, the author of these lines published five articles in the oblast press and one in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA ("To Destroy or Unravel the 'Agrarian Knot'"). The last thing I wanted was to be right in this dispute with the Kaluga administration. But now that the time has come to write postfactum I am openly sorry that the proposals which were presented in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA were not heeded.

The root of the mistakes is that a democratic government and its local emissaries are not always able to take into account the entire complex of economic, social, and political factors and choose the only proper vector of action from the complex of these forces. Many people's heads are simply spinning from the August successes. Others, who "fed off" the oblast, have resolved their own personal problems by entrusting the extremely important matter of agrarian reform to the old corrupted apparat.

Economic necessity still does not mean a social opportunity for rapid and decisive changes. When the attack on kolkhozes began, it was for good reason interpreted by the corps of chairmen as an attack on peasants. In the speeches (secret then, but now public) by defenders of

the kolkhoz system, at every oblast meeting there was always an "old woman of the kolkhoz" who had supposedly been offended by the democrats. And that was no accident, because socially the reform proved to be unprepared.

As long as there is no private property initiative from below, all the divisions of land will be fictional, as happened in Kaluga Oblast.

People are glad to take livestock into their private yards when the kolkhoz proposes it. Even now Kaluga kolkhozes and sovkhozes are fattening up livestock and dividing the bulls among the different households. However, they are prohibited from dividing up the dairy herd, and why? Is there fear for the productivity? That is a ridiculous pretext, considering that cows at livestock bases give 2-3 liters of milk a day. I doubt that the conditions for keeping cows on private farms will improve after kolkhozes are changed into joint stock companies. Someone is afraid that people will slaughter the cows. But after all, they do not slaughter the bulls which they get for fattening at privileged prices. They fatten them up and sell them.

All the pasture land must be handed over to rural societies and the hayfields will simply have to be divided up among people. Divide up livestock among the various households, but for the time being leave the grain system to the kolkhoz, providing for the right of any owner to leave with his full share. In this way we will not only resolve the meat and dairy problem, but we will prepare the social base for the private farm, the American way of development. Incidentally, the kolkhoz farms which are freed may be leased to those very same private farmers and less construction will be needed.

All the other methods for resolving the agrarian problem rely on the Prussian variant and provide, as a result, feudal landholding. If we take the path which Kaluga has taken—drive peasants into new harsh structures with endless opportunities for arbitrary actions by the authorities, the former socialist bureaucrat will become the lord of the manor who has been given the Kaluga countryside to plunder. This is an odious figure and so we will be unlikely to avoid conflicts here. If the bureaucrat, who has today made himself into a patriot, does not succeed in taking over the village himself, he will put it up for auction, counting on a commission. Then non-Russian (in most cases) nouveau riche will become the landowners in the historical part of Russia. While in itself that is not terrible (the history of Russia demonstrates the Russian people's fine ability to assimilate to newcomers), it is fraught with conflicts. When the social yoke acquires a nationality slant, you cannot avoid conflicts. I do not think that another Karabakh, this time in the center of Russia, is good.

The chairman of the Mayak Kolkhoz in Mosalskiy Rayon, M. Kobyakov, spoke at one of the numerous agrarian conferences in Kaluga. He said that kolkhoz members are demanding that livestock be divided up

among the private households and that this will ultimately lead to the collapse of the kolkhoz. That distressed M. Kobyakov very much, while the so-called "radical" Deryagin-Pakhnov reform did not distress hardly any of the present landowners. From the very start they saw the saving emptiness behind the crudely constructed facade.

Tatar President's Decree To Set Up Diplomatic Missions Abroad

924C1292A Moscow *TRUD* in Russian 24 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by Ye. Ukhov: "Diplomats of the Kazan Kremlin"]

[Text] In the very near future the most popular and prestigious professions in Tatarstan will be those such as diplomat, ambassador, and plenipotentiary.

President M. Shaymiyev has issued an Ukase entitled: "On Missions of the Republic of Tatarstan." This Ukase stems directly from the referendum that was held regarding the state status of Tatarstan. The above-mentioned referendum determined that Tatarstan should be a sovereign state, establishing relations with other states on the basis of equal treaties.

These missions will be opened in all the capitals of the CIS states, as well as in foreign countries which are farther away—the United States, France, Japan, Saudi Arabia.... The Cabinet of Ministers has been assigned the task of working out proposals—within tight deadlines—regarding structures, staff schedules, and estimates of expenditures. And all things considered, such expenditures will be considerable.

But where are they to get so many specialists in international affairs? So far there are no professionally trained staffs in this republic. One thing is clear: There is obviously no danger of unemployment for the bureaucratic apparatus of the Kazan Kremlin.

Tatar Milli-Majlis Statement on Its Role in Government Issues

924C1292B Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian 22 Apr 92 p 3

[Report by Colonel A. Bondarenko, correspondent: "What Does Tatarstan's 'Parallel Parliament' Understand by Available Methods? A Direct Wire From Kazan"]

[Text] A press conference organized by the milli-majlis—this republic's "national parliament"—was held in Tatarstan's Union of Writers. Members of this elected All-Tatar Kurultay (Congress)—a kind of parallel legislative organ—stated their opinions on this republic's sovereignty, as they understand it, ways to develop the economy, culture, interstate relations, and the role to be played by the "national parliament" in deciding all these issues.

On this occasion too the leaders of the milli-majlis declared that they are advising Tatarstan's immediate withdrawal from Russia. Particular attention must be paid to clearing up viewpoints with regard to military matters. The milli-majlis advocates creating a national guard for Tatarstan and the refusal to permit any of this year's draftees or conscripts to serve in the Russian Army or the United Armed Forces on the territories of other CIS countries.

As we can see, the military issue, which is not on the agenda of the All-Tatar Kurultay at all, has become one of the main items in the activity of this republic's "parallel parliament." Furthermore, Talgat Abdullin, the chairman of the milli-majlis, declared that the national parliament and the forces supporting it would struggle "by all available methods" to achieve the above-mentioned goals. Only time will tell what exactly is meant by the concept of "available methods."

Kumyks in Dagestan Oppose Reinstatement of Aukhovskiy Rayon

924C1292C Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA* in Russian 18 Apr 92 p 3

[Report: "Dagestan"]

[Text] About 50 of Dagestan's citizens who are of Kumyk nationality have set up several mobile carts, wagons, and tents on the lands to the north of Makhachkala, where it has been proposed to reinstate the Aukhovskiy Rayon; the latter had been abolished in 1944. The decision to reinstate this rayon was made by Dagestan's Congress of People's Deputies. The Aukhovskiy Rayon was abolished in February 1944 in connection with the deportation of the Chechen-Akintsy who had been living there. However, this decision is being disputed by the milli-majlis of the Kumyk people, which considers these lands to be originally and indigenously Kumyk. The Kumyks intend to block the emergence of this new administrative unit. Negotiations between official representatives and the pickets have now been crowned with success so far. The situation is becoming complicated.

Chechnya Institutes Press Censorship

924C1292D Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA* in Russian 18 Apr 92 p 3

[Report: "Chechnya"]

[Text] The government of the Chechen Republic has instituted preliminary censorship over the mass media.

Representatives from the editorial offices of newspapers and other mass media were invited into the minister's office, where they were given instructions with regard to carrying out a preliminary censorship. The editors in chief themselves must become the censors.

Bashkortostan Supreme Soviet Head Meets With Political Hunger Strikers

*924C1292E Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Apr 92 p 3*

[Report by R.B.: "Bashkortostan"]

[Text] A meeting has taken place between Murtaza Rakhimov, chairman of this republic's Supreme Soviet, and the participants in a political hunger strike. The latter are protesting against the republic's signing of the Federation Treaty.

"I understand your feelings and your aspirations," Rakhimov told the activists of the Union of Bashkir Youth, "but the set goals can be achieved only on the basis of unity among all the peoples living in Bashkortostan." After noting that these goals can be achieved only by civilized methods, the head of parliament appealed to these young persons to stop their hunger strike. Rakhimov emphasized that "the time has passed when we attempted to impart a nationalistic coloration to sovereignty." "The land and its resources, as well as the entire scientific and technical potential in this republic must belong to its multinational people. It is only in this way—by independently disposing of the results of our own labor—that we can extricate ourselves from this crisis," said the chairman of the Bashkir parliament. These principles have been laid down in the foundation not only of the Declaration on Sovereignty, but also in the draft bilateral treaty on the basics of interstate relations between Bashkortostan and Russia. Rakhimov reaffirmed his own position with regard to the ratification of the Federation Treaty by the Bashkir Supreme Soviet. In his opinion, the republic's parliament should not do this until the bilateral treaty has been signed.

In response to remarks made by certain of the participants in this protest action demanding the resignation of this republic's leaders, Murtaza Rakhimov declared that he was prepared to give up his powers if a worthy replacement could be found.

Armed Groups Formed in Altay To Protect Private, Collective Ownership

*924C1239A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Apr 92 p 1*

[Unattributed article: "Hunters Have Taken Up Their Guns"]

[Text] Local self-defense detachments have begun to operate in villages of Novichikhinskiy Rayon in Altay. This has resulted from the rise in crime that has spread throughout the kray, and in particular the increase in the number of thefts of all kinds. Hunters, soldiers who fought in Afghanistan, and members of people's patrols have volunteered for the detachments. They are taking under their protection private and collective peasant farms, everything that is a potential temptation to thieves. Similar organizations to protect private and collective property are also being created in other villages of Altay.

Economic Protest Action Planned in Altay

924C1239C Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Apr 92 p 1

[Text] Altay's peasants will resort to terminating deliveries of food to the state if their demands are not met. By decision of the plenum of the kray trade union committee of workers of the agroindustrial complex in Altay, strike committees are being formed for that purpose and alternatives are being worked out for the processing, storage, and use of what they produce during the period of a possible collective protest action.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Union of Communist, Nationalist Interests in Crimea Detailed

92UN1199A Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian
10-16 Apr 92 p 4

[Article by NEZAVISIMOST correspondent V. Savchenko: "A Third Karabakh? Who Will Stop the Red-Browns in the Crimea?"]

[Text] Simferopol—At the end of March a group of advisers of the president of Ukraine arrived in the Crimea. They made the rounds of enterprises and met with representatives of local authorities. They noted with great satisfaction that people are working peacefully, there were no barricades in the streets, and this means that the alarming reports from the peninsula can be attributed to the careless work of certain mass media. Alas, there were more than enough half-truths and outright lies about the Crimean events in newspapers and on television recently, and, of course, they played their own destabilizing role. But the relative quiet is very, very deceptive: The arrival of Kravchuk's advisers coincided with a period when a noisy campaign for the collection of signatures to conduct a referendum had actually ended and the opposing forces were outlining tactics for the next phase of the struggle.

So, the main events are still ahead, and the Crimea can play an extremely important role in them. Especially now, when it is becoming clearer and clearer with each day that the attempt to hurdle an entire historical stage and, on the ruins of the last empire, to establish a civilized commonwealth built on a community of interests, according to the example of the European Community, is virtually failing. Relations between Kiev and Moscow are not called the main support of the CIS to no purpose.

For decades the CPSU leadership paid special attention to the Crimea. After all, it was here that the members of the Politburo and other leaders of the Union spent their vacation time. It was here that important meetings were held and high policy was made. Especially then when official contacts were not desired. The first secretary of the Crimea Oblast Party Committee of the CPSU held a position in a secret table of party hierarchy ranks that was higher than many of the top people of the Union republics: A person who is invested with special trust, who is one of a narrow elitist group of people, and who has direct contact with the powers that be.

The peninsula of plenty also enticed officials of lesser rank. Especially from those departments whose interests were never disputed by anybody. For example, the completion of service in the Crimea rather than Murmansk or Khabarovsk was viewed in the military leadership as a kind of incentive. Inasmuch as generals and admirals had to command something, the peninsula was filled with troops beyond what was needed militarily. Where should political workers for construction battalions be trained? Only in the Crimea. Where should

patriots of national liberation movements, for some reason called terrorists in the world, be nurtured? Only here, in the Crimea. But what kind of need was there for the deployment of tank troops that were concealed in the Perekopskiy Peresheyek like in a mouse trap? Moreover, even the reduction of troops conducted by Gorbachev had practically no effect on the Crimea.

For example, in Simferopol soldiers and officers of one of the units simply changed the green combined arms full dress blouses for black naval full dress blouses, and as a consequence stopped being troops that fell under the reductions. But as a result the peninsula was gradually transformed into a large garrison where retired servicemen and their wives and children constituted an increasingly substantial social stratum. Thus, in the Ukrainian parliament two out of three deputies who represent Simferopol wear military uniform. I. Yermakov, who incidentally was recently appointed representative of the president of Ukraine, also wore one until he took up the position of mayor of Simferopol, the second largest city in the Crimea. The picture is also the same with the leadership of the militia, the procuracy, and the numerous ideological and administrative nomenklatura engaged by the KGB. Year in year out they all provided themselves with the best apartments, and their wives and children were not forgotten. But today many of them have added their signatures to a demand for a referendum.

The intense ideological cultivation of the Crimeans conducted in these years could not fail to produce results. An absolute monopoly of the mass media, the strong tactic of conducting elections and referendums, the active use of the resources of law enforcement organs in the political struggle—all of this, alas, is the picture today. It should be no surprise that just in March of this year, Crimea stopped being Soviet Socialist and became simply a republic.

The Crimean leadership graphically confirmed its devotion to the ideas of socialism during the days of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of the Emergency]. But it was obvious that the Moscow conspirators would not have moved to isolate Gorbachev in Foros if they did not know for certain that they would find full support here. And that is what happened. It is somewhat improper to mention those days now. Too many persons invested with authority are trying to forget this period as quickly as possible, but facts remain facts: The Crimean leadership supported the program of the putschists completely. The present head of the Crimean parliament, N. Bagrov, has piled up so many contradictory statements that one-hundredth of them would be enough for even a slightly serious politician to abandon the political arena forever. However, this is if, what is more, measures of a civilized state are applied.

When the first shock of the failure of the putsch passed, the Crimean supporters of the socialist choice rather quickly went into aggressive action. Those who in those days were on the side of democracy turned out to be

targets of purposeful persecution. Organizations sprouted like mushrooms in cities and rayons, declaring themselves to be the continuers of the cause of the CPSU, and even making claims to their own piece of its property. Of course, they had neither mass character nor political influence. It became clear that you could not go far with orthodox communist slogans. What was needed were populist appeals, people who did not compromise themselves with years of work in the party apparatus, their own "hands," and well-paid leaders from the camp of the democrats. All these were found rather quickly.

The situation that arose in the Crimea after the putsch was a paradox in many ways. Not only was the CPSU the ruling party here, but up to the very pre-putsch days it had a monopoly on all aspects of political life. While ceasing to exist de jure, the communists did not lose their position in the organs of authority. And here the ideological kinship of the new bolsheviks with the nationalists showed itself. To declare the priority of the interests of the class or the interests of the nation—this is already a secondary question. The main thing is a division of the people into sorts, into "ours" and "not ours." Moreover—and this was especially noticeable in the Crimea—this maneuver prevented dotting the "i's" in the August events. Demarcation according to the national feature made it impossible to trace a clear border between democrats, who defended the priority of the person and individual rights, and the red-browns.

This process was not as obvious in the Crimea as a number of other regions. When the former secretary of the oblast party committee of the CPSU suddenly heads the movement for the revival of the Cossacks, a great deal is clear to everyone. And it is not surprising when he sends military assistance to another party functionary. Of course, you will see neither one nor the other in the trenches. But who would need them at all, if blood was not being spilled and calls for help were not heard! Here, the bolsheviks and the nationalists are doing one and the same thing—they are setting the people at loggerheads, transforming one-sixth of the earth's surface into a complete Karabakh or a Dniester region.

Under these conditions it was quite a surprise for many residents of the Crimea when the Republican Movement of Crimea (RDK) appeared on the political arena. It began its political struggle with a populist action: the sale of charcoal-grilled chicken filets on the streets of Simferopol at more than reasonable prices. The nucleus of the new movement was one of Simferopol's organizations of former soldier-internationalists "Bagram," and the ideological leader and inspirer was Yuriy Meshkov, a former lawyer. It was at an organizational conference, to which former "Afgantsy" [veterans of the Afghan war] from the entire peninsula were invited, that Meshkov disclosed for the first time the necessity to establish Crimean defense forces, whose backbone, according to his concept, should be the "Afgantsy." Of course, many of the former soldiers revealed that they had had enough fighting in Afghanistan, and that they were not planning

to participate in new political escapades. Nevertheless, the organizational birth of the new movement did take place.

Of course, the RDK warrants a special discussion. But for now we will only mention that with its very first steps the movement showed that it has practically unlimited financial capabilities both in rubles and hard currency. The work of the activists, the offices, and motor vehicles are generously paid for by "Impeks-55," which is headed by A. Nadtoika, a regular party apparatchik with many years of experience.

The RDK even offered to pay for the conduct of a Crimean referendum. Announcements were made that it was not reluctant to spend even one hundred million. Of course, they later thought it over and, in order to conceal the generous financial stream, published a bank account number, suggesting that Crimean residents make contributions for the creation of their own statehood. Under the conditions of N. Bagrov continually declaring that the land in the Crimea will remain the property of the state, that there simply are no people on the peninsula who desire to become farmers, the financial magnates who appropriated money from the very same government are today simply buying up the entire Crimea wholesale.

The main bluff of the RDK is the play on national feelings of the Russians who comprise a majority of the population of the Crimea. Its flags have the very same colors that the Russian flag, but for some reason they are askew. And this bias is clearly in the red-brown direction. Also in the same spirit is the propaganda for which "Impeks" spares no resources in buying journalists. A significant number of the people who put their signatures to the demand for a referendum are confident that the question concerns reunification with Russia. But the forces that are behind the RDK will never allow this. It is necessary for them to acquire the Crimea for their own property. After all, both Russia and the Crimea sooner or later will cease looting Crimean wealth. Thus, from its very first steps the RDK emphasized in its documents the undesirability of reunification with Russia, although it tries not to disclose this in its propaganda efforts. Moreover, when the organization "Good Will," which is headed by N. Gubenko, a well-known defender of rights, tried to conduct an organized meeting of people who were demanding inclusion in the referendum of the question of reunification with Russia, it was the activists of the RDK who disrupted it.

After the republicans came into the political arena, they began at the same time to be supported by successfully established organizations, movements, and blocs. For example, the "People's Opposition" bloc, whose members included a Russian society that actually represented the Crimean variant of "Pamyat"; V. Sagatovskiy, a professor of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and a former adviser of the oblast party committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and amusing sham organizations that were accepted as members owing to their numbers. Or a

movement which for some reason assumed the right to speak in behalf of voters of Crimea for granting it statehood. An important role in its establishment was played by the press organ of the oblast party committee KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA, and veterans of the armed forces were its backbone. With its help an attempt is being made to revive the structure of the territorial party organizations under new flags.

At the same time an unprecedented persecution of enemies of the RDK position was promoted. Now, the very same KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA, as well as a new newspaper with the eloquent name of RESPUBLIKA KRYM, have pounced upon V. Astakhov, a journalist who recently became the head of a television and radio company. Yu. Komov also did not escape this fate. But, after all, we are talking about two deputies who alone found the courage on 20 August to vote against the GKChP at the memorable meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea. Neither the communists nor the latter day republicans can forgive them for this.

Unfortunately, the democratic forces of Crimea are too weak and disunited to be able to provide real resistance to the red-browns. Therefore, there simply is no one to stop the Crimean drift. A forceful attempt to do this on the part of the president of Ukraine will quickly lead to a Dniester region variant, and it can prove to be decisive in relations between Ukraine and Russia. But the time allotted to the political settlement of the problem is passing irretrievably.

...It is said that Kravchuk and Bagrov like to play chess during their meetings. I do not know what their score is, but Kravchuk is losing the Crimea with each passing day. It is hardly likely that Bagrov will win either.

Ukrainian TV Criticized for Being Politicized

92UN1199B Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian
10-16 Apr 92 p 7

[Article by I. Ivanitskiy: "Who Laughs Last? A Big, Fat Face Without Passion"]

[Text] Saving Sinking Ukrainian TV...

If I was asked to name the main deficiency of our national TV, I would answer briefly—the lack of passion. Consequently, there is a lack of involvement by the leading different television programs in any subject under discussion that they raise.

As far back as the days of stagnation I encountered a fact that astonished me. During a time that is sacred to villagers—the harvest—the people in one Cherkassy village rebelled and announced that they would not work until the local cinema operator-projectionist sobered up and brought in the next Indian melodrama from the rayon. A similar hullabaloo can be seen in the villages now during Sunday showings of a regular series on the rich who, it turns out, also cry. The neighbors gather in small groups (although each one has a personal "box") in

order to discuss the actions of the heroes in detail. But the grandmothers and the grandfathers, while mixing up the names of all the leaders of the Soviet epoch, will indicate to the day when they saw "Tarzan," just as my generation now watches the comedy films of the inimitable Gayday. But what passions! You ask: What has TV got to do with this, when we are talking about the cinema? Well, for the reason that since the "tv" has replaced the expensive movie houses, then at least show films that are intelligible and not engage from morning until evening in studio lobby interviews about nothing, from time to time changing the props in the form of interlocutors. Is this not the reason why the capital television studio "Tete-a-Tete" (in common parlance "ta-ta-ta") has become the most popular of all of the rest of the television productions in the last several months, because its contents are simple—good and different films that are not honed to the usual political trend.

But with what kind of passions is UT [Ukrainian Television] filled, except for the passions around the Black Sea Fleet, cheap coupons, and expensive living? I am a patriot of Ukraine, but on the first question I half concur with Brzezinski who views the Black Sea Fleet from a military standpoint as nothing more than a pile of scrap metal. This would be so if it were not for the other side of the coin—economics: Scrap metal also costs money. Well, and other political passions? We have become a society of political addicts, and the mass media in the form of TV only irritates this sore. Measured, from day to day, by drops and kilograms. It is impossible to say that this is being done with finesse. It is being done clumsily and primitively. But besides politics there are also dances on the screen. A person who does not know better would say that we are the most dancing of people, because both UT-1 and UT-2 even vibrate from folklorish silly passions.

What do you think, why does the rather young journal DIM. SAD. GOROD [HOUSE. GARDEN. CITY] enjoy such wild success in Ukraine? Although Moscow has TSVETOVOVODSTVO [FLORICULTURE], PRI-USADEBNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO [KITCHEN GARDENING], and other publications with long traditions. Well, it is very simple—the recommendations of DIM. SAD. GOROD. are calculated for the climatic conditions of Ukraine, not Krasnoyarsk. Here, television employees should also display some skill, at least to put together several educational and comprehensible telecasts... But there are none—again they have news of a political trend, as if more food will appear from these transmissions. There was already a referendum on 1 December. The people had their say. Why think so poorly of the people and once again agitate them to independence? Now this same independence has to be filled with substance.

In its efforts to politicize all television sets and their own claims to comprehensiveness, UT in fact perhaps forgot the main characteristic of its people—the ability to laugh. We have no great satirists since Ostap Vishnya—so, has laughter subsided as a result? It just has to be

noticed and shown. America in the 1930's—the years of a great economic slump—called on the people to smile. And it is smiling to this day. Is that not why things are still going well for it? But here all are being called to rally around the president and to move along a course set by the idea of independence. Abundance, landowners, and television politicians. But if I overwork myself, and I am not in the mood—who will be responsible for this? Now, many newspapers are ensuring their own subscribers against accidents (newspapers got more expensive, and so they value each reader). You broke your arm, show a receipt—and get a thousand or two. But why should TV not insure its viewers and send money to those whose mood it spoiled in the evening? (Statistics corroborate that there are more than 30 million television viewers in Ukraine.) It would go bankrupt immediately. Moreover, it is already coming to this—electricity is getting more expensive. People will switch to radio. It is more accessible, and cheaper. But, on the other hand, it has more content, and it is much more involved. There is only the voice. There are only intonations, but there is everything behind them—gestures, style, thoughts, and the character of the journalists. And they, the authors of broadcasts, are less limited and more relaxed, despite their own very large audience.

But we will talk about radio another time, when the occasion presents itself. But, for now, I am switching to "Tete-a-Tete," which you should do also.

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

First Quarter 1992 Economic Statistics Reported

Overall Figures

92UN1238A Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian No 16, Apr 92 p 8

[Unattributed report: "The Economy of Ukraine in the First Quarter of 1992"]

[Text] According to preliminary data, the produced national income declined by 20 percent while the volume of **industrial production** declined by 15.3 percent (in January-February—by 17.2 percent). There was a slump in production of the majority of the most important types of production. However it should be noted that in recent months the pace of the decline in production has slowed (in March—9.2 percent, in February—14 percent, and in January—19.7 percent).

Wholesale prices for industrial production in January of this year compared to the same month last year increased by a factor of 13.9, in February—16.9, in March—18.6, and for the quarter as a whole—by a factor of 16.5.

The slump in production and the high prices for output have led to further deterioration in ties between economic units. For the quarter, **shortfalls in deliveries to customers** by enterprises amounted to more than 17 billion rubles [R] or 2.4 percent of total production.

Output of **consumer goods** for the first quarter fell by R48.9 billion or 21.5 percent.

Production of **food goods** declined by 34 percent, including meat—by 29 percent, creamy butter—by 32 percent, cheese—by 39 percent, whole milk—by 26 percent, and oil and mayonnaise—by 2.3 percent.

The financial state of enterprises of the food industry, especially those working under conditions of regulated retail prices and fixed rates of subsidies, is critical. First and foremost these include the dairy, bakery, macaroni, and butter and cheese industries.

Output of **nonfood goods** declined by R14.9 billion or 12.5 percent.

Interruptions in supplies of raw materials and component products to enterprises led to a reduction in production of the majority of consumer and household goods, especially large household appliances and electrical appliances. For example, output of electrical juicers declined by more than half in the first quarter compared to last year's first quarter, output of televisions and washing machines declined by one-third, electric teakettles—by 39 percent, and refrigerators, tape recorders, and electric irons—by 15-19 percent.

The main reason for the sharp decrease in production of **light industry goods** is lack of provision of raw materials and supplies, especially those located beyond the borders of Ukraine.

As a consequence of this, volumes of production of knitted products in physical terms compared to January-March of last year fell by 22 percent, stocking and sock goods—by 7.2 percent, silk fabrics—by 39 percent, wool products—by 3.7 percent, and footwear—by 15 percent.

Still unresolved is the question of purchasing imported raw materials, including 17,000 tonnes of natural wool, which in the coming two-three months may lead to stoppages at the Krivoy Rog, Sumy, and Donetsk spinning factories, which produce yarn for the knitting sector.

The decline in volumes of production of consumer goods and the sharp increase in prices despite the limited purchasing capacity of the population has led to a significant decline in the physical volume of **retail commodity circulation** (in adjusted prices, by R11.2 billion or 52.1 percent) and a reduction in consumption of food and nonfood commodities.

Sales of practically all commodities have slowed, as a result of which **inventories of commodities** in retail trade have increased since the beginning of the year by R38.6 billion, including R16 billion in March. In wholesale trade and industry, inventories of meat, oil, and egg products have increased by 43,800 tonnes, 2,900 tonnes, and 64.5 million units respectively. There have been declines in reserves of sausage products (by 100 tonnes), butter (by 1,000 tonnes), whole milk products (by 3,600

tonnes), fish (by 8,200 tonnes), confectionery products (by 400 tonnes), and sugar (by 343,800 tonnes).

A similar situation has arisen with regard to supplying the population with the most necessary commodities of the nonfood group. Footwear, clothing, children's articles, durable goods, furniture, dishwear, etc. have become practically impossible to purchase, especially for the indigent sectors of the population.

Prices for refrigerators increased on average by a factor of almost 10. The cost of color televisions increased by a factor of 7.5, vacuum cleaners and washing machines—a factor of seven, furniture, particularly bureaus for clothing—a factor of almost eight, and sofas—a factor of six.

On the kolkhoz market prices on almost all commodities declined by comparison with January. As a consequence of this, the amount that kolkhoz prices exceed prices in retail and cooperative trade in March for beef, for example, is only a factor of 1.3 compared to a factor of 2.7 in November last year; the prices on the kolkhoz market for pork are 1.6 times higher compared to 3.2 times higher, respectively.

In January-March almost 50 percent fewer paid services were rendered to the population of Ukraine than last year. At the same time prices and tariffs on paid services increased by a factor of more than seven on the average.

Ukraine concluded intergovernmental agreements concerning mutual deliveries of output for 1992 with all the countries of the former USSR except Estonia.

More than half of the industrial complex of Ukraine is supplied with many types of output brought in from other regions. First and foremost these include fuel and energy resources, raw materials for light industry, output of heavy machine-building, nonferrous metallurgy, and the chemical and petrochemical industries, and lumber and paper output.

Ukraine, in its turn, sends beyond its borders output of the food industry, ferrous metallurgy, machine-building and metal processing, and agriculture.

The Russian Federation, representing three-fourths of total commodity circulation, is one of the main partners of Ukraine, which calls for a special procedure for forming relations with it.

With regard to mutual deliveries by states of the former Union, intergovernmental agreements are not being carried out in full measure. According to the latest data, in the first quarter Russia supplied lumber at a level of four percent, commercial timber—14.7, gasoline—34, petroleum—89.7, and diesel fuel—93.6 percent. Belarus did not deliver any gasoline at all, and it delivered petroleum at a level of seven percent. Deliveries of output of light industry, raw materials for it, and consumer goods by Moldova, the Baltic countries, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia were performed at a low level.

Nor does Ukraine always fulfill its obligations. For example, cement was shipped out to various regions of the former Union at a level of 90 percent, and coal and fabrics of all types—30 percent. Deliveries of salt and other food goods were performed at a low level.

Individual Economic Branches

92UN1238B Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian No 16, Apr 92 p 8

[Report by the Combined Department for Development of the National Economy, Finances, and Social Protection of the Population, of the Secretariat of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers: "On Operations of Individual Sectors of the National Economy"]

[Text] The target for mining of coal was 95.3 percent fulfilled. Compared with the corresponding period last year, mining declined by 2 million tonnes or 5.4 percent. The target for mining of coking coal was 101.9 percent fulfilled, including 105.5 percent in March. Targets were fulfilled for the processing of coal at enriching factories and for output of concentrate and high-quality coal. The state order for delivery of coal output was 108.5 percent fulfilled in March and 105.7 percent fulfilled since the beginning of the year.

An improvement in the provision of metallurgical enterprises with coal for coking and scrap contributed to an increase of 2-18 percent in volumes of production of basic types of output in March compared to January-February. However, since the beginning of the year 2.1 million tonnes less coal for coking was received than planned as a consequence of the fact that coal enterprises of Russia concluded accords for the delivery in 1992 of only 1.7 million tonnes despite the fact that the government of Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement for a volume of 10 million tonnes and repeatedly affirmed it. As a result, for the quarter as a whole compared to the corresponding period last year production of basic types of metal output declined by 15-28 percent.

Some 11-12 blast furnaces were routinely idled during the quarter because of shortfalls of coke, while about 10 open-hearth furnaces were idled because of shortfalls of cast iron and metal scrap.

In March the level of the factory operating rate in the chemical industry increased somewhat with regard to production of commercial fertilizers, soda ash, chemical threads and fibers, and synthetic resins and plastics. However, because of shortfalls in requirements of natural gas, raw materials, first and foremost apatites, and difficulties with the procurement of chlorine, as well as the unsatisfactory technical state of soda production facilities and the absence of free capacity for waste materials, production of the majority of types of chemical production declined significantly. In particular, production of commercial fertilizers fell by 33 percent, including phosphate fertilizer—by 65.8 percent, soda

ash—by 7.9 percent, caustic soda—by 5.1 percent, and synthetic ammonia—by 7.7 percent.

In the first quarter enterprises for the extraction of oil and gas extracted 26,000 tonnes of oil and gas concentrate and 483 million cubic meters of natural gas over the target. On the other hand, provision of gas to consumers, for the most part industrial consumers, declined in March in conjunction with a halt in deliveries of natural gas from Turkmenia. As a result, there was a shortfall of 2.7 billion cubic meters.

Because of shortfalls in deliveries of petroleum, petroleum processing factories operated at significantly lower rates. In March the average daily processing of petroleum was 10 percent lower than in February; in all, 9.7 million tonnes were processed in the first quarter, which is 35 percent less than last year. Deliveries of finished petroleum products from Russia also decreased, including diesel fuel by 15 percent and gasoline by a factor of 2.7. As a consequence of this, centralized stores of gasoline were only 51.3 percent of last year's volumes, and stores of diesel fuel—66 percent.

Taking into account the need to provide fuel for sowing on a first-priority basis, in March 335,000 tonnes of gasoline and 691,000 tonnes of diesel fuel were delivered to agriculture, which is 86 and 71 percent respectively of the total centralized stores.

The construction materials industry was unable to fulfill the first quarter target for production of the most important types of construction materials and saw a decline in volumes of production.

Cement factories of the Ukrtsement [Ukrainian cement] concern underperformed the target by 173,500 tonnes of cement. Production of cement, slate, and pipes in the first quarter declined by 7.2, 1, and 6.1 percent respectively.

Enterprises of the former State Committee for the Timber Industry had very unstable operations. For example, by comparison with the corresponding period last year production of lumber declined by 25.4 percent, wood particle board—by 9.4 percent, solid fiberboard—by 12.7 percent, and plywood—by 43.8 percent. Simultaneously there was a drop in output of the production range of furniture. Another negative influence on volumes of output of furniture was the increase by a factor of 10 in prices for raw materials and supplies in the related sectors of the chemical and light industries. Because of the high prices at many enterprises there were difficulties with sales of furniture resulting in a forced decline in production.

A difficult situation also arose in the cellulose and paper industry, whose operations depend to a significant degree on deliveries of raw materials from the Russian Federation. Since the beginning of the year production of paper and cardboard declined against the first quarter of last year by 28 and 31 percent respectively, while production of school notebooks declined by 56 percent.

The farms of all the oblasts and the Republic of Crimea began sowing of spring crops for the 1992 harvest. As of 6 April 3.8 million hectares had been sown, which is 1.3 million hectares more than last year.

Forward contracting for the supply of grain on 1 April was at a level of 66 percent of the established state order and 65 percent for sugar beets and oil-producing crops. Contracts were concluded for potatoes and for fruit and vegetable output at lower volumes than last year.

Livestock production on kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and interfarm enterprises is significantly lower than last year: Meat—by 26 percent, milk—by 24 percent, and eggs—by 14 percent. This was as a result of both a decline in the number of livestock and poultry and a decline in their productivity.

State purchases of livestock and poultry declined compared to January-March of last year by 316,200 tonnes or 29 percent, of milk and dairy products—by 1.1 million tonnes or 32 percent, and of eggs—by 603,300 units or 27 percent.

In the first quarter the railroads of Ukraine transported 37.3 million tonnes less freight than in the same period last year.

Unloading of cars worsened significantly, including on approach tracks of freight customers.

The situation in investment activities worsened still more in the first quarter of this year. A lack of solutions to the problems of financing, a significant decline in the payment of interest on credit, and the inability to address the questions of indexation of capital investments and a mechanism for compensation of additional expenses are putting capital construction on the edge of ruin.

This is connected especially with the uncontrolled growth of prices for construction materials, transport services, and electrical energy. As a result, the cost of construction has grown by a factor of 10-20 or more (at the contract prices which builders are proposing). At the same time, the customers do not have that kind of money.

For these and other reasons, the volume of contracts for contract work is only 13.4 percent of the stipulated volume of work for 1992.

A lack of money is not allowing a significant quantity of customers to perform settlements with builders. Over just the first two months of the current year indebtedness of customers to contracting organizations was more than R5.8 billion. Operations of enterprises of the construction industry are coming to a halt.

This has led to a slump in volumes of completed work. Compared to the corresponding period in 1991, such volumes declined at the Ukrbud corporation by eight percent, Ukrhroprombud—by seven percent, Kyyivmiskbud—by 11 percent, and the concerns of Ukrshlyakhbud—by seven percent.

Construction of facilities for social and cultural use have slowed. The pace of housing construction, whose cost has increased compared to last year's level by a factor of 10-25, has slowed significantly. Housing brought on line at the expense of all sources of financing declined against the first quarter of 1991 by 13 percent, and at the expense of state assets—by 26 percent.

Income of R88 billion came into the budgets of Ukraine, while expenditures were R99 billion and exceeded income by R11 billion. Income of the state (republic) budget was R61 billion while expenditures were financed in the amount of R53 billion.

In conjunction with a shortage of assets to the local budgets of the Republic of Crimea and the oblasts, short-term loans were granted from the republic budget in the amount of R32 billion (including R6.1 billion at the expense of credit of the National Bank of Ukraine), and R5 billion were transferred as a result of reciprocal settlements. Taking into account these expenses, the total sum of expenditures of the state (republic) budget was R90 billion.

The state of payment discipline has worsened. The total sum of defaulted payments in February compared to January grew by R42 billion and was R76 billion on 1 March, including R1 billion on loans of banks and R75 billion for settlements to suppliers.

In January-March cash offices of banks received R99 billion in cash, including R50.9 billion in coupons (51.4 percent of the total sum), and R68.5 billion in trade receipts, including R48.4 billion in coupons (70.6 percent).

Issuance of cash from the cash offices of banks during this period reached R131.2, including R85.7 billion in coupons (65.3 percent). Compared to the corresponding period last year, issuance of money increased by a factor of 4.8, including a factor of 6.7 for wages and 6.8 for pensions and assistance, while receipts of cash increased by only a factor of 3.6, including a factor of 4.4 from trade receipts.

Emission of money for the first quarter was R32.2 billion, including R34.8 billion in coupons issued into circulation and R2.6 billion returned to the cash offices of banks.

Balances of deposits of the population in the Savings Bank grew in the current year by R24 billion and on 1 April were R140 billion, including R0.7 billion in coupons.

Council for Denationalization, Privatization Formed in Kiev
92UN1223A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
14 Apr 92 p 2

[Interview with V.P. Dehtyarenko, chairman of the executive committee of the Kiev City Council of the

Union of Scientific and Engineering Associations of Ukraine, by Tamara Yashchenko; place and date not given: "And What if Your Neighbor Gets Rich?"]

[Text] Attitudes to denationalization and privatization differ in our society. Certain traditions and stereotypes promote simplistic approaches to the most important tasks facing us today. Consequently, there is a danger that privatization may meet the same ill-fated end as collectivization. For that reason, the Kiev City Council of the Union of Scientific and Engineering Associations of Ukraine took upon itself certain obligations and responsibilities with respect to organizing denationalization and privatization in Kiev. V.P. Dehtyarenko, the chairman of the executive committee of this council, shared with us his views on these problems.

[Yashchenko] What basic mechanisms will be used to conduct prudent and consistent denationalization and privatization in Kiev?

[Dehtyarenko] Our union and a number of trade union organizations have announced a competition of an exploratory nature. We count on each collective submitting recommendations, which will take into consideration the level of interest on the part of the members of the workers' collective and their technical resources, and later we will present to these collectives our own proposals. The competition commission will determine the winners, and their recommendations will be sent to those enterprises who take part in this competition and finance it. Our main goal is not only to find sound models of privatization, but also to find people who are interested in a creative approach to privatization and know how to conduct it.

[Yashchenko] I believe that it is necessary, nonetheless, to begin denationalization, bearing in mind the principles of social justice. After all, everyone has a right to claim a part of the state's property.

[Dehtyarenko] True, but that resembles the same collective farm we mentioned earlier. If we abide by the traditional understanding of the principles of social justice, we will not escape the crisis. For example, there must be someone in a scientific-research institute who holds the principal parcel of shares. If the majority of shares is held by those individuals, whose intellectual labors secure the future, the institution will flourish. In such institutions, the intellectual responsibility for the key scientific and engineering work lies with some five percent of the staff, while the rest are merely implementors. But those in the latter category do not always acknowledge this fact, and therein lies a fundamental contradiction. It is important for people to abandon the dogma that everyone must be equally well-off. He will be richer, who will give most of himself, and if the work is intellectual, the more reason there is for that to be true.

When I was abroad, I studied the principles of privatization and the work of workers' collectives with a so-called collective form of ownership. Only some 30 percent of the members of the work collective own shares

in these enterprises. As a rule, these are the managers or directors of production units. The rest are hired employees. And if the labor collective lacks a clear goal, whether its members are shareholders or not, it will become bankrupt.

[Yashchenko] At the plenum of the city's Trade Union Council, a representatives of the Lepse Factory took the floor and angrily related that one of the directors of the enterprise had sold the dormitory facility for 30,000 rubles without consulting the members of the labor collective. May it not have been sold at a significantly higher price, and, generally speaking, should not the collective have been consulted?

[Dehtyarenko] Perhaps, but it seems to me that this approach is somewhat simplistic. To begin with, it would be a good thing if privatization were being carried out openly in our city. But, with the blessings of the Kiev Presidium of the City Council and the district councils, everything is being done in secret and not very honestly. Therefore, the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet declaring all illegal agreements void is very timely. But I would like to say something about the dormitory. How many enterprises are there bold enough to pay 30,000 rubles for a dormitory and several million to renovate it? Will bad management save us? This also applies to many production areas at enterprises.

[Yashchenko] But we also do not need privatization for the sake of privatization. Once our borders open, our enterprises will all go bankrupt. Is there a solution?

[Dehtyarenko] It is essential that we already begin taking time to explain to enterprises that it is not possible to carry out privatization in a single swoop. We propose that large enterprises not be privatized immediately, but rather that small privatized enterprises be organized within them. Let 10, then 20, and eventually 200 persons become owners. The establishment of some dozen such enterprises would provide security for two thousand people.

[Yashchenko] But is it not more just to distribute everything without cost?

[Dehtyarenko] That would be the most terrible thing we could do. Something received at no cost will never be put to effective use. Land, enterprises, and stores will be squandered just as gratuitously. We must sell, but at what price? Symbolic or real? Once we make this decision, we will find entrepreneurs tomorrow, who will want to invest their money. These will include both members of the shadow economy and foreigners. And we need not be afraid of this.

[Yashchenko] So, the shadow economy businessmen will have their revenge here as well and leave the poorest with nothing?

[Dehtyarenko] Naturally our conscience rejects this. But, on the other hand, that is better than waiting for all of us to become wealthy again, while we grow even poorer as

we wait. Those who are able to invest funds into enterprises and make profitable use of them have the advantage today. What is terrible in our society is not that we are all poor, but that everyone is afraid that someone else will grow rich.

Congress of Young Entrepreneurs Held in Kiev

92UN1223B Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
14 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by Volodymyr Oliynyk: "Privatization Will Be Just"]

[Text] In our preceding issue, we reported that a congress of Ukraine's young entrepreneurs was held in Kiev on 8-11 April, the first such gathering convened by the newly created Ukrainian Fund for International Cooperation of Youth. The congress drew criticism while it was still in session, but though it elicited equivocal reactions, to use a currently fashionable expression, it is safe to predict unequivocally that it will be viewed as a success. Because, believe me, no one would have wasted valuable television time on idle chit-chat.

The "grounds" for criticism were there. They were quite obvious and therefore quite easy for any journalist present to see. The event was not very well organized. The participants did not behave in a very disciplined manner; they sometimes walked out of the auditorium or were late in arriving at the next discussion. Critics found easy prey in the former responsible workers of the Komsomol, who "for some reason were once again" among the organizers of the congress. The list of "jabs" might be continued, but, in my opinion, it is foolish to ask why, for instance, a former head of a department of the Central Committee of the Komsomol of Ukraine (Democratic Union of Youth [MDS]) was among the organizers, instead of an ardent informal-antinomenklatura activist from one of the districts, or to complain that the participants of the congress included many familiar faces from the former Komsomol apparatus. I had an opportunity to work with these people when everything was still uniformly and unequivocally communist, and they were the ones who were labeled ideological "degenerates," and theirs were the building complexes or young people's recreational facilities with cafes or "video parlors" that the auditing commissions rummaged through in search of anticommunist heresy.

And now, when their time has finally come, they are being attacked from the other side: "Go get them, those former functionaries!" You must admit that this is less than just.

And now back to the business at hand. As Vice-Premier and Minister of Economic Affairs of Ukraine Volodymyr Lanovyy, who spent more than an hour with the participants of the congress, put it: let us attempt to examine the heart of the matter.

The problem is indeed very complicated. To begin with, because at this point in Ukraine's struggle for genuine

independence, when no one denies any longer that this independence can be achieved primarily through economic independence, we must not forget about the future. We must not ignore the need for the immediate establishment of small businesses and businesses run by young people. Businesses should be run by young people, who are not overly familiar with the new legislation and who have not yet "grown fat" with economic, personal, and organizational ties. Those young people, whom, to put it bluntly, the state has no time to lead by the hand, or to subsidize Utopian programs for them as in the days of planning.

That is why an international youth fund was created. There is nothing terrible in the fact that today the youth wing of the Ukrainian parliament has rallied round this idea, nothing terrible in its concentrating its intellectual and economic potential under this roof, because there will soon be new elections and new economic problems, and we will be able to solve these problems only if we all join together.

It seems that both the government of Ukraine and the parliament are well aware of this, because the prime minister, the vice-premier, and a number of influential and highly qualified people's deputies would not have attended a little-known and unimportant congress just to check it off on their calendar.

They came not to deliver speeches but to hold candid talks, and there were plenty of questions from the young participants.

For example, the most popular question was: "To whom should ownership pass under privatization?" V.T. Lanovyy did not conceal the fact that opinion on this issue is divided, both in parliament and in the government. But he also assured his listeners that all property and real estate that is regulated by the market will be transferred into private ownership and gave a detailed explanation of the procedure and regulations governing the issuance of privatization vouchers. He responded to the impatient questions regarding when privatization would begin by saying that no one would rush to privatize until price indexing is completed and the necessary organizational mechanism is worked out, but that privatization would be set in motion before the year is out.

Many were satisfied with the answer that finally the state would not be selling anything and that it would not be engaged in trade. The government will confine itself to

stimulating the economy, while passing everything else into the hands of the producers. Moreover, under privatization, the state's share of property will become minimal, and municipal bodies will keep even less property. In other words, they will untie the hands of reformers and real businessmen, and even the utilization of the military's intellectual potential will be worked out in detail at the highest level.

During privatization, all restrictions on private and associational entrepreneurs will be lifted, albeit within reasonable limits to ensure that the interests of the workers' collectives are not harmed.

At the same time, however, there will be a mechanism at work to prevent municipal bodies from stifling entrepreneurship under the guise of protecting the interests of the workers' collectives, as has already been happening in many regions of Ukraine.

To be sure, there were also questions about the national currency. Or rather, about its prospects. After all, we need to know how to plan business strategy. Patience is needed in this respect as well. No national bank can calculate how many new monetary units need to be introduced or set the exchange rate against other currencies while a genuine banking system has yet to be created, while a huge portion of the economy still works according to the old laws of inertia, and while privatization has not yet been effected. The hryvnya will be issued, but not because someone is more in favor of this or otherwise, but rather when this becomes expedient from the economic point of view.

The vice-premier underscored once again that the introduction of a national currency will be closely coordinated with International Monetary Fund, to which Ukraine has already submitted its economic plans.

Thus a beginning has been made. Maryna Lyeskova, a young businesswoman from Lviv, noted: "I feel that such congresses have a future. Now, as never before, young entrepreneurs need to unite. There is a great need for such a fund. After all, not everyone is in excellent financial shape. And those who have earned some money often lack prospects, business contacts, and even the opportunity to expand their undertaking or share their experience."

Investment in the fund by its founders is an investment in the future—something that we have long dreamed about.

BYELARUS

Seizure of Military Land for Civilian Use

92UN1254A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 28 Apr 92
Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Mikhail Shimanskiy (Minsk-Brest): "Byelarus Confiscates Military Land"]

[Text] This is extraordinary news: Civilians in Byelarus have decided to find out how much land the military has and to confiscate part of it.

Kolkhoz lands "torn asunder" by enormous military proving grounds are a common sight in Byelarus. Dozens of hectares have been shredded by powerful military equipment, but is this how our land should be used?

The issue is of crucial importance to Byelarus today, and there are serious reasons for this. The first is that the republic ranks highest in the CIS in terms of the concentration and number of military combined units. There is one serviceman for every 43 civilians in the republic today. The figures for other regions are 98 for Ukraine, 118 for Kazakhstan, 526 for Tajikistan, and 624 for Russia.

The second reason is that the republic lost almost one-fifth of its agricultural land to the Chernobyl disaster. Hundreds of rural communities were stricken by radiation and were abandoned. Their inhabitants were moved to uncontaminated parts of the republic, but they needed land for farmsteads and private plots, and the amount they needed was sizable. Land for the new settlers was being taken away from farms, but the "military" lands were off limits!

Furthermore, thousands of inhabitants of Byelarus, especially urbanites, want to build country homes and grow their own fruit and vegetables. Local soviets have received 380,000 applications. There are already several hundred family farms in rural areas, and soon there will be more. They also need land. It will take at least 10,000 hectares of farmland to satisfy all of the requests.

And what about forests? Can huge forests be kept under guard now that one-fourth of the world-renowned Byelarusian forests have been severely polluted with radio-nuclides from Chernobyl?

How was the republic to replenish its supply of land and forests? The government decided to confiscate part of the military establishment's land. This was one part of the solution. Another was a long-overdue inventory of military property. I do not know about other former republics of the former USSR, but in Byelarus no one has ever checked how much land the military has and how it has been used in the almost 50 years since the war. The leadership of the Byelarusian Military District admitted that much of the land was not on record and was not being used. The job was done by a special joint commission made up of representatives of the republic committee on land reform and land use and the military. I spoke with G. Kuznetsov, the deputy chairman of the committee.

"Georgiy Ivanovich, how much land does the military have in Byelarus?"

"Colossal amounts. When all of it had been itemized, we were astounded. There was half a million hectares of land."

"What is on this land?"

"There are many proving grounds, tank training areas, firing ranges, and airfields. In addition, there is a great deal of land that is not being used at all, because the military simply does not need it."

From the very beginning, during the very first stage of the inventory, 20,000 hectares of land was confiscated from the military establishment in Byelarus to serve the needs of the national economy. This affected only the largest military "concerns." One example was the famous Minsk Training Center with its huge proving ground.

The land committee achieved its goal: The center lost 2,130 hectares to the local rural soviet for housing construction and a vegetable factory and to the Minsk city executive committee for an industrial zone. In addition, 1,800 hectares of wonderful forests became part of the Minsk forest-park. The city gained a marvelous recreational area.

There is no reason that military airfields should take up so much land in Byelarus. It is true that this is a complex branch of military service, requiring a great deal of space, but why does the military establishment have so many alternate and reserve airfields in the republic? The situation with regard to these, according to Kuznetsov, is chaotic anyway. No one on the staff of the Byelarus Military District even knows the exact number of these airfields. Only 13 of the 29 the commission investigated were actually being used.

As a result of the inventory, 16 alternate airfields were turned over to the national economy.

In this way, the Byelarusian Government finally claimed part of the military land. Was this an encroachment on something essential to the army, something without which the army is certain to lose part of its fighting ability?

"No," said Major General V. Demidik, the Byelarusian military district deputy commander. "There was no encroachment, and our interests were not infringed in any way."

"But these 20,000 hectares are only a small part of the half a million hectares."

The general looked annoyed:

"I repeat, we have given all that we can give today. We must not lose sight of the distinctive nature of some military installations. One example is the safety zone around the proving grounds. We cannot have tractors working next to them. Besides this, each tank regiment needs its own proving ground, and each air division needs its own airfield...."

On the one hand, this sounds reasonable. On the other, can the economy afford to reserve dozens of hectares of land for one round of fire a year?

The problem has to be solved by passing a law. If we have the kind of economic mechanism in which the military establishment will have to pay a certain amount for the use of each hectare of land or forest used, we can be certain that it will give up all surplus land voluntarily. Byelorussia is probably not the only one with a need for this kind of law.

MOLDOVA

Dniester Women's Movement Leader, Guards Commander Interviewed

92UM0924A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Lt Cols A. Bondarenko and S. Dyshev: "The Dniester Area: Which Battalions on Firing Line?"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] In spite of the agreement separating the opposing sides, the Dniester area continues to see conflict and people dying. How to obtain some kind of calm? Each side has its mind made up and insists on defending its interests.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA two days ago presented the opinions of the Dniester area Republic Guards commander and commissar of the Bendery police. Pulled into the whirlpool of events were not only the warring sides, but also the Army and various socio-political movements. We present this article in the hope of helping people who adhere to different positions so that perhaps a comparison can be made.

The "Women's Guard"

Galina Andreyeva of the Dniester area is known as least as well as the famous person of the same name was at one time. Military people have no special liking for her, but women believe her to be their undisputed leader.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Galina Stepanovna, someone has said—accurately or not—that you are the commander of the "black playsuit" battalion.

[Andreyeva] There is a women's movement and there is a strike committee. The not-too-bright journalist who said that would be better off if he were to help our women acquire playsuits. But to write something like that, without even having met with us, is simply a shame. Our movement started out on 31 August of last year. We responded to the arrest of our Supreme Soviet deputies by setting up a month-long blockade of the railroad. That was the first women's political strike—something all the newspapers acknowledged.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] We are aware that you have a "special relationship" with the military.

[Andreyeva] Of most interest to us at present is the Army. After the events of November 1990, when OPON

[Special Purpose Police Detachment] men killed people in Dubossary, we requested the military to protect the populace. They actually turned us down. We started to picket, taking action to prevent the Army from being disbanded. Then the statement was made on television: Andreyeva is in command of the 14th Army. We sent the Moscow generals back. Yes, under women's escort to the bus, and on to Odessa. We did not use force; we fed them pirozhki. We know what kind of materiel there is and where it is located, and we know the amounts; and we do not want these weapons to be turned over to Kishinev.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Are there many officers' wives in your movement?

[Andreyeva] We have not made a count. Quite a few. There are many—and this is confirmed by the officers themselves—who do not let their husbands come home: Until there is peace, no sense letting them lie around the house doing nothing!

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Are you being supplied information by military wives?

[Andreyeva] We possess information obtained from the General Staff. So do not worry! We have a women's intelligence activity, one that is active everywhere: in Moscow and in Moldova. We are politically motivated and we are playing a political game. The army commander is careful not to violate an order, while I with my women's strike action am concerned about obtaining protection for women, children, and the elderly. (Galina Stepanovna sighed.) The only thing we would love to have is armored vehicles.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] We gathered in our telephone conversation that the women are learning how to drive tanks and fly helicopters.

[Andreyeva] That is no secret. We sent women off to other areas to learn how to handle weapons and combat equipment. If the guys hesitate to take action, we will take over and offer protection. We even carried out night exercises with the 14th Army. You should have seen how our grannies climbed over tanks and armored personnel carriers! They take up their positions faster than soldiers! We were forced to seize weapons in the chemical battalion when we found out that they were to be turned over to Moldova. No soldier tried to stop us.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Finally, tell us something about yourself.

[Andreyeva] I graduated from the Sverdlovsk Institute of Law. I worked as a jurist in the city soviet. I now occupy a quite peaceful position as head of the Tiraspol Division of social security. I have under my care quite an army: 40,000 pensioners. I am in addition chairman of the Women's Strike Committee; deputy chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, and city soviet deputy. I am married. My husband is in the Home Guard. With his wife militant, my husband also must be. What do we want? Peace! And each one of us women dreams of getting some more sleep—maybe another hour or so.

cooking something for the husband, doing the laundry, baking a cake. And heaven forbid more shooting!

The Guards Army

Hanging on the wall behind Lieutenant Colonel V. Biryukov, commander of a missile brigade, were a picture of Lenin and the Russian flag. It is clear that the residents of the Dniester area do not intend to forget the entire past and adopt a new outlook overnight.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vladimir Yuryevich, we could be wrong, but we believe you are chief of the Bender garrison.

[Biryukov] That is difficult to say. About two months ago, the Moldova minister of defense appointed to that post Colonel Mendeleyev, who was chief of the repair shop. The latter panicked; he was able to obtain a transfer to the Moscow area on short notice. That is how I came to occupy the post of chief.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It is said that a large number of military personnel wish to transfer out. Was it not the opposite at one time?

[Biryukov] Yes, we—missilemen—thought of this place as being the best: The unit was stationed in the city; the area is pleasant, the people, nice. Everything was still normal when I arrived here last year from the Far East.

It was not long before the difficulties began: with fuel, pay, logistical support. This later came to include combat training. It was decided here that we were preparing to remove our equipment, so we were forbidden to move any columns out of the unit; guard points were posted at the gates.

Also, when the republics started to organize their own armies, the soldiers were being called to stations in locations from where they had come. So, what we have now is confusion. Parents come to visit their sons, and, when they hear the shooting, they virtually sweep their sons up in their arms and take them home.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What are your feelings about the conflict in the Dniester area?

[Biryukov] Things became much worse at the end of February, when the shooting started. We assumed a neutral position: We did nothing in word or deed that would express any opinion of what was going on. This is definitely a political conflict, and the Army is now above politics. Remember how everyone demanded that it be depoliticized?

Things got to the point where officers stopped wearing their uniform during their free time in town.

But later, when the Tiraspol officers demanded an end to the bloodshed, and we supported them, good relations came back into play.

I will not enter into a detailed analysis of the course of events. There are armed people standing on both sides, and it is hard to say who is the one who shoots first. There are too many weapons here. A case in point:

Dniester area female activists seized stores of a unit located not far from here and took a large number of pistols and automatic rifles. This is something they did on their own, but now the commander is threatened with legal action. He could not order fire on the women! Nevertheless, Andreyeva should be held legally accountable for her actions.

In a word, we are trying to avoid being drawn into the conflict. Even at that, weapons have been used against us. A bullet from a sniper's rifle became lodged in the safety glass of a BTR, bullets flew through windows of apartments housing servicemen, and one of our officers was fired upon with an automatic rifle at a bus stop.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Are you willing to step between the opposing sides? That certainly is more dangerous than being neutral. What does the brigade think about that?

[Biryukov] They are willing to do so. They are tired of this tense uncertainty. We do understand that, without calling the troops, nothing will be accomplished. But no one can replace us here. At the same time, we do not expect a rapid resolution of the conflict. For example, if the Moldova police or the OPON are ordered to go away, it is unlikely that the volunteers will lay down their arms in the near future.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How did the brigade react to the transfer "to Russia"?

[Biryukov] Enthusiastically. The CIS is presently a nebulous concept, but there is belief in Russia. What have appeared are certainty, three-colored flags... But that is all there is so far; everything else is the same as before. We are waiting for things to get better.

More on the above:

Our correspondent, Nikolay Mulyar, informs us that the bilateral commission on mediation of the Dniester area conflict held another session in Bender. The sides presented contrasting positions. The Bender representatives were of the opinion that implementation of the 12 April protocol would lead to nothing less than withdrawal of the city of Bender from the Moldovan Dniester Republic.

Viktor Katane, first deputy minister for internal affairs of the Republic of Moldova, has expressed his point of view. In a Moldova radio interview, he stated emphatically that both sides have accomplished much, but that it was not possible to complete the work, since it was decided to deliberate the 12 April protocol in city soviet session in Bender. This is spite of the fact that it was "approved by the Higher Security Council of the Republic of Moldova and the Supreme Soviet of the so-called Moldovan Dniester Republic."

KAZAKHSTAN

**Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Relations
on Trade with PRC**

92US03904 Alma-Ata QAZAQ ADEBIYETI in Kazakh
3 Jan 92 p 11

[Interview with Bolatkhan Qozhanuly Tayzhanov, first deputy minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan Ministry for External Economic Relations, recorded by Zhangabek Shaghataj: "Now We Cannot Be Armed"]

[Text] After the 21 December incident in Alma-Ata which brought about the funeral of an empire as powerful as the USSR, a new trade and economic agreement has come into being between the PRC and Kazakhstan. How is this agreement valuable for us? Will it be able to alleviate, in the slightest way, our economic situation, which worsens each day?

Below, Bolatkhan Qozhanuly Tayzhanov, first deputy minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan Ministry for External Economic Relations, answers such questions weighing on our minds.

[Shaghataj] The ink on the trade and economic agreement signed between Kazakhstan and the PRC has still not dried. However, just now we live forced not to sell everything possible to others, but to buy more. That is to say, at what level will we be able to carry out this trade?

[Tayzhanov] Let us look in more detail at the new content of our trade and economic agreements. As we all know, such agreements hitherto were carried out only by Moscow, and it was difficult to know what the respective weight of each republic was in such agreements. We had to put up with only general quantitative figures, and be satisfied. Now, God has answered our prayers, and we have signed directly, in the name of our republic, the first agreement signed since we have attained independence. This is an unmistakable sign of our emergence into the international arena. Moreover, it is our duty to sign many more such agreements in the future. Whether it is with Turkey, with the Arab countries of the Near East, Iran directly to the south, or the countries of southern Asia, which are placing emphasis on relations with us since they are bordering countries, wherever you look, we must strengthen economic relations with rich Japan, and with all these countries. As can be seen, there are things which still have to be done. We cannot forget economic solidarity with Western countries.

However, it is difficult to speak about a specific volume of trade with China. This is because trade will be a protracted, continued process. There is no doubt that turnover will grow and increase with each passing year. Moreover, there are no limits. Agreements have been made among more than 80 sectors, including light industry, and the machinery building sector. Organizations and production establishments producing goods of the two countries have made agreements directly, and

have determined the values of specific goods. We, on the other hand, provide general directions.

[Shaghataj] In addition to buying and selling goods, we have a greater need of investment, to liberate our economy from its present structure, and of bringing technology up to world levels. In particular, the 14,000 tonnes of sugar obtained from China via Qorghas are wonderful. However, what is this sugar going to cost us?

[Tayzhanov] Please remember that we are very much in need of sugar at present. Another 6,000 tonnes of sugar are being delivered through Qorghas. Likewise, we need fodder, and flour products. We will bring in part of the needed fodder from abroad, including from China. To be sure, the primary goal of our ministry is, as before, to obtain technology up to world levels, equipment and product-producing machinery. However, our present primary goal is supply food to the people. There will be people doubting that "Chinese industrial technology is among the best." First of all, we will not take obsolete systems not up to the needs of the times. Second, we must not forget that the Chinese have their scientific and technological achievements. Achievements in light industry and in the textile sector are not just the accomplishments of a few years, but are a national tradition which has taken shape over the centuries.

China lags behind none in its production of complex equipment needed for daily use based upon its cybernetics sector, mastery of computers and its microchips. For that reason, we believe that the achievements of a neighboring country can be of help to us.

[Shaghataj] The day of the USSR is over, its empire has disintegrated. There is eager discussion about our obtaining of independence in Alma-Ata. Now one of our great tasks will be to know how to defend that independence. China is one of the powerful countries exporting weapons abroad today. That is to say, is there nothing about the purchase of weapons in this agreement?

[Tayzhanov] This is an interesting question. However, the answer is no. The question has not been touched on. In addition, there is no doubt that the weapons stocks of the USSR, which has just collapsed, will suffice for some years. It would be good if we were able to destroy these stocks. At present, to be sure, there is a general disarmament taking place in the world. Is not even the removal of American nuclear weapons from South Korea a pleasant event? Just now it would be inappropriate for our country, which has just achieved its independence, to make efforts to buy weapons. There are also no surplus funds. We must consider where we are going to obtain funds not included in the budget.

In any case, it would be best if Asian materials were sources of peace and restraint.

The authority of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan has grown unceasingly in the world. We always notice this and hear about it when we make agreements with those in foreign countries. What Kazakhstan needs

today is social peace, and for that reason I myself ask from the people that if, in the new year, they make known their self-control and tenacity, if they believe that "at the root of self-control is gold," then certainly the inter-ethnic circumstances of Kazakhstan will thereby improve, and there is no doubt that we will join the ranks of leading countries. By working together and cooperating with one another, we have carried out intended plans and measures. My request as reader is that the intellectual public read more frequently in the pages of QAZAQ ADEBIYETI the meaningful, carefully-thought-out views of intelligent people on social, economic and political conditions.

[Shaghatay] Thank you!

Administration Chief on Republic Unemployment

92US0391A Alma-Ata QAZAQ ADEBIYETI in Kazakh
17 Jan 92 p 7

[Interview with Serik Abilqasymov, chief of the Chief Administration for Providing Work to the People under the Republic of Kazakhstan Ministry of Labor, recorded by Talapian Akhmetzhan Tegi: "Who Are Those Unemployed?"]

[Text] As market-place relationships take hold in our nation, it is quite clear that unemployment has begun to spread. Inasmuch as the only way to get out of this unavoidable dead-end is for us to study ways of providing the people with work, and to take control of the process, the law "On Providing Work to the People" was ratified at the 1990 session of the republic Supreme Council. The law came into force 1 July, last year. Our reporter spoke with Serik Abilqasymov, chief of the Chief Administration for Providing Work to the People under the Republic of Kazakhstan Ministry of Labor, regarding what other measures are being carried out intended to save the people from the yoke of unemployment, and regarding whether or not unemployment will become a danger to the Kazakh nationality in the future.

[Akhmetzhan Tegi] Serik Serghaliuly, will you touch on the degree that the numbers of those seeking employment have increased recently, and on what segment of the people will be subject more frequently to the labor market?

[Abilqasymov] Beginning with the coming into force of the "Law on Providing Work to the People," almost 100,000 persons have come to organs providing work. Most are women. Some 25,000 of those coming looking for work lack specialties, or are elemental workers. To be sure, it is difficult to find work for such people. We advise most of them, if they are unsuited to the labor market, or if they are in a popular specialty, about the need to go to educational institutions to prepare for specialties for which there is a high demand. We also give this advice to people without specialties. We have referred some 62,000 to jobs. Of them, 41,000 were hired. The remaining persons are in the process of trying to find jobs. We have sent 2,000 to other educational institutions to get new specialties. These persons are

studying supported by social funds. Some 1,000 persons have found jobs in public work.

However, some 4,000 of those seeking work remain unemployed. Quite a number of them are being paid assistance in connection with their unemployment. Southern and western oblasts densely settled by Kazakhs were among the first areas to suffer from unemployment. In particular, the rate of unemployment among young people in Mangystaw, Shymkent, and Zhambyl oblasts is considerably higher than in other oblasts. When investigations were carried out among the unemployed, it was ascertained that 80 percent were women. And almost half were young people up to age 29. Some 74 percent of those unemployed were persons with middle and specialized education, and about 20 percent were persons with a higher education.

In conclusion, we can say that the situation grows worse day by day. Whereas the number of those seeking work in July in the republic was 3-9,000, the figure has now grown to 11-13,000.

Transition to a market economy, privatization, the closing of unprofitable or totally profitless industries, the ending of state finance, the freeing of prices, and the increased competition of industries, have in their time drastically increased the number of unemployed. During October of last year, as a result of the reasons mentioned, numbers of unemployed increased by 24 to 29 percent. The situation in 1992 is still more difficult. According to surveys of the Ministry of Labor, some 1.7 million people have looked for work. Some 574,000 of them have found work on their own. Some 325,000 have remained unemployed, and have attained the status of unemployed. Most of them are women with children, persons without specialties, young people and those in the prime of life.

[Akhmetzhan Tegi] We cannot perceive a ray of hope like some burning beacon from these many unfortunate statistics. This being the case, should we throw up our hands and say: "God has decided, what else can we do?"

[Abilqasymov] No, we should absolutely not throw up our hands. We must work actively with local councils, with organizations and industries needing workers. The most important thing is to put effort into having people change specialties, into retraining and into on-the-job training. Within the republic we must retrain 110,000 persons in other specialties in this manner. Some 60,000 persons are being provided public work, and some 6,000 must be sent to labor-short areas. At present there is labor shortage in agriculture in particular. Likewise, it would be proper if we were to make efforts to organize small industries in areas of dense settlement. It would be very convenient if such industries were organized in proximity to the centers providing the labor. Such small industries must become places producing consumer goods, or places making possible involvement with craftsmanship now beginning to be forgotten. At present, the number of such small industries has reached 40. Some 1,500 persons work in them. However, in 1992, the number of such industries will reach 250, and those

involved in working in them 14-15,000. Those laid off, and the unemployed, are being grouped into such small industries. However, in all we are paying assistance to more than 100,000.

[Akhmetzhan Tegi] At a time like the present, when prices are on the rise, and the high prices of everything oppress, it is not easy to keep body and soul together with assistance. We have no doubt that most of those 100,000 are our Kazakh kinsmen. At present, when we have just obtained our independence after suffering all kinds of historical grief, one cannot help but have the sad thought that if our young people, whom we have faith in as our future, are unemployed, and live on assistance, is this the joy of freedom yearned for for centuries by our ancestors?...

[Abilqasymov] Indeed, we get nothing without effort. The freedom yearned for for centuries by our ancestors has imposed upon us a terrible burden. The one way to avoid losing our freedom is to know how to overcome the difficulties we encounter. The Kazakhs have the proverb: "Adjust your hat in accordance with the times." This being the case, liberating ourselves completely from the former materialistic psychology, we must be profoundly concerned about the proverb: "May the sheep find the wormwood left behind by the donkey."

In fact, oil processing plants in Guryev need workers. There persons who have come from many republics of the former Soviet Union are working overtime. They are not basic, reliable labor forces for us. They are people here today, gone tomorrow. For that reason, if we create very fine small cities with good cultural and living standards in places where the industries are, it will be possible for us to concentrate our young people there. To the extent that we do not ourselves master the riches of our own lands, we will not be able to enjoy abundance. Thus there are a great many still unresolved questions. We must begin the preparation of capable national cadres willing to take of the challenge without wavering. Without this, it will not be easy to save ourselves from the severe difficulties of a market economy.

Activities of 'Yedinstvo' Movement Outlined

92US04004 Alma-Ata ZHAS ALASH in Kazakh
7 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Gh. Sagymbayev: "'Yedinstvo' Makes A Lot Of Noise And Then Goes, But We Remain"]

[Text] The pledge of the 'Yedinstvo' Movement to Republic of Kazakhstan President N.A. Nazarbayev has been published in the pages of KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA. I think it fitting for me to express my own views regarding this pledge. This is because 'Yedinstvo,' from the time of its formation, has emerged as one of the organizations forming a barrier to the young national democracy of the Kazakhs.

While the name of the organization is 'Yedinstvo' (Unity), its actions and "pledge" have been directed

against Kazakhstan's formation of an independent nation of its own, and against its formation of a national state, and at obtaining illegal benefits and preferences for seasonal workers and vagabonds while preserving the obsolete colonialist order.

'Yedinstvo' strives to break the peace, to generate enmity and distrust among peoples, and to blacken and denigrate the major accomplishments of our president in this area.

'Yedinstvo,' appearing as the protector of non-indigenous peoples and mobilizing them against the Kazakhs, spreads the rumor that "many benefits and preferences are being given to the local nationality."

But if we look at the truth, what kind of benefits are these benefits, and who is enjoying them?

It is true that 93 percent of Kazakhstan industries were under the control of Union ministries and authorities. Managers sent in by the central authority have brought in from outside with them not only their assistants, engineers and technicians, but also custodians, guards, cashiers and machinists. If not, they choose these persons from among local Slavic residents. To this end the government expends many billions of rubles of financing, and unending material resources. Local Kazakhs, at the same time, cannot find work, cannot support their families, and are on the streets, and they are not put to work or sent to school.

The reason is understandable. Chauvinist managers begrudge Kazakhs the high-paying jobs and benefits associated with such jobs, and have no desire to give them to them.

It is well known that wages in industries controlled by the Union are 2-3 times greater, that workers and managers working in them are completely guaranteed housing, kindergarten, cafeterias, vacation facilities, trade and communal organizations.

Kazakhs do not work in these organizations because they are not hired to work in them. Housing is not given to those not working. Their children are not accepted in kindergarten, and they have no access to health care. If the vagabond workers consider Kazakhstan their native land, if they are not going to go to another country tomorrow, then they must make an effort to come to some sort of an accommodation with local people, and to live with justice and honor. We see the nature of 'Yedinstvo's' so-called "preferences" given Kazakhs from these examples.

Not one of the 130 kindergartens in Pavlodar city is given over to the education of Kazakh children in their mother tongue. However, if we calculate the number of Kazakhs living there, we can see that the need for Kazakh kindergarten is quite proper. While there is the news that one kindergarten will be turned over the Kazakh children in Aqtobe, a meeting of local Russians has taken place and the cry has been raised: "We will not

give it to the Kazakhs." If we calculate the number of Kazakhs in the city, they should have not just one kindergarten, but 40 percent of Aqtobe kindergartens. Only recently, S. Medvedev gave "permission" for one kindergarten to operate in Kazakh in the city of Petropav. Thus, only picked-over privileges are tossed to the Kazakhs.

In Alma-Ata, with much fanfare, two of 200 schools have been converted to Kazakh language instruction. Now, children between the ages of 7-10 in a great city of more than a million have to worry about getting on a bus and traveling from one end of the city to the other to go to school. Russian schools, however, are in every convenient location, on every street, and there are more than one. These schools are not filled with students. Buildings of some schools have been put into use as offices, as post offices, as libraries, as teaching-production artels, and for other purposes.

From the standpoint of justice, and if we take into account the numbers of Kazakhs in the city, some 50-60 schools should be given to Kazakh children. But in fact, justice has not been considered.

This circumstance is encountered in places other than oblast centers and in any of the industrial cities. 'Yedintsvo' is not at all concerned about such injustice. It is well known that, in their times, Kazakh schools and kindergartens have been closed without any fanfare at all, quietly. However, now that there is discussion of taking charge of them again, there is a lot of noise about "damage to the interests of the non-indigenous people."

Unfortunately, the thoughts and actions of colonialists are not concerned about justice. This is because colonialists are unconcerned about the rights of others. Rowdies in Qaraghandy last summer twice invaded Kazakh schools, destroyed doors and windows, damaged property and beat students and teachers. They held in their hands racist slogans stating: "Kazakhs cannot be allowed to stay in Qaraghandy," and shouted in the streets. The police called in to help arrived two hours later, and were unable to arrest anyone.

Unknown people in Alma-Ata destroyed an iron barrier separating Kazakh and Russian schools by throwing a grenade. They have not been called to account. Kazakh children forced to study in Russian schools have been subjected to continuous intimidation and violence. They have been beaten up and abused, forced to smoke tobacco, have had the money stolen from their pockets, and the students themselves have been excluded from cafeterias and lavatories.

Graves of Kazakhs have been destroyed in Alma-Ata. Chauvinists have explained this by saying: "This is the work of drunken youths, the pranks of children." If they were drunk, or were children, how were they "smart" enough to destroy only the graves of Kazakhs? During the same period of time Kazakh graves were destroyed in the vicinity of Qostanay, in Arqalyq, in Aqmola, and in other places. Was this the work of those drunk, or of

children, or was this a matter of intimidation of Kazakhs by chauvinists with a single centralized control? Kazakhs have no right to know their mother tongue and culture, to be educated, to develop, and themselves solve economic and social questions. The chauvinistic view that "representatives of a given ethnic group are not to be involved in protecting an ethnic group's interests, but representatives of other ethnic groups," is being put into practice. However, we can see clearly what the "care" of another ethnic group for the Kazakhs will be like from their present state of helplessness.

The day has dawned upon the Kazakhs for them to live like human beings in their own land, to preserve their mother tongue, to honor their national culture, and maintain their traditions and customs; for them to raise their families. They want to teach their children in their own language, and are speaking this language. They have become subject to maliciousness such as fraud, libel, slander, humiliation, intimidation and scorn. "Our masters" do not like the wishes of the Kazakhs, they are unwilling to be deprived of the favors they have become used to for 74 years, of the delicacies they like so well.

Without rights, those speaking of justice are saying nothing, and the vagabonds and colonialists continue to carry out their rebellions. They take away our national riches and strive to exploit them for their own individual interests. As they do so, they greatly alarm us. The coal, oil, iron, fertilizer, food, wool, bauxite, and other riches of Kazakhstan are being sold to foreign countries, and they are getting for themselves nice clothing, light vehicles, televisions and VCRs.

However, the owners of these riches, the Kazakhs, are those who are cut off from everything, who are in a hopeless state. They have no houses, are not hired. They have established no national schools and kindergartens. They cannot speak their native language. Wherever they go, they must speak only Russian at the office, at the post office, at banks, hospitals and in artels. The reason is that those there do not know how to speak Kazakh, and have no desire to know.

Those of our Kazakhs who are in positions of authority, do not exercise control over how Kazakh is used as a state language, and make no demand that Kazakh be used. This is because they are afraid in their hearts that they might lose their posts and their salaries.

We cannot expect to gain our future and our happiness from anyone. We have no hope in others. If tomorrow they wear out our land, if they steal our riches, they will set out for their own historical homeland while we, on the other hand, will be left behind in the ruins. We must not believe in deception advanced by 'Yedinstvo' that, "just as Kazakhstan is the motherland for Kazakhs, the same is also true for the vagabonds."

'Yedinstvo makes a lot of noise and then departs, but we remain. How are we to live, and what will our future be like? At a time like this, when we have put a stop to the theft, when we are thinking about the concerns of the

people, it may be too late. "The empire has fallen, now each people has attained its independence." These are empty words, pronounced to deceive the people. The empire is still alive, it has not been overthrown. There are still a sufficient number of its supporters and defenders.

The Kazakhs, who are returning to their country after many years of persecution, are not being sent to the empty apartments of local chauvinist managers, or to inhabited areas where people have departed and left space. What kind of disorganization is this? Likewise, they are calling in their comrades from other parts, and are providing them with housing, and are making a place for them. No one is putting a stop to this. Officials of the Taran Rayon Educational Division in Qostanay Oblast have written a letter summoning Russian fugitives to Qostanay Oblast via UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA. It is noted that the promise is made that "we will provide good jobs, high salaries and housing."

A man called V. Bondaryenko has, through KOMSO-MOLSKAYA PRAVDA, called upon troops released from the army not to go to Moscow or Siberia, but to go directly to central Kazakhstan, or to Qaraghandy. He lays it on thick saying that salaries are up to 3000 rubles a month, that those coming will get places in dormitories, that there are circuses, cultural and sports palaces, stadiums, movie theaters, cafes and restaurants, a university, pedagogical, polytechnical and medical institutes, a higher police school, and technicums.

This paper is read by 17860 persons, and if we bear in mind that the size of the military is now being reduced, what guarantee is there that, in response to Bondaryenko's "invitation," 10-12 divisions, the demobilized soldiers and their generals, will not come to Kazakhstan?

With or without an invitation, the number of vagabonds coming to Kazakhstan increases day by day. If in previous years their numbers did not exceed 30-50,000, in 1990 their numbers were 632,000; if figures for last year did not increase much over this, they were not much less.

Although it sees all this and is aware of it, our Supreme Council has not ratified a law on emigration. This is something very incomprehensible and dangerous. The reason is that if we do not stop the flood of vagabonds, in 4 or 5 years, we will be hearing from these vagabonds that the name "Kazakhstan" should be changed. If not, there are forces in our Supreme Council which would like to make our country henceforth a "Vagabonds' Horde." The idea is that those who wish to come should come, those who wish to go, should go, that the Kazakh lands thus have no owners, no masters, and whoever wants them should have them as he likes, to expend to his own purposes. In fact the sad thing is that this state of affairs is still not taken into consideration.

UZBEKISTAN

Decree on Apportionment of Credit Resources

925D03494 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
11 Apr 92 p 1

[Decree issued by the Cabinet of Ministers under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan: "On Apportioning Credit Resources"]

[Text] In order to provide and ensure the necessary conditions for the normal functioning of this republic's national economy under the conditions of an increasing rise in prices and a shortage of credit resources, to reduce the acuteness of the payments crisis and the strain on the accounts of most enterprises and organizations, to carry out on-schedule spring sowing operations, and to provide the population with a stable supply of food items and consumer goods, the Cabinet of Ministers hereby decrees the following:

1. It is recommended that the State Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan allocate—for targeted purposes and with the observance of strict requirements—additional or supplementary credit resources in the amount of 9 billion rubles [R] for granting credits to high-priority sectors, primarily the agroindustrial complex, the basic sectors of industry, construction, trade and commerce, as well as supply, marketing, and sales organizations.

The above-indicated credit resources shall be granted to the Uzagroprombank [Uzbek Agroindustrial Bank] in the total amount of R5 billion and to the Uzpromstroybank [Uzbek Industrial Construction Bank] in the total amount of R4 billion by drawing on funds obtained from the sale of above-norm, surplus reserve supplies, by re-evaluating commodity stocks, and by shortening the terms of accounts.

It is established that the payment of debts shall be carried out in a top-priority procedure to this republic's suppliers.

2. The Uzagroprombank shall be granted targeted credits for paying out wages and paying up accounts for equipment being delivered, commodity stocks, work performed, and services rendered to agriculture in a total amount of as much as R2.1 billion; to the processing sectors of the agroindustrial complex—R0.5 billion; to consumer-cooperative organizations—R1.0 billion; to supply-and-marketing organizations—R0.7 billion; and to construction organizations—R0.7 billion.

3. The Uzpromstroybank shall be granted credits in the total amount of R4 billion of this amount; as much as R1.3 billion shall go to the trade organizations; R0.5 billion to the Uzbekneft and Goskomnefteprodukt production associations; R0.95 billion to enterprises of the chemical industry, machine-building, and metallurgy; R0.25 billion to the supply-and-marketing organizations; and R1.0 billion to the construction organizations.

4. This republic's ministries and departments shall conduct the appropriate work within a month's time on verifying and reducing the debit-credit indebtedness. And they shall report to the Cabinet of Ministers regarding the solubility of the sub-departmental enterprises and organizations.

5. The Uzagroprombank (Comrade Akhadov) and the Uzpromstroybank (Comrade Azimov) shall provide up-to-date forecasts on the needs of the sectors being serviced for bank credits. And they shall take effective measures to mobilize resources.

6. It is proposed that the Uzgosbank [Uzbek State Bank]—in conjunction with the Uzagroprombank and the Uzpromstroybank—in July of this year inform the republic-level government concerning the state of the accounts in the national economy, taking into consideration the execution of the present decree.

[Signed] *I. Karimov, chairman, Cabinet of Ministers*

Decree on Measures To Prevent Illegal Financing of Organizations

925D0351A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
14 Apr 92 p 1

[Decree issued by the Republic of Uzbekistan's Supreme Soviet Presidium: "On Measures To Prevent the Illegal Financing of Public Associations in the Republic of Uzbekistan"]

[Text] On the whole, the Law on Public Associations—which was adopted in this republic on 15 February 1991—has had a positive effect upon consolidating the society around finding genuine sovereignty, as well as upon stabilizing the sociopolitical situation in this republic.

Nevertheless, instances have recently been noted involving the illegal financing of certain public associations by means of funds which are not provided for by the registered charters of these organizations.

Guided by the above-mentioned law, and in order to unconditionally carry out the provisions therein, the Republic of Uzbekistan's Supreme Soviet Presidium hereby **decrees** the following:

1. The Republic of Uzbekistan's Ministry of Justice shall implement the registration of charters of those public associations provided for in Article 1 of the Law "On Public Associations in the Republic of Uzbekistan," when such associations shall present or submit declarations concerning the sources for financing their activities, including publishing activities, and the contents of their press organs.

2. The Republic of Uzbekistan's Ministry of Finance, Procuracy, and Main State Tax Administration shall strictly adhere to the provisions of the law concerning

the procedure and sources of financing the activities of the public associations registered in accordance with the above-indicated law.

In case facts are revealed involving a violation of financial discipline, measures shall be applied as provided for by the law, right up to and including handing the appropriate materials over to the juridical organs.

3. It shall be established that political parties and mass movements pursuing political goals shall not have the right to carry on publishing activities or maintain press organs by means of funds coming in from religious organizations or from foreign states, organizations, and citizens.

4. The Committee on Affairs of Legislation, Legality, and Law-Enforcement shall prepare and introduce at the next session of the Republic of Uzbekistan's Supreme Soviet proposals with regard to making appropriate additions, amendments, and changes to the Law on Public Associations.

[Signed] *B. Burgov, deputy chairman, Republic of Uzbekistan Supreme Soviet*
Tashkent
3 April 1992

Measures To Facilitate Trade With China Viewed

92UN1251A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
14 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Dmitriy Goroshin: "A Window Onto China"]

[Text] Having become a member of the world community, the Republic of Uzbekistan is developing political, economic, and cultural ties with foreign countries.

Certain persons were quite skeptical when this republic began to take its initial steps toward establishing political and economic contacts—without glancing back at the former center. Such doubts disappeared after Islam Abduganiyevich Karimov's visits to India, Turkey, and China. These visits were marked by the establishment of diplomatic relations with these countries and by the signing of several important governmental documents, including some pertaining to the regulation of trade and economic cooperation.

The documents which were signed have opened up the road for our entrepreneurs to establish closer ties with business circles in friendly states.

During I.A. Karimov's visit to China he declared the following in an interview: "As a result of this meeting, several agreements will be signed; and they will serve as the foundation for the further development of ties between the two countries."

Entrepreneurs must become the "standard-bearers" of the government's reform policy. By this term we should

understand not only members of cooperatives, but also the leading officials of state enterprises, kolkhozes, and farming enterprises.

Because of I.A. Karimov's visit to the PRC, all the factors in our republic have been activated to facilitate the fastest possible progress in developing business contacts with that country. However, Uzbekistan's geopolitical position in relation to China is quite complicated. This republic has no common border with China, and, therefore, there are virtually no trade routes directly linking our local entrepreneurs with their Chinese colleagues. And throughout the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] as a whole, transportation egress to the PRC has been complicated by the stoppages and shutdown of ports and stations. This was caused by the increase in the flow of exports and imports. The only existing railroad link connecting the CIS countries with China through the Zabaykalsk-Manchzhuriya Station is shut down today for an indefinite period due to the accumulation of freight; its processing will require a minimum of six months. During this enforced "stoppage" the export goods will be subjected to thefts, they will spoil, or fall below acceptable quality standards. When shipping out goods, the top-priority right is accorded to Russia. The sole solution for us in this situation is to seek out or create a new way to untangle this transportation "knot."

And we have found such a way. By signing a series of agreements, a "window onto China" was cut through by the Uzvneshekonommash Foreign Economic Association, headed up by its director general, N.M. Sharapov. Its representative, O.S. Sarkisyan, has concluded an agreement on mutually advantageous cooperation between the association, the Amur River Shipping Company, and the Khabarovsk River Port. This agreement provides for the use of the above-mentioned Far Eastern river port's production capacities for servicing goods coming from the Republic of Uzbekistan not only to China, but also to the countries of Southeast Asia—to Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Hong Kong, and others.

The agreement presents a unique opportunity to ferry a cargo flow of export-import goods along the Amur from Khabarovsk to these states without stoppages or delays.

Both sides have agreed to channel their joint efforts into further developing and modernizing the port for receiving goods from Uzbekistan. It was stipulated that in 1992 this port—as a first step—would assume the obligation of receiving, storing, and unloading 20,000 metric tonnes of export goods.

Taking the further development of the goods flow into account, the association will participate in improving this port's material-and-technical base beginning as early as the present year.

The Alyans Multiple-Type Cooperative-Commercial Center has assumed a function of considerable importance. It will prepare goods for shipment and transmit information to the port as to the times of their arrival.

All this eloquently reaffirms the following well-known thesis: "Borders do not exist for entrepreneurs." Thanks to their endeavors, we can now avoid breaking our promises with regard to deliveries, cargo delays, penalty fines, and the possible loss of faith in our reliability on the part of our foreign partners. In taking this modest step on their own initiatives, the Uzvneshekonommash Association and the Alyans MKKTs [Multiple-Type Cooperative-Commercial Center] are counting on support from the government of an independent Republic of Uzbekistan.

U.S. Specialists in Taming Uzbek Oil Gusher

924A1048A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Apr 92 pp 1, 6

[Article by Vitaliy Kolbasyuk and Vladimir Svartsevich: "Taming a 'Golden Fountain': American Specialists Help Uzbek Oil Men To Cope With a Sensational Oil Field; Uzbekistan Will Become Rich From a 'Thousand Springs'"]

[Text] A U.S. Air Force C-14 military transport airplane appeared over Namangan. It brought complex equipment for the oil field named Minbulak, which—when translated—means "a thousand springs." A golden rain has been and still is "pouring" over Uzbekistan. This has compelled the authorities to surround the oil field with a solid cordon of police and security-service personnel. American journalists were permitted to take several photographs, but the authorities demanded that the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA staff photographer show them accreditation from Uzbekistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, they treated him like a foreigner. The photograph was actually taken on the sly.

In the eyes of the specialists, this major oil field in Uzbekistan is not a gift sent by Allah; a great deal of exploratory work and prospecting was conducted here for a long time. Mingbulak could prove to be one of the world's best future oil fields. The minimal price per metric ton amounts to 350 rubles or 150 dollars. That means that on an annual basis (in the opinion of B. Rapigaliyev, khakim [governor] of Namangan Oblast), even calculating the volume assumed for the immediate future, Namangan Oblast could produce more than 1.5 billion rubles worth or hundreds of millions of dollars worth of this valuable raw material.

The oil gusher (whose pressure at the mouth is as much as 700 atmospheres) has caused considerable trouble not only for the petroleum specialists and oil workers, but also for the inhabitants of the surrounding villages, cotton growers, ecologists, and the inhabitants of Namangan. Naturally, the people here were not prepared to receive this "black gold."

The Republic of Uzbekistan's government took extraordinary and urgent measures on the second day after the appearance of this sensation. Work was begun on taming the "golden" fountain, the rain from which covered quite a large area. When the oil workers began to take the drilling rig apart, the gusher filled in.

In the specialists' opinion, setting fire to the well was the optimal variant from both an ecological as well as an economic point of view. But now—by using technology and equipment—we must shut off this fiery fountain. The American firm Stan Cornelius Enterprises offered its services to the Uzbek oilmen. These Americans have tamed oil gushers in Texas, Mexico, Kuwait, and China. Their combat score stands at 60 such wells.

The American specialists think that the pressure in the Mingbulak Oil Well is very great. But they also consider that the actions taken by their Uzbek colleagues were correct. And a joint operation is still envisaged.

It appears that a joint venture will operate this well, and the equipment will be a concrete contribution to the future joint venture. In the opinion of the American specialists, their assistance to the Uzbek oilmen in taming this stubborn well will cost several million dollars. The specialists figure that this mighty oil gusher, which has caused so much trouble, will be contained by the beginning of May.

ARMENIA

Nuclear Power Station Safety Examined

924A1004A Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA
in Russian 2 Apr 92 p 2

[Interview with Karapet Sarafyan, deputy general director of the National Seismic Protection Service (NSSZ), by Vigeik Sarkisyan: "The Armenian AES: A Check on Its Seismicity"]

[Text] On ordinary occasions, discussion about the AES [nuclear electric power station] has developed with special sharpness. It is completely obvious now that "atomic" fears will be seething for a long time, at least until all the "i's" have been dotted and all the "t's" crossed in this four-year dispute. This time, not only the harsh winter, which was spent without gas and light, but also the government's repudiated position on the question of the AES, has served as a push toward a beginning. Is a repeat startup of the station possible? This question is agitating many today. Nevertheless, during the dispute some have forgotten an extremely important aspect, and the decision to mothball the facility was adopted right away after the Spitak earthquake by virtue of the increased seismic danger. But what has changed since then? Perhaps the AES no longer is situated in an earthquake-prone zone?

Today Karapet Sarafyan, deputy general director of the National Seismic-Protection Service (NSSZ), answers RA's [RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA's] questions.

[Sarkisyan] Mr. Sarafyan, to our knowledge the National Service was given an assignment by a government commission that includes NSSZ General Director Professor S. Balasanyan to evaluate finally the seismicity of the area of the AES. There is no doubt that this question is the most critical feature of the power station's problem.

[Sarafyan] Your information is correct. This problem was previously raised also and sharpened by the President at the Council for Safety, at which, in a report about the seismicity of the AES area, Professor S. Balasanyan spoke as a member of the government commission. In order to solve the problem, the National Service was charged with creating two independent consultant groups. The first included leading specialists of the Institute of Earth Physics of the Russian AN [Academy of Sciences]—the CIS's main seismological coordination center. In charge was corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of Russia A. Nikolayev, who is chairman of the CIS's Consulting Council for Evaluating Seismic Danger and Forecasting Earthquakes and chairman of the counterpart international commission, that is, he is the world's greatest specialist. Other members: V. Ulomov, corresponding member of the Uzbekistan AN, one of the CIS's leading specialists in the field of seismology; V. Shteynberg, doctor of mathematical-physics sciences and chairman of the consultants' group for evaluating seismic danger for MAGATE [International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)]; and K. Rogozhin, doctor of mineralogical-geology sciences and a major

specialist in the area of seismotectonics. The consultants' group of the Republic of Armenia invited leading specialists from various organizations: the Institute of Geophysics and Engineering Seismology, the Institute of Geology, the State Administration for Mineral Resources, a geological party, and, naturally, three specialists from the National Service.

For their consultations, both groups, which were operating independently, were given all the available data and information that the various organizations that work on the AES's seismicity problem had at their disposal. It must be noted that the invited consultants know Armenia well enough, and many of them have the results of their own still-unpublished research of recent years. One can certify that the consultants' groups were presented all the information on the region for the past quarter of a century.

[Sarkisyan] What deadlines were given for making a comprehensive analysis of the information?

[Sarafyan] The consultants needed from the 13th to the 25th of February for analyzing the full extent of the information on seismicity of the AES site. For professionals who know their business well, this period was adequate. The CIS's consultants group also worked in Armenia.

[Sarkisyan] Tell me, what specific questions were posed to the consultants?

[Sarafyan] Four questions in all. 1. Is there enough existing information for drawing a conclusion on the seismicity of the AES site? 2. What is the reference scale value for the site? 3. What is the increment of scale value because of the engineering-geology conditions? 4. What are the dynamics of seismic activeness for Armenia and adjacent regions? The answers to these questions should clear up conclusively two values of seismic danger that were not used in assessing the seismicity of the AES's site: the design earthquake, and the maximum estimated earthquake.

[Sarkisyan] Well, what conclusions did the consultants arrive at?

[Sarafyan] After completion of the work, the conclusions were presented to the National Service. The consultants of the NSSZ Council examined them and certified to the following: the conclusions of both groups noted the completeness and adequacy of the existing information for making a valid evaluation of the AES site's seismicity. In regard to an increase in scale value as a whole, the initial information was satisfactory. The CIS's consultants' group assessed the reference scale value at 8.5 points, the Republic of Armenia group at nine points. These assessments coincided with the conclusions of Framat (France) consultants, which were given in 1991 (the French specialists' design earthquake was assessed at nine points, and the maximum calculated one was 10 points), and with the conclusions of the Yerevan Branch of Armenergoprojekt [Armenian Design Institute for the

Design of Power Facilities] (in 1989, nine and 10 points, respectively), the Interagency Council on Seismology and Seismicity of the AN USSR, and USSR Gosstroy [State Committee for Construction]. This assessment was reflected in the seismic regionalization map of Armenia's territory, which designated this area as a nine-point zone, and in the results of much research performed in recent years. The CIS consultants' group evaluated the increment of scale value, using engineering-geology conditions, at +1 point, while the RA consultants' group gave two assessments: zero points and +(0.6-0.8) points. This difference was occasioned by the fact that the estimates were conducted by traditional and by new methods. It must be said that in all cases no negative values were obtained, that is, the increments were not subtracted from but were added to the reference scale value.

Further, both consultants' groups noted an increase in the seismic activity of Armenian territory. And this was accompanied during the past 6-7 years by at least five destructive earthquakes, including those of Spitak, Georgia, Turkey, Iran, and now Turkey again.

Based on the reference value and the established repeatability of the earthquakes, the CIS consultants' group gives the following final evaluation for seismicity of the AES site—**8.5 points for the design earthquake, 9.5 for the maximum estimated points**. The Republic of Armenia consultants' group gave nine and 10 points, respectively. Thus this final evaluation of the two consultant groups have extremely close values. It must be noted that in evaluating the seismic danger at the AES site, the main value is the maximal estimated earthquake, that is, in our case 9.5 and 10 points.

In conclusion, the National Service expresses a readiness, with the government's consent, to submit the consultants' papers for any independent judgment, including an international one.

[Sarkisyan] Do you consider that it is necessary to have one more consultancy and that it is better here to act on the principle: "measure seven times...."

[Sarafyan] I consider that the specialists in the consultants' groups operated with full professional responsibility, have such high qualification, and are represented by such authoritative organizations that there is no doubt of the assessments. But since a very serious step is being taken, and it is a question of a very important problem, then for the adoption of a more substantiated decision there it makes sense to have an international consultancy. At least, if such a consultants' group is convened and its assessments coincide with ours, then the government will have no doubt that the Armenian and CIS groups are capable of performing honestly and professionally the job of evaluating the seismicity of a site for harmful and dangerous facilities.

[Sarkisyan] It is clear that the consultants' group came to its conclusion entirely without trying to influence the final solution of the question. As far as I know, the design

earthquake for the Armenian AES is seven points, and the maximum estimated earthquake is eight points. The authoritative commissions have come to different conclusions, that is, that the AES cannot operate. Without at all asking that you give an unambiguous answer to the question, I am confident that many will interpret the groups' conclusions in exactly the same way.

[Sarafyan] The fact is that world experience knows cases of the construction and operation of AES's in high-seismicity areas (the U.S. and Japan). We should have learned the actual natural seismic danger, and all other actions should have been adequate for the level of danger. It is precisely this way in which the problem has been resolved in world experience. It is not the existing danger that is important but the fact that the AES's norms should correspond with this danger. Because of the seismicity, there should be a chain of other problems—for example, the AES's resistance to seismic activity.

And competent consultants' groups which can verify the status of the station and all its components, modules, and structures should also be established. And on that basis the consultants should decide what must be done to bring the station into correspondence with the actual danger, or, if there are no such engineering means, other ways for solving the problem must be found.

[Sarkisyan] Have the results of the consultants' work been reported to the government, and has the mission of the National Service been completed by this?

[Sarafyan] Yes, the governmental commission has become acquainted with the consultants' conclusions. As for the "mission," we have our functions, and we have coped with them, and now we can hand the baton over to other specialists.

[Sarkisyan] And what do you think, Mr. Sarafyan, can the assessment of the consultants' groups be bypassed?

[Sarafyan] Theoretically, it can always be bypassed. It is possible, let's say, to find an interested organization and to finance it, and it would conduct so-called additional research, after which it would give the incremental scale value as -1 point and then the problem of seismicity would be closed. But this would be too unworthy even for the person who would seek such an organization and for the organization that would undertake to carry out this order. But in life everything happens.

[Sarkisyan] Let us suppose that the AES's problem will be removed from the agenda if the government commission makes a decision that its operation is undesirable. Does the "seismic" status of the station itself disappear with this verdict?

[Sarafyan] The question of the AES's "seismic danger" in this case remains in effect, although not to such a severe extent. In general, it is necessary to speak not just

about AES's but also about many other harmful production facilities. We consider that the station in any case should be reliably protected.

For this purpose, the National Service has proposed to the government: repeat the certification of the AES as to its seismic resistance, and strengthen the AES to the level of the existing seismic danger; and improve the AES's seismic protection qualitatively.

Energy Development Highlighted

924A1004B Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA
in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Emil Saakyan, power engineer of PO Armenenergo [Production Association of the Armenian Administration for Power Systems Management]: "Once More on Developing Power Engineering in Armenia"]

[Text] Each state that is on the road to independence should without fail resolve, along with other first-priority problems, the problem of meeting its energy requirements, since power-engineering independence predestines the state. In this connection, the Armenian government, sooner or later, inevitably will have to undertake the development of a strategic (long-term) program for developing the republic's fuel-and-power complex, taking into consideration its actual potential.

However, prior to undertaking immediately the development of a program for developing power engineering, it should at first, in order to avoid repeating mistakes made previously, try to determine the factor that has caused our republic's power-engineering complex to be in such a helpless and critical situation up to the present. For the creators of this complex certainly were guided at the time by some kind of criteria, being confident of the correctness of their actions.

As the history of past decades has shown, the establishment of Armenia's power-engineering complex conformed to programs and decisions taken at the initiative and discretion of the complex's managers. Each newly named power-system manager worked out and promoted his own idea of power-engineering development in accordance with his own notions and concepts, inducing specialists who had been chosen for their dedication into making his idea reality. Further advanced ideas and decisions were pushed, with the support of the selected specialists, through the stages of consultation and the formal stages of coordination and approval without the participation of the Union authorities, but in so doing the true state interests of Armenia were, as a rule, ignored. As a result of this established tradition, the most conflicting proposals, such as the construction of pumped-storage electric-power plants, the rebuilding and expansion of the Razdanskaya GRES [state regional electric power station], the erection of a new TETs [heat and electric power station] in the city of Yerevan, the erection (and expansion) of the nuclear-power station, and so on and on, were in turn advanced to the status of first-priority and urgent tasks for developing Armenia's

power-engineering complex. In accordance with the tasks advanced, Armenia's power engineers in past years repeatedly undertook and carried out the various programs, rushing from one extreme to the other. And since the tasks that were set changed radically from program to program, it is difficult right now to understand and determine the general line of Armenia's power-engineering development, if it exists at all. Moreover, it should be added with special regret that, in the process of developing these programs, the Armenian government took the role of a passive accomplice, and at times even that of a detached observer, completely letting go of its role of initiator and its function of state monitoring of these processes. Thus remaining outside the sphere of state control. The Armenian power system, which was incorporated within USSR Minenergo [Ministry of Power and Electrification], was developed on a scale and in directions which absolutely did not correspond to the true potential of our republic.

It was as a result of the implementation of such short-sighted policies in Armenia that construction of the nuclear-power station was allowed and the annual generation of electricity by thermal electric-power stations was brought up to 90 percent of annual consumption. The vitality of Armenia's economy turned out to be completely dependent upon the importation from outside of natural and "nuclear" fuels. From 1970 to 1988 the republic's electrical generation rose almost threefold, being more than 15 billion kWh in 1988. The average annual increase in electrical consumption during this same period was on the order of about 6-7 percent, exceeding severalfold the generally accepted pattern for these processes (1.5-2.0 percent). As a result, not possessing enough of its own energy resources, Armenia converted to the export of electricity, and within the republic itself a deceptive impression that there was a surplus of electricity reigned for a long time.

In the artificially created atmosphere of a seeming surplus of cheap electricity in past years, Armenia seriously violated the harmonious interconnection between the actual potential of its production and its consumption. In so doing, a disdainful attitude toward matters of efficiency and expedience in the use of electricity and in saving it manifested itself. As a result of this process, there arose within the republic in the course of time this unwieldy and absurd industrial complex with the uncontrollably rising power consumption that we have today.

Ideally, what was happening should have been pondered earnestly and analyzed and steps taken to correct mistakes previously made, particularly the restoration of a state of balance of the realistically possible generation and consumption of electricity in our republic. However, again various "authoritative" leaders came into the arena, announcing the necessity for an intense expansion of electrical generation in ways that were not typical for Armenia, particularly ways that were based on nuclear and thermal power stations. In turn, the argument that the general line and master program for developing Armenia's power engineering in one historic period or

other are determined under pressure of the decisions of the various managers who were operating during that same period is thereby confirmed. Such an approach to solving problems can be applicable for a particular enterprise, but it is not permissible for a state that is on the road to independence. The general line of development of power engineering in our republic cannot be made to depend upon the whim of some activist or other, since Armenia is unified by an invariable set of characteristic features that are inherent to it, including its geographic position, political interests, economic potential, ecological requirements, and so on and on. It is in accordance with this complex of features that a master line for developing power engineering should be implemented, for this direction is more reliable and stable in time.

For the practical solution of this task, there must be a system of leadership principles. Their development should be executed in the process of a comprehensive discussion of existing and world experience in traditional and nontraditional approaches and in solving power-engineering problems, while preserving as high a degree of state independence for Armenia as possible. Moreover, they should possess the status of a state directive decision. Only where there are state principles for developing power engineering is it possible to implement this policy unwaveringly, a path that will promote our interests. Each program in the various areas of developing power engineering that is presented to the government should not contradict the principles for protecting this most important sphere of the economy from the effects of ambition, incompetence, and adventurism that have been approved by the state.

For example, if our government had at one time shown wisdom and followed an approach that is characteristic of an independent state, Armenia in the past should have rejected the construction on its soil of the nuclear electric-power station inasmuch as, not having its own output of "nuclear fuel" and a potential for burying radioactive waste, it has against its fallen into cruel dependence upon other states. Now, despite the fact that the "Chernobyl catastrophe" has been added to these arguments, various groups are again trying to claim that opening up the AES [nuclear electric power station] is the only alternative to an energy crisis. Under these circumstances, the existence of an approved state principle that is founded on rejecting the use at present of nuclear electric-power stations in Armenia would allow us, once and for always, to be done with being bored to death by fruitless disputes.

It is well known that the world's reserves of natural fuel are being depleted day by day, and that prices are rising accordingly. According to some estimates, at today's consumption rate the explored oil reserves in the lands of the former USSR will be exhausted in 13 years, gas in 57 years, and coal in 450 years. This trend is also being observed in regard to the globe's supply of energy resources.

This obvious and important circumstance cannot be ignored now in working out strategic programs for developing Armenia's fuel and power complex. Already today a rigid stipulation suspending a further increase in the generation of electricity by thermal power stations that use imported fuel is required. Moreover, the generation of electricity at TETs's should be cut from year to year as capacity to replace it is introduced at hydropower stations, with simultaneous regulation of the consumption of electricity and a rise in its sophistication. This stipulation should also be adopted and viewed as a regular principle in developing Armenia's fuel and power complex. A sharp rise in prices for fuel at a later time will make this measure imperative. Moderation in the consumption of natural fuel is desirable now also, based upon ecological consideration.

As is well known, our energy complex turned out to be practically devoid of fuel reserves at the threshold of the 1991-1992 winter and, moreover, the existing storage capacity for fuel reserves would be enough at best for 30-35 days of normal operation. Unfortunately, experience has shown that in our circumstances even a requirement so obvious and clear in the extreme can be violated with impunity by mine managers, since a fundamental prescribing directive on this question is lacking. The principle of creating and expanding storage for a strategic reserve, particularly for the winter, is mandatory, since it is obviously necessary, it goes without saying, even under normal operating conditions for the power system of any state that is concerned about the fate of its people.

In this way, the process for working out the underlying principles for developing Armenia's fuel and power complex should continue to be transformed into a system of prerequisites that will enable our government to control the well-balanced development of power engineering, enabling achievement of the highest possible degree of state independence and invulnerability and normal functioning of the economy. Of course, with time, when the conditions and singularities that characterize our republic undergo considerable change by virtue of some circumstances, the guiding principles indicated above should be reconstructed accordingly.

Such is the essence of the points of view set forth above on the prospects for the development and existence of Armenia's power complex. This path is difficult and involves certain deprivations at first. However, in the circumstances that exist today, our people should firmly evaluate their actual potential if they are seriously intent on achieving independence.

AZERBAIJAN

National Security Officer on Current Tasks

92US0443A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
16 Apr 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Maj. Gen. R.A. Sadykhov, first deputy minister for national security of the republic, by E. Abaskuliyeva: "Our Concept Is to Protect the Interests of the People"]

[Text] Perhaps no other department evokes such partiality as does the Ministry for National Security [MNB]. The organization known under various abbreviations—GPU, NKVD, and KGB—has a very complex past. And although there have been changes in the structure and functions of this organization as well since the fall of the totalitarian regime, the events of the last years and days nevertheless cause one to ask the question again: What is its role in what is happening in the society?

This is especially important if one bears in mind that some mass media, taking advantage of the increased public attention paid to the MNB, sometimes do not bother to verify the reliability of the information on its work that they are divulging. The fact is that the department, formerly completely hidden from human eyes and ears, is eager to have contact with the public.

A recently published statement by the MNB produced a strong reaction from readers and precisely this was the point of departure for the conversation of our correspondent with Maj. Gen. R.A. Sadykhov, first deputy minister for national security of the republic.

[Abaskuliyeva] So, what caused the appearance of the rather threatening statement by the MNB?

[Sadykhov] We had information that certain forces want to raid the archives of the former KGB with the goal of seizing them. There were repeated calls to do this from the speaker's platform of the session of the Supreme Soviet of the republic, at mass public meetings, and at press actions. We are still of the opinion that any problems arising in the society should be resolved in a civilized manner.

Yes, the fate of the archives of such institutions as ours and not just in the former USSR but in foreign countries as well provokes an ambiguous reaction. We have already turned over some of the materials to the civil archives but there are secret materials which must not be opened, because the fate of people depends on this. It is inadmissible to endanger someone's life and to create a reason to settle accounts. This is fraught with unpredictable consequences for the society, which is still so far from civil peace. Precisely to avoid an undesirable development of events, we appealed to the population with the familiar statement that was approved at the meeting of the officer personnel of the MNB.

It is necessary to say frankly that more and more often dilettantes are interfering in our work. This is what is complicating contacts with the public!

[Abaskuliyeva] But this is clearly linked with the traditional "secrecy" of your institution. What has changed in your ministry in connection with the changing of your signboard? Say, are you maintaining continuity in the means and methods of your work—recruiting, political surveillance, listening, etc.? The public knows almost nothing about this. But it wants to know.

[Sadykhov] After the republic attained sovereignty, the main thing that changed was not the name but the structure. We eliminated the unfortunately well-known fifth section, which dealt with the fight against ideological diversion, the so-called political detective work. With the repeal of articles 58 and 70, there was no longer a need to deal with the fight against nonconformists and dissidents and the like, in short, with those who came under the purview of the article—"for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

The new structure was established and functions in accordance with the provisional statute on the MNB developed and affirmed by the armed forces of the republic. All of our work is regulated by enforceable acts. A new law is foreseen that will set forth what resources and forces we must use. A "Law on Operational Investigatory Work" must also be affirmed.

[Abaskuliyeva] What is the overall concept for national security and in what, in your view, must it consist?

[Sadykhov] The national security concept must be defined not by those executing it but by political forces—the Supreme Soviet of the republic, specialists, political scientists, economists, military people, and ecologists. For the notion of national security includes a large number of problems. Its concept must be evident in the Constitution of Azerbaijan and the legislative bodies must determine who is our friend and who is our enemy.

Many are showing a great deal of interest in us today. They include the former republics of the USSR and foreign countries. Of course the special services must follow this process so that they can know for certain who our friends are and who our enemies are. For the national interests of Azerbaijan are paramount, even more important than these notions.

Certainly we who work in the MNB have our own idea of national security. This is above all the defense of the interests of the people of Azerbaijan, the protection of its territorial integrity, and the inadmissibility of the fracturing or breaking up of the republic. We organize our work precisely on the basis of these tasks. Our services—intelligence, counterintelligence, and the fight against organized crime, terrorism, contraband, and drug trafficking—also act in accordance with them.

Incompetent appeals are repeatedly being issued to break up the MNB, even though there has already been a large reduction of personnel. Despite the closing of five sections, we, as you know, have been given many new tasks. An entire subdivision is engaged in the uncovering and prevention of diversionary actions and acts of terrorism. Formerly it was the police who dealt with organized crime but now we must also involve ourselves.

Since our ministry is responsible to the Supreme Soviet of the republic, we reported to the National Council that we are prepared to receive a group of deputies that would familiarize itself with our work and study it, after which

the Supreme Soviet could make the appropriate decision. You must agree that other, illegal ways to discuss the problems that arise are out of the question.

[Abaskuliyeva] People are interested not only in your department's past but also in its role in the Karabakh conflict. The Tragedy in Khodzhala has again made current the question: "What is the MNB doing?" Indeed, how could something like that happen under the system of the republic's security service?

[Sadykhov] Today everyone knows that the Karabakh conflict has been brewing for a long time. And then they asked how it was that you lost sight of all this. I can state as responsibly as I can that at that time we informed the republic's leaders that emissaries from Armenia and abroad were being sent to the former Stepanakert and that they were actively preparing for extremist actions in Nagorno-Karabakhskay Autonomous Oblast. Unfortunately, however, no measures were taken. Just as they were not taken quite recently, a half month before the slaughter in Khodzhala, when each day beginning on 10 February we sent information on the situation in Khodzhala to different administrative bodies. These reports were prepared daily and sent that same day to the Supreme Soviet, presidential staff, and ministries of defense and internal affairs.

We present the texts of some of these reports below.

"11 February 1992

"Until the morning (11 February), Armenians fired on the village of Malybeyli intensively from armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. There is extensive destruction and there are killed and wounded. Armenian combatants cut Malybeyli off from Khodzhala. The situation in the village is critical and it is necessary to take decisive measures. The situation in the village of Malybeyli is having a depressing effect on the inhabitants of the town of Khodzhala and the village of Kosalar in Askeranskiy Rayon, who are saying that in such a situation, in which there is no systematic effort to help them, they will be forced to abandon their place of residence.

"Report of the situation in the republic as of 1700 on 11 February 1992."

". . . 14 February 1992

"On 12 and 13 February of this year, the town of Khodzhala was subjected to fire from infantry fighting vehicles by the Armenian population centers of Nyuragyuk and Mekhtikend. As a result, two inhabitants were wounded and several premises were destroyed. There is observed movement of military equipment (four infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and others) from the direction of Khankendi to Dashbulag, Nyuragyuk, and Askeran.

"On 12 February, 200 inhabitants of Khodzhala (mostly elderly, women, children, and the ill) were evacuated to the town of Gyandzha. At the present time, about 400 people are waiting at the airport to be flown out.

"There are presently more than 3,000 inhabitants remaining in the town.

"(The Ministry of Defense was informed on 14 February 1992.)"

The following reports on the forces and resources of the defenders: 160 men (a local battalion, soldiers of the national army, and members of the police) and a meager quantity of weapons.

"...18 February 1992

"A change was recently made in the leadership of the Armenian armed formations. Thus, the minister of defense is now Serzhik Sarkisyan, 36 to 38 years old and a former Komsomol worker. Arkadiy Tovmasyan has been appointed chief of staff. It should be noted that it is expected that the latter will be brought back to Armenia to divert charges against him in connection with the fact that he was sent by the 'Karabakh' committee. There are increasing numbers of combatants coming to the city from Armenia in military and civilian helicopters.

"According to Sarkisyan, they plan to capture Khodzhala in the near future.

"(Sent to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan 18 February 1992.)"

Information from 21 February 1991 talks about a concentration of Armenian forces and arms combatants around the town of Khodzhala: it is accurate to the number of people at posts in each of the nearby villages populated by Armenians and their weapons.

[Abaskuliyeva] But none of these reports says anything about the participation of the infamous 366th Regiment. Have you had no information in this regard?

[Sadykhov] We have special information about the participation of military personnel in the course of the entire Karabakh conflict, information that has been reported in individual cases.

As for the 366th Regiment, its participation in the tragedy at Khodzhala is affirmed by eye witnesses and military personnel who have left the deployment location of the unit in connection with their refusal to participate in combat operations against the peaceful population of Azerbaijan. The investigating procurator's office of the republic has such reports that it got from us.

[Abaskuliyeva] This may be a naive question but tell me, please, how the MNB will act if it sees that the information that it has prepared is not being utilized. In such an event, could you not declassify it and, say, come out in the press and on television?

[Sadykhov] Under the proposed statute, the MNB is under the jurisdiction of the president and is responsible to the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan. Our task is to

gather the needed information and pass it on to the politicians. You must agree that there are those who can stir up public opinion without us.

[Abaskuliyeva] But could you not at least attempt through your own forces to guarantee the security of the peaceful population in the zone of the conflict?

[Sadykhov] Excuse me, but you are repeating a general misconception. After all, no one is asking why the agencies of the prosecutor's office did not defend Khodzhala through their own forces.... Unfortunately, the society is poorly informed about our possibilities. Even when there were KGB troops and border troops of the USSR, we—I mean the republic—had no possibility of using them. This is ruled out all the more now that Azerbaijan has become a sovereign state and the MNB is independent. So you yourself understand that we unfortunately do not have the necessary forces to participate in military actions unleashed by Armenian armed forces on our land.

In 1991, we established a group of special forces that we used in the time of engagements in Geranboyskiy Rayon. But it was disbanded after the August coup.

Despite its small size (no more than three people), the rayon staffs in the localities take part not only in operational work but also in negotiations on the exchange of hostages as well as in military actions, and so on.

One of the most vital tasks of our service today is the fight against terrorism, in particular Armenian terrorism. We recently saw the end of the trial of the terrorists who carried out an act of sabotage in a Tbilisi-Agdam bus, killing our colleague S. Askerova and three servicemen. All operational investigatory measures beginning with the ascertainment of the persons involved in diversionary and terroristic actions in the territory of the republic and ending with their arrest were carried out by a special group of the MNB that even went beyond the borders of the republic for this purpose. For example, Arutyunyan was arrested in Mineralnye Vody and taken to Baku. This is just one example. Fortunately, there are also cases in which we are able to head off the criminals and prevent sabotage. The public and private rules of our service require that such information be kept secret.

[Abaskuliyeva] There is one further question and that is about the problems of your department.

[Sadykhov] We are being hit from the left and the right but there is no one to watch out for us. This is why we have plenty of problems. No, I am not complaining. We are talking about a business performed by ordinary people. The time has passed when it was possible to accomplish a lot by calling from here. I am not talking about wages: a cashier who sells airplane tickets receives more than our section chief.

The entire subdivision that deals with terrorism has one vehicle. The equipment that is used here is hopelessly

obsolete. Previously we at least received equipment from Moscow and now that is gone too. But this is needed for effective work, about which we will continue to speak sparingly in the interests of the business.

[Abaskuliyeva] And one last question. I think the readers would be interested in knowing how the relations of the MNB are developing with Moscow, with the corresponding Russian service.

[Sadykhov] It seems that your question reflects the rumors to the effect that we are still faithful to our oath to the USSR, which no longer exists. The Supreme Soviet has formulated an oath of allegiance to Azerbaijan and we will swear to it in the days to come. There is now a new duty that strengthens the labor agreement of the individual coming to work in the MNB. I assure you that we do not intend to go against our people.

Now about our relations with the former center.

After the events of January 1990, no information went from us to Moscow with the exception of information having to do with Karabakh. After the events of August, the information channels from Moscow were shut down completely. As long as the center existed, the idea of signing a multilateral agreement between the former republics was hanging in the air but it has passed, just as has the center, by the way. It is another matter that we, having become a sovereign state just like any other, must cooperate not only with our former neighbors in the Union but also with contiguous and other foreign states. Of course this is possible only on the basis of agreements between them. We do not yet have such an agreement with Russia.

But the interests of national security and the fight against terrorism require (for we do not live in a vacuum!) the signing of certain agreements with other countries. Clearly, with time such agreements will be signed.

Threat Of 'Islam Factor' Refuted

92US0436A Baku AZERBAYJAN MUELLIMI in Azer
18 Mar 92 p 4

[Article by Akif Abbasov, Candidate Pedagogical Science: "The Words Of Muhammed The Prophet"]

[Text] Recently attacks have been made against the Islamic world both in the world and in the former USSR. These attacks have taken on a broad scope. The fact of the emergence of the Nagorno-Karabagh problem and the anti-humanist, perfidious policy conducted against the Muslim peoples, the drowning of hundreds and thousands of people in their own blood, the forcible expulsion of hundreds of thousands of our compatriots from their traditional lands, their plunder and murder is incompatible with any democratic society.

Those who wish us ill spread propaganda blaming Islamic violence without basis, and have superficially declared the 'Islam factor' a danger to the Soviet existence. In fact,

the Islamic religion has no connection with violence; on the contrary, it categorically repudiates violence. In this regard, it states in Islam's holy book, in the 256th Sura of the Koran, "there is no compulsion (violence) in religion." Some deep-thinking, wise people in the world, even some who adhered to the Christian religion (L. N. Tolstoy and others), came to the conclusion that Islam was more progressive than Christianity.

Islam unites within it a number of sectors of knowledge—philosophy, politics, ethics, law, logic and pedagogy. There are rich educational possibilities in the fundamentals of this religion, especially in the Koran and the Hadith of the prophet. Let us turn to examples: in the Koran, Muhammed the Prophet advised that one do good works in life, perform good actions, and master culture in an all-round manner, and he demanded that one stay away from bad actions. ("Bad words are characteristic of bad men; good words are characteristic of good people.") Life, which is the great teacher, has proven that good men do not tend to bad actions; they are beloved of everyone, and gain respect and influence.

The Koran considers that mankind should be attentive towards its children and be concerned for them, and that the forgiveness of sin is the most important aspect, the most positive quality. ("A good word and the forgiveness of sins is better than charity given grudgingly.")

The educational possibilities of the Hadith of Muhammed the Prophet are broad. Muhammed, peace be unto him, recommended that, above all, one acquire knowledge from the cradle to the grave. Scholars in this stage of our society defend the idea firmly, and are suggesting the idea of continuous education. In Azerbaijan also a similar assertion is being suggested in the concept of national education.

An interesting aspect which is worthy of attention is that His Excellency Muhammed considered the mastery of knowledge necessary for both men and women. The prophet himself considered knowledge to be superior to prayer, contrary to what the illiterate and ignorant mullahs say: "One hour of learning knowledge is better than sixty years of prayer" (Hadith 101). The prophet considered that man should begin one's education from the earliest age, and equated knowledge learned from childhood to writing on a stone, and knowledge attained after adulthood to writing on water.

When talking about the taking shape and formation of man, Muhammed the Prophet gave primary importance to education: "No father can give his children a more valuable gift than a beautiful education."

This idea of the prophet has not lost its value today.

His Excellency the Prophet, along with considering it the parents' obligation to provide their children with a worthy education, demanded of the children that they show honor and respect to their parents, and that they help them when they are in need. ("A person wishing to

extend his life and increase his daily bread must honor his parents." "Respect your parents and your children will respect you.")

In the Hadith, being modest and honorable are put forth as important spiritual qualities. The reason for this is clarified: "Be modest and honorable so that your women be modest and honorable." From this the result can emerge that sometimes the way a woman comports herself in her daily life depends on the man. Every man and husband ought to take this into consideration.

Muhammed the Prophet called on the young to respect the old and heed their advice. "The old are blessed and wise." In fact, a man who works according to the words and advice of the elders and ancestors finds wellbeing. And this is not by chance, because they have lived a long life, felt the heat and cold of this world, and have seen its pain and bitterness.

His Excellency Muhammed valued the role of the mother in man's life very highly. Her suffering of every agony on the road was considered her sacred, holy duty. Concern and respect for the father was also at the center of his attention. In the opinion of Muhammed the Prophet, obedience to the father is obedience to Allah; an attack on the father is an attack on Allah. ("Allah Almighty curses those who turn from their father and mother.")

When talking of doing good deeds, showing respect and mercy to relatives reminds one that tyranny and breaking relationship ties are evil acts. The prophet considered a relationship to be one of love, abundant earnings and long life among people who are close.

In the Hadith individuals who torment, torture or strike people are condemned and it is shown that they will receive punishment in the afterlife.

Muhammed the Prophet scorns those who accumulate wealth and considers them stupid. ("He collects the goods of the world without intelligence.") Death is justice. When departing the world, he takes with him three arshins of calico. He takes no valuables to the other world. Thus, they are unaffected by the enthusiasm for worldly possessions. But the prophet, undoubtedly, does not take into consideration those who, thinking of the sons and children who will remain after them, have accumulated a certain amount of goods.

Muhammed, peace be upon him, branded the greedy, the envious, individuals who are lazy, indolent, unstable, and sluggish with a curse. There is a reason for this. Such an individual does much harm to charity. They are a burden to the family and to society. Thus the prophet was discussing an environment which stultifies the mentality.

The prophet called on parents to be loving with children and give them a good education.

His Excellency Muhammed considered the best of men those who have long lives and do good deeds, and the

worst of men those whose have long lives and do bad deeds. He valued the feeling of patriotism among men very highly. ("To love the Fatherland is part of faith.") The prophet sees love for the Fatherland not in words, but in deeds; he justly perceives the cause of defeat in betrayal. In his opinion, "one must search for betrayal within the nation." ("If there is no betrayal within my nation, the enemy cannot stand before us.")

Neighborly relations are also touched on in the Hadith: they discuss the necessity of being aware in a timely manner of a neighbor's good or ill ("If a neighbor eats well while his neighbor is starving, he cannot be considered a believer"), of being on good terms with one's neighbor ("The best neighbor gets on well with his neighbor"), of doing good for one's neighbor ("Allah Almighty does not forgive the bad neighbor," "He loses advantages who does not communicate with neighbors," "Do good for your neighbor").

The Prophet's sayings on envy also awaken interest: "As fire consumes the tree, so does envy consume goodness; as water extinguishes the flame, charity extinguishes the torch of evil."

Although centuries, more than a thousand years, have passed, these words have not lost their validity.

In the Hadith there is advice for men on managing frugally. The individual who nourishes thrift is a person thinking about the morning. (The statements below prove once again how a sharp, intelligent, farseeing person the prophet was: "Thrift is half of daily life, good relations with the community is half of wisdom, the intelligent answer is half of knowledge.") According to the prophet, he who lacks a relationship with his relatives loses kindness, he who is indifferent to his family loses a pleasant way of life.

His Excellency Muhammed, peace be unto him, advised men to be cautious; if they wish to do a deed, they should think about the consequences of this deed. ("If you wish to do something, think about the end; if the end is good, do it; if the end is evil, cast out the thought.")

Thus, contrary to what those who wish us ill say, the fundamental teachings of Islam, including the Koran and Muhammed the Prophet, never preach aggression, these fundamental teachings defend humanistic ideas, try to form positive qualities in man, and stress the doing of good deeds, goodness, sincerity, kindness, friendship and justice.

New Post Opens On Iranian Border

92US0440A Baku KHALG GEZETI in Azeri 8 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Idris Shukuri: "Gate To Iran"]

[Text] Residents of Lerik who have relatives in the Islamic Republic of Iran will have the chance to meet them. At the wish of the public, we will open a crossing

to Iran from the territory of Lerik. The Azerbaijan Republic Cabinet of Ministers and the corresponding administrations in the Islamic Republic of Iran have reached agreement on coming and going to the country.

The public of Lenkeran, Lerik, Masally and Yardymly will be able to use the facilities of this departure zone.

Dialogue On Improving Relations With Israel

92US0440B Baku KHALG GEZETI in Azeri 9 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by Azerinform: "Azerbaijan-Israel: Dialog Between Parties With Equal Rights: Reception At The Republic Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] Arye Levin, Israel's Ambassador in Moscow who is now in Azerbaijan, was received on 7 April in the republic Supreme Soviet.

Y. J. Memmedov, chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet, greeted the guest in the name of the republic parliament and government and said that the exchange of notes on the ambassador's coming to Baku and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries is a new stage in the friendly relations between Azerbaijan and Israel and will serve the development of cooperation that will enrich both our peoples.

He said: "In our multinational state Azerbaijanis and Jews have always lived as brothers. It is not by chance that those leaving the republic for one reason or another still preserve a close relationship with it, and consider Azerbaijan a great Fatherland and themselves to be Bakuites. A number of our compatriots live in your country. Now they and the state of Israel are giving us serious spiritual help during this difficult period for Azerbaijan. We feel this and value it highly. Our compatriots who have moved to Israel and yours who live in Azerbaijan are highly respected ambassadors of friendship and brotherhood, they are diplomats reaching the goal of mutually profitable cooperation. Although we have heard that opening an embassy in Baku is an expensive proposition, one can still be satisfied at first with a representation."

Y. J. Memmedov, discussing the duties the state of Azerbaijan is fulfilling, said that the republic, which is building a democratic, civilized society, has been following the line of independence and establishing relations with all countries on an equal basis. He discussed the problem of Nagorno-Karabagh, which was created by the neighbor republic and the separatists, in great detail, and, analyzing the situation in the region, said that a definite turning point had been reached in illuminating the events in the Transcaucasus in the world press. In the opinion of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, our compatriots from Azerbaijan now living in Israel and the USA are not playing a small role in breaking the information blockade. They are making their own truth about the Fatherland reach the Western reader. Y. J. Memmedov expressed the hope that the Israeli state and

all influential Jewish communities of the world will be able to help Azerbaijan spread the truth about the Karabagh crisis and eliminate it justly.

The ambassador, expressing his thanks in the name of the Jewish people and Israel for the reception and the kind words, extended his sincerest wishes to Azerbaijan for peace and progress in the name of the parliament, the government, and Prime Minister I. Shamir. He said: "We believe that your state will emerge worthily from the war into which it has been forced, that the bloodshed will finally cease, and that you will return to a life of peace and joy and attain true independence, comfort and felicity. You have proven throughout your history that you are worthy of this."

Arye Levin said further: "Immigrants coming from Azerbaijan have found their new home and new Fatherland with us. But I wish to assure you that all measures are being taken in our country so that their connections with your republic are not broken." He said: "I am sure that they will help in establishing and strengthening economic, cultural and scientific relations with Azerbaijan."

H. M. Sadygov, Azerbaijan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Guluzade, advisor to the republic President, Z. P. Rustemzade, authorized representative of the Azerbaijan Republic in Moscow, and N. E. Akhundov, director of the international relations department of the Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet, also talk part in the talks.

GEORGIA

Poor Economic Situation Surveyed

92US0435A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
7 Apr 92 p 1

[Report by DM correspondent Anatoliy Gordienko; date not given: "Georgia: Time to Gather up the Stones"]

[Text] Tbilisi—After his return to Tbilisi in early March, Eduard Shevardnadze noted, grief-stricken, at his first press conference: "I knew Georgia's economy was going through grave difficulties, but I could never have guessed that matters would be so deplorable."

Matters in the republic, where all last year a line "toward economic self-determination" was pursued with a persistence worthy of the best application, are indeed bad. Worse even than on average in the former USSR—and, moreover, for the most important parameters. Thus, the produced national income fell in the republic last year by one fourth, and the real income of the population by 30 percent. Georgia's state domestic debt nearly doubled. More than four fifths of the republic's population, according to official statistics, found themselves below the poverty line—their total income last year was substantially lower than the calculated (and by no means overly high) subsistence minimum. In just one year the material situation worsened on average for three out of every five families.

"This is hard to believe: Georgia was always considered if not a flourishing then in any case a successful republic. It is a fact, however," said Iosif Archvadze, an economics candidate from the republic's Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics], commenting upon the statistical calculations. "It is amazing that the people are putting up with all this, that it has not reached the point of social outburst. After all, it has become out and out unbearable to live here. Judge for yourself. The average per capita consumption of meat, say, in comparison with last year, has declined in Georgia by 23 percent, while in the former USSR only by 9 percent. Milk and dairy products by 29 and 6 percent, respectively, sugar by 35 and 10 percent, purchases of livestock and fowl declined over 1991 by a factor of two and a half and of milk and eggs by 40 percent. People have virtually forgotten what butter is. You have to get in line before daybreak for a liter of milk."

According to preliminary data, the increase in monetary investments in the republic for the year was cut by a factor of more than three, whereas the population's nominal income grew on average by a factor of one and a half and the quantity of cash in circulation by a factor of nearly two. What we have is a substantial increase in current expenses for consumption over current income. And we have nothing but an erosion of accumulated national wealth. All this conceals a danger of immense destructive power.

The social and property stratification in society has become sharper. World experience shows that a country can be considered flourishing where the middle class numbers at least three fifths of the entire population and the proportion of poor, that is, those living below the poverty line, does not exceed 25 percent. In Georgia today the proportions are completely different: the poor now make up about 80 percent, the rich are only about 8 percent, and the middle, solidly successful class, includes no more than 12 percent of the republic's entire population.

The unstable political situation and the crisis phenomena in the economy have influenced the growth in migratory processes, which have reached scales unprecedented for Georgia. Matters have reached the point where last year Georgia led all the republics of the former "indissoluble union" for population drain. For every 10,000 people in Georgia, 253 left last year. Among those leaving quite a few are first-class specialists, engineers, representatives of the intelligentsia, and workers on whom, without exaggeration, workshops and entire plants relied. Yes, so far it has been mostly representatives of non-native nationalities that have been leaving. But no one today can give any guarantees that in the near future Georgia will not have a problem with departing Georgians. Moreover, those leaving are not going to the West—after all, for nearly 100 percent of the potential migrants the international language of technology, the language of professional communication was and remains not English but Russian. And this, my interlocutor Iosif Archvadze feels, will lead to a situation in

which, in the search for a better life, people quitting Georgia will not land in the labor market of the Western countries but more than likely will take jobs vacated by those who have moved to the West from Russia. By the way, the already opened Tbilisi labor exchange last year registered the first official unemployed. Although their number for the beginning of 1992 was less than 1000, nonetheless, claims from enterprises and organizations for the current year have already reached 9000.

That's how things are. What effort it took to bring a truly prosperous republic to such a life in a single year! The course toward the notorious "economic self-determination" has brought Georgia to the only point it could—the dead-end of economic self-isolation. "Stones were scattered" here for an entire year—first state capitalism, then a kind of God-chosenness, an exclusivity of the Georgian people and its path, and all ties were broken with the civilized world. Now the time has come to gather up the stones. But how long will it take to gather them? A year for this is scarcely enough. Especially if we keep in mind the present-day situation, when the fanatic supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia again, for the umpteenth time in recent months, have exacerbated the situation to the limit. Georgia is once again on the brink of civil war. Once again there is armed conflict in Western Georgia. Once again traffic on the Trans-Caucasian Railway has been paralyzed: the Zviadists have completely blockaded the Ingiri station not far from Zudidi. Speaking a few days ago on republic television, a member of the Georgian State Council, Tengis Kitorvani, declared: "It is time to be done with this!" And it really is. Otherwise, Georgia will never get back up.

Republic Viewed as Global Buffer Zone

92US0435B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Mikhail Tavkhelidze; place and date not given: "Will Georgia Take Part in Settling the Arab-Israeli Conflict? Why Not? Under Shevardnadze Anything Is Possible."]

[Text]

Sic!

To a certain degree, determining Georgia's place in the world and assigning foreign policy priorities for this new country in the Trans-Caucasus have led to surprising results. It turns out that Georgia, assuming it develops as a democratic state, could play its own special role in global political processes, such as settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. The idea of Georgia's participation in resolving the many-year conflict was "bestowed" on Georgia's prime minister, Tengis Sigua, by representatives of several Arab states during a conference of countries from the Mediterranean basin in Greece. This became known from nonofficial sources. At the conference they were talking not so much about Georgia as a

state as about Eduard Shevardnadze at the head of that state. The diplomatic abilities, experience, and authority of this man have obviously attracted and encouraged the Arabs. Naturally, this idea caught Shevardnadze's interest immediately. People are saying in the corridors of the Foreign Affairs Ministry that when Shevardnadze heard about this his eyes flashed. And so far as we know, Eduard Shevardnadze is preparing to play this role, and Georgia as a state is preparing along with him. What prerequisites Shevardnadze has for this clearly do not have to be explained. Georgia is a separate issue. From the point of view adopted in diplomatic and political spheres, the conflict between the Arab world and Israel bears more of an ethnic and religious nature than a political one. In a broader sense it is part of the global conflict between the developed and developing countries. This conflict is still called the "North-South" conflict. By its own geopolitical position, Georgia is located right on the boundary of this conflict, and, moreover, it has always been considered the political, economic, and cultural crossroads along the "North-South" lines. Georgia has served as a unique buffer zone where the interests of these two worlds have come into contact. This role for Georgia was forgotten, though, due to the loss of its independence. Lately, before the collapse of the USSR, Turkey has served as a kind of buffer country for the Western democracies, having declared a secularist (separating religion from the state) policy and chosen a path of development based on the values of European democracy. With the collapse of the Union, though, a clear conflict of interest arose between Turkey and Iran regarding the Muslim republics of the former USSR; that is, Turkey to a certain degree lost its former neutral image. Moreover, Turkey was and is a state with a Muslim population.

As a Christian and Europeanized state, Armenia could also become a buffer between North and South. Armenia's geopolitical position wholly corresponds to this role. First of all, though, Armenia has become embroiled in conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, thereby opposing itself to a certain degree to the Muslim world. Secondly, Armenia became a member of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), thereby giving its consent to being in Russia's zone of influence. This has deprived it of grounds for claiming the role of neutral buffer zone in the region. In this situation, Georgia's role as a buffer in the "North-South" conflict could be revived, but in a somewhat different capacity now. Christian, European in its "mentality," but territorially close to Asia, Georgia could become not the place where the interests of the two worlds clash but, on the contrary, the place where the interests can join up, that is, Georgia in principle is capable of acting as a "bridge of stability" or a "regional Switzerland." And participation in settling the Arab-Israeli conflict could just mean that Georgia is taking on the role of a "bridge of stability." In turn, the consent of the interested parties (if it were given) would mean recognition by the world of this mission for Georgia. The advantages for the republic in this instance

are obvious: entry into the arena of big policy, acquisition of the status of an influential neutral, departure from under the wing of Russia, an influx of capital, and so on. At the same time, however, a number of problems arise that demand immediate resolution. Above all, this concerns domestic instability and the war in Southern Ossetia. If Georgia can deal quickly presumably with domestic instability, then resolving the conflict with Southern Ossetia will take many times more effort. Southern Ossetia, to all appearances, is going to verify the "professional fitness" of Georgia and its government to participate in solving global world problems. The second difficulty is financial-economic. Certainly, holding in Tbilisi at least one international conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict, for instance, could bring Georgia income comparable with the income from a world soccer championship, but to get this income, Georgia first has to invest money, and a good amount, or it won't have it. Of the specific problems influencing the possibility of Georgia's participation in regulating the

Arab-Israeli conflict, one should point out the continued absence of official relations with Israel. Actually, Georgian-Jewish relations were established a long time ago, and they could be called especially friendly. Thanks to the presence in Israel of a strong community of Georgian Jews who have not lost contact with their "former" homeland and the traditional absence of anti-Semitism in Georgia, Georgian-Israeli cultural and economic ties are developing nicely. Nevertheless, there are still no formal inter-state relations, nor does Georgia have them with the Arab countries. Due to these and several other less important reasons, Georgia is not in a position to formulate its position regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and cannot propose any model for its solution. At the same time, specialists feel that it will not take as much time for Georgia to overcome the problems enumerated as might seem at first glance. In any case, these problems should not force Georgia to reject the desire to become a "regional Switzerland" and thereby take its own special place in the new "world order."

ESTONIA

Baltic Fleet Hands Over Tallinn Naval Facilities

92UN1248C Tallinn *ARIPAEV* in Estonian 14 Mar 92 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Again Under Estonian Authority"]

[Text] With this Monday's resolution, the government turned over to the Ministry of Transportation and Communications buildings that had been at the disposal of the former Soviet Union's Defense Ministry, housing the Baltic Fleet's Construction Administration's Plant of Reinforced Concrete Products, and the military unit number 63413, located at Sadama Street 9 and 23 in Tallinn.

At the same time, the Tallinn Shipyard Plant was transferred from the Ministry of Industry and Energy to the Ministry of Transportation and Communications; and the Commercial Shipping Administration Torgmortrans from the Ministry of Transportation and Communications to the Ministry of Commerce.

In connection with these resolutions, it behooves us to look at how the maritime and port facilities formerly under Soviet authority are being integrated into the national economy of Estonia. For that, we will rely on the statement of Nathan Tönnisson, executive director of Estonia's Office of Waterways, that has been submitted to the government.

Estonian Maritime Corporation

The Estonian Maritime Corporation was transferred to the ownership of the Republic of Estonia on September 11, 1991. On December 18, with a decree from the minister of Transportation and Communications, the Estonian Maritime Corporation was reorganized as a type II state corporation.

The Commercial Seaport and the New Port of Tallinn

The Republic of Estonia took possession of the Commercial Seaport of Tallinn on September 9, 1991, and of the New Port of Tallinn on September 11, 1991. According to government decrees dated December 24, 1991, and January 7, 1992, these ports are subject to reorganization. As of April 1, 1992, a state enterprise Tallinna Sadam [Port of Tallinn] will be formed out of the structures and assets of both ports, which will also include the assets of the Tallinn Sea Fishing Port. The Port of Muuga (the former New Port), and the Port of Kopli (Sea Fishing Port until now) will remain independent, structural units of the economy.

The Port of Tallinn gets part of its income in foreign currency, which also benefits the republic in the form of taxes.

Estonian Maritime Educational Center

Estonia took possession of the Maritime Educational Center on September 10, 1991, first assigned to the administration of the Ministry of Transportation and

Communications, and later to the Ministry of Education. The Estonian Maritime Educational Center, which has post-secondary accreditation, is based on the former Estonian Maritime Educational Center, the Tallinn Maritime College, Vocational School Number 1, and the Tallinn Maritime School of Eesti Kalatööstus [Estonian Fishing Industry]. Reorganization of this center is now in progress.

Commercial Shipping Administration Torgmortrans

Estonia took possession of Torgmortrans on September 10, 1991. On December 2, 1991, it was reorganized into a type II state corporation. Now, Torgmortrans was transferred from the Ministry of Transportation and Communications to the Ministry of Commerce.

The Tallinn Shipyard Plant

This plant was placed under the Estonian Ministry of Industry and Energy with the government decree dated September 12, 1991. As mentioned, the plant has now been transferred to the Ministry of Transportation and Communications.

Both minister Enn Sarap and executive director Nathan Tönnisson of the Waterways Office find that the shipyard plant, at its present location, interferes with the normal functioning of the port. This is why it is thought efficacious to liquidate the plant as such. That much more so since there are many other possibilities for ship repair in Estonia. The present aquatorium and piers of the plant are projected to form a landing area for small craft and yachts (smack in the heart of town!), and also, if need be, for floating hotels. The plant buildings, in that case, would be maintained to develop a production base for the port.

A final decision is yet to be made.

Soviet Army Officers Stripped Of Deputy Posts

92UN1088C Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA* in Russian 17 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Ilya Pobedonostsev: "Take Your Greatcoat and Go Home: Purge Begins in Estonian Parliament"]

[Text] Estonia—Four officers of the former Soviet Army who were elected Deputies to the Estonian Supreme Soviet in March 1990 have been stripped of their powers at a parliamentary session. The assembly of legislators, by a vote of 57 in favor, adopted a decision to expel the officers of a foreign state from the Supreme Council.

During the rather heated debate, the legal commission opposed the Supreme Council Presidium's proposal to expel the officers from parliament, saying that in the final analysis, all the Deputies were elected on the basis of the laws of the Estonian SSR and that the law should not be sacrificed to opportunist political considerations. For this, the commission was dubbed the "Soviet-legal" commission, and the military Deputies walked out of the hall.

And so thanks to the collapse of the "empire" and its own decisions (for example, on citizenship), the Estonian Republic Supreme Council has wound up full of foreigners with unknown legal status, servicemen from the army of a state that is viewed as a former and potential aggressor, and other dubious people like the former communist nomenklatura. But not to fear. A new constitution is being adopted, elections are being held, and everything will fall into place.

But that's not what's happening. The Supreme Council has a serious rival breathing down its neck. It is the Estonian Congress and its executive body—the Estonian Committee. The Estonian Congress, in contrast to the Supreme Council, was created and held its elections only on the basis of the electorate of native Estonian citizens. And since the current government has declared that the Estonian Republic is not the legal successor to the Estonian SSR, the Estonian people (that is, citizens) are in effect represented more or less legitimately by the Estonian Congress. And the latter won't let the parliament forget that.

Thus, the republic parliament is confronted with the need to offer regular sacrifices. This time it was the officers. Incidentally, none of the lawmakers denied the positive role that the military Deputies had played in the republic's attainment of independence. But friendship is one thing. The "foreign" Deputies could be next. There have already been proposals to this effect, but in all likelihood, so as to avoid a scandal, they will not be stripped of their powers as Deputies in the near future.

Russian Democratic Movement Holds Congress

92UN1088B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Ilya Pobedonostsev and Yelena Visens: "Third Congress of the Russian Democratic Movement of Estonia Decides: 'We're Condemned to Fight for Our Rights'"]

[Text] Estonia—The reason for convening the extraordinary third congress of the Russian Democratic Movement of Estonia in Tallinn was prompted by the epic story, now in its fifth month, involving registration of the movement with the Estonian Republic Supreme Council Presidium (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, No 39). Failing to register the only more or less mass "Russian-speaking" organization but, at the same time, technically not refusing to do so, the authorities have demanded that the congress confirm relatively insignificant changes in the registration documents, changes that were made at their insistence.

Gathered in the conference hall of the RET factory, the "Russian democrats" went considerably beyond a discussion of organizational issues and, anticipating a very hot spring, took a number of steps to play a more active role in Estonian political life.

Since March 8, the situation in the republic has become sharply destabilized: The Russian-speaking inhabitants' dissatisfaction with their unclear status has intensified, a

wave of "empty saucepan" demonstrations has swept the provinces, and the election campaign has essentially begun, accompanied by a growing downturn in production. And finally, on Monday, March 16, the republic Supreme Council began final debate on the now complete draft Estonian Constitution. The basic law, a good and democratic one overall, nevertheless provides for the possibility of serious restrictions on the rights of "noncitizens," from social security to freedom of speech. Worried by this prospect, the RDME [Russian Democratic Movement of Estonia] Congress demanded "yet again" that the citizenship problem for foreign-born inhabitants of Estonia be solved in strict accordance with the Russian-Estonian treaty, which is to say on the basis of voluntary choice of Estonian citizenship without any restrictions.

This time the RDME congress's demands could prove much more serious than before, since the "Russian democrats" have supported the power industry workers of Narva and are establishing working contacts with them. For two weeks now, the Narva workers have held to the decisions of a combined trade-union conference of the Narva and Baltiisk State Regional Power Stations; that conference demanded that the parliament and government resolve the question of granting citizenship to permanent residents of the republic who want it by March 30. Otherwise, they threaten to hold rallies and strikes.

Near the end of the congress it was decided to join the international organization known as the Democratic Reform Movement.

In the opinion of one RDME leader, Aleksey Semyonov, the congress participants were not as unanimous in their positions as at the previous congress. Some of the delegates demanded vigorous and immediate actions, while others, on the contrary, believe that such drastic actions could lead to quarrels with the Estonian part of society.

During the one-day congress, delegates discussed fundamental issues relating to reconfirmation of the charter (with due regard for the amendments that the Central Council made in it as it prepared the registration documents), as well as Estonia's economic and political situation, which has become exacerbated of late. It was said that Estonia is on the brink of an economic depression, which poses the danger of various kinds of "unpredictable and irresponsible actions" since an "economic depression is a nutrient medium for all manner of lumpen movements." "It is essential to concentrate all possible forces within society that can counter this, and to put an end to this absurd division into citizens and noncitizens."

In the view of the RDME's leaders, now, after meeting all the demands of the Estonian Republic Supreme Council Presidium regarding the procedure for submitting registration documents, there are no further obstacles to official recognition of the movement. Since the Supreme Council Presidium is reviewing not a new

charter but the original one with insignificant changes, a new two-month period for reviewing the documents submitted for registration is not necessary. The next session of the Supreme Council Presidium is to be held Thursday

Citizenship Law Impact On Non-Estonians

92UNI088D Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 5

[Article by G. Sapozhnikova: "All Will Leave. Only Old Toomas Will Remain"]

[Text] It always seemed to me that fall was on its way, with the wind and rain, like a sentence, pressing a maple leaf against the window, when a loved one would call and say: "I have a flight to New York in two hours. And you know, I'm not coming back, I'm leaving for good." But spring is on its way, and yet another person is filling out his documents, another one is packing her things, some more have left to find work in Russia. And the grass will grow in spite of everything, and nature will blossom, but there won't be anyone left to call and tell about this joyful fact. And it isn't necessary to say that we can write each other and that we'll all definitely come to New York, Copenhagen, or Hamburg—you yourself know perfectly well that none of that is going to happen. A tragedy is a tragedy when you experience it for the first time. Jews, Germans, dissidents, and free-thinkers went through these tragedies long ago. Is it our turn now?

Our turn to pack the suitcases? I myself became convinced once more that something incredible is happening in our life when KOMSOMOLSKAYA GAZETA published the telephone numbers of its correspondents. During that week it seemed to me as if I was working as a Russian ambassador, and after the Estonian Supreme Council's adoption of the resolution putting the Law on Citizenship into effect, I realized that I could boldly open a consultation firm called "What to Do, How to Live."

The citizenship law had been anticipated for so long that it caused virtually no feeling of pain except uncertainty, which is even more painful. Outwardly, it looks quite decent, even though it gives preference to the purely ethnic option for solving the problem. If you were lucky enough to born an Estonian in the Far East, even if you don't know a word of Estonian and have never lived a day there, you can still obtain citizenship automatically. If you happened to be born a non-Estonian, that's your problem, comrade. Because you, my dear friend, are nevertheless an occupier here, even if you occupied Estonia at the age of three or even when you were still in your mother's womb. Everyone who does not have a blood relationship with citizens of this independent Estonia will have to go through the naturalization procedure. Within one year after applying, you have to pass a test in the Estonian language and swear allegiance to the Estonian Republic. To say that this option is not to the liking of either the Russian or Estonian national radicals is to say nothing. During that year, the Estonian people—and nobody even tries to conceal this—will

hold elections to a State Assembly, which will promptly amend the law as it sees fit.

But the law also contains some small loopholes—such as "special services," which offer a simplified way to obtain citizenship. But so far, no one can say with certainty exactly what this will mean. How much service must be rendered? Do you have to be a genius or an athlete, or maybe a rat-catcher with a pipe who can lead multitudes of people back to their historical homeland? Or do you simply have to work for the good of the republic for 20 years? Nor have the criteria for knowledge of Estonian been drawn up, even though, to be objective, anyone can learn the language, I've proved that myself. It is indeed helpful, but it's hardly a guarantee that a person will start thinking like an Estonian and cultivate Estonianness in himself and display its indispensable attributes, such as the national peasant costumes that, for some reason, women wear even to balls and government receptions. Or that a person will vacation in a village on the island of Saaremaa and sincerely believe that the indigenous people's priorities are indisputable. Each of us has on more than one occasion witnessed how wonderfully people can swear in the official language, or how, reacting to your Russian accent, they advise you in the polite Estonian way to go back to Russia.

And so the problem is not the law itself, but the way it will be applied. In general, all these regulations should apply to those coming to Estonia for the first time, and not to those who held Estonian SSR citizenship.

Furthermore, the paragraph of the treaty between Estonia and Russia that obliges the two states to grant citizenship to their residents on the basis of free choice has been violated. Two weeks went by before the Russian Foreign Ministry had any reaction to this, and even then it took an extremely composed view of all these things, signing one trade, political, and economic agreement after another. It is believed that the current failure to supply Russian raw materials to Estonia is Russia's revenge for Estonia's refusal to participate in repaying the USSR's foreign debt and its adoption of legislative acts infringing on the rights of the nonnative population. But frankly speaking, this offers no moral satisfaction. From Estonia, Russia seems bright, clean, and honest. But Estonia is our life, and our hearts feel for it no less. The cost of independence, followed by the absurd and unthinkable price increases, do not comfort even the staunchest opponents of Estonian freedom.

There are several alternatives: to obtain Estonian citizenship or Russian Federation citizenship, or to become a person without citizenship. The problem is that the status of all these citizens is still undefined. Can a Russian become a property owner in Estonia? And will he have to quit his job—after all, he will no longer be able to work as a ship captain, a judge, or any kind of official. Furthermore, a choice of Russian citizenship could lead in the future to a coerced "voluntary" return to the "fatherland." In April, citizens will be issued new Estonian foreign-travel passports, and visa-free travel to many European countries will be introduced for them;

noncitizens, by contrast, will stand in line for visas. Last week, a terrible panic was caused by the rumor that Estonian Air intended to give preferential treatment to citizens, while tickets would be sold to all other permanent residents the same way they are sold to foreigners. The company director denied the report, but Russian businessmen (incidentally, it is said that 80 percent of all finance capital is concentrated in their hands) came up with an original idea—to sell gasoline to noncitizens at a low price, and to citizens at world prices. If this situation continues, citizens will have to lay in a supply of candles, while noncitizens will have to stock food. Both proposals have already been heard in the press. Vardo Rumessen, an active figure in the Estonian Committee, publicly proposed to sell bread only on the presentation of citizenship cards. Yohannes Kass, a Deputy to the Estonian Supreme Council, declared in the newspaper PAEVALEHT: "In this way, the Supreme Council has taken on concern for 600,000 Soviet immigrants, and this at a time when we ourselves don't have enough food and essential goods or fuel to heat our apartments." Thank God, he was rebuffed by his own associates in the same newspaper, where it was hinted to him in a correct fashion that 90 percent of all workers in the slate-extracting industry and 95 percent of all Narva power-industry workers are the very immigrants with whom he proposes to settle scores. The Narva power-industry workers, incidentally, have now held a trade-union conference and hinted that they are prepared to shut down the choppers in April. One can condemn them for extremism, but in one respect they are exactly right: The Russian population in Estonia has indeed taken an understanding view of the establishment and development of Estonian statehood, and only this has prevented ethnic clashes. Something that, incidentally, hardly guarantees peace down the road—the Citizenship Law essentially encourages the creation of a Narva republic—what else could one call the region that covers one-third of Estonia's territory, is oriented toward Russia, inhabited by noncitizens, and borders on Russia? The most direct analogies arise with Dniester region, Ulster, etc.

Social rights are becoming confused with civil rights—and this is the root of all the problems. It is believed that the only privilege of the citizen is the right to vote in elections. Noncitizens, on the other hand, are seemingly permitted all but one thing: the establishment of political parties. In other words, sew sarafans, dance, and drink—within the limits of national and cultural autonomy; but engaging in politics is strictly off limits. For this reason, the Supreme Council Presidium has for several months now stubbornly refused to register the Russian Democratic Movement of Estonia, under the pretext that the organization's charter is at variance with future (?) Estonian legislation. The RDME initially had very sensible and very democratic ideas, but after six months of fighting, its statements have begun to differ little from the old slogans of those fighting for the rights of the nonnative population. Herein lies the personal tragedy of many RDME members, since for all these years most of them were truly sincere in their support for Estonian

independence and, as best they could, refused to have anything to do with the "reds," thinking that this would be assessed on its merits.

In general, citizenship in Estonia is viewed as a rank of nobility or the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. For some reason, it is believed that this is a privilege, and not a normal human condition. This is no doubt why the Estonian Citizens Committee is insisting on citizenship quotas. It is proposed that only a small batch of foreigners be admitted to the citizens' camp each year, as if into a swimming pool. People would have a natural reaction to all this if it applied to future foreigners and to those just now coming to Estonia, and not to those who have lived here 20, 30, or even 50 years.

But those who make a final choice in favor of Estonia must bear in mind that they will have to live in emigration. One east-bound train route is quietly being cancelled after another, Russian groups are gradually being reduced in higher schools, and Russian books and magazines are slowly disappearing from store shelves.

The sting of the Citizenship Law had hardly stopped when Moscow professor B. Kumarin sent the Estonian Embassy an open letter that was immediately published by the local newspapers. And all because the professor believes that giving Russians in Estonia citizenship would be just like granting Russian citizenship to the hordes of Genghis Khan and Batya Khan and to all the soldiers in Napoleon Bonaparte's campaign. The professor's advice: "They've shown you the door, so what can you do? Save face, politely take your leave, and come to the free Non-Black-Earth Zone, to your native birch trees." I wonder what he'll say when someone, in the process of looking for those birches, moves into his apartment.

But why get upset over which citizenship—Russian or Estonian—to acquire? A large part of the population could be idled all the same, because Estonia will never be able to do everything in the one year set aside for the language test and verification of genealogy and loyalty, and by that time the period for applying for Russian citizenship will be successfully completed. There is, of course, another possibility—to try to change society. But events of the past few months offer convincing proof that it is useless to smother the abscess with perfume; it has to be lanced.

People began leaving Estonia about 18 months ago. To be more precise, they began looking at the world map, knowing full well that for most of these people, Russia is a foreign country; many of them have never spent a day there, and the rest no longer have any ties to it. It makes no difference what country they will have to adapt to, but it would be better if it were a developed and rich country. The first group, consisting of thousands of people, hoped to go to Canada. A few families, it's said, succeeded in doing so.

But most people nonetheless intend to return to Russia. Once a week, on Fridays, a long line forms outside a Tallinn building where a group known as Sources is

taking applications. About 500 people are processed in one day. You can find all kinds of people there—young and old, native-born and people who came later—all of them equally fed up with uncertainty and politics. They sum up their reason for moving in one phrase: "We don't want to either surrender or fight." The question of money has yet to be resolved—who should pay for this new resettlement of peoples. In the view of Supreme Council Deputy Sergey Petinov, this "pleasure" will cost every family roughly 1 million rubles, when compensation for psychological damages, housing construction, and employment are taken into account. Some want to move as close as possible to relatives; in others, the words "native Ukraine" and "native Byelarus" have awakened national feelings. But the most popular idea remains that of building somewhere in Leningrad Oblast a city that would have the same climatic conditions as Estonia, moving there as a community, and preserving their customary way of life.

Well look at that—even we are starting to talk about this in a matter-of-fact way, without quivering voices, even though a couple of years ago the thought of a mass exodus of Russians from Estonia seemed absurd. What is the cause here and what is the effect? And aren't all these organizations stimulants in a certain sense? There's no disagreeing with the proposition that Estonia, compared to other republics, is asking "foreigners" to leave in a very civilized manner, even paying good money for their auctioned-off homes? At the outset of perestroika, the following dialogue was very popular in Estonia: "Well, then, are you doing to drive us out?" the Russians ask. And the Estonians answer: "Not at all, you'll leave on your own. Shall we give you a suitcase, or will you take your own?" That was supposed to be the punchline. A little Estonian joke. Faced with future mass unemployment, people will indeed leave voluntarily.

So far, not one program has state assistance; only a reemigration fund has been set up, serving mainly officer families. Andres Kollist, director of the Immigration Department, says: "For normal development, it would be good for Estonia if all Russians who don't want to live here were able to leave. The worst scenario is to be forced to live here." Kollist's forecasts are very modest—he believes that realistically, only 60,000 to 70,000 people will leave. By European standards—standards that Estonia is now trying to meet in all areas—the number of emigrants should not exceed 10 percent of the native population.

That people who have come to know Estonia and are now forced to leave it will be broken is beyond doubt. Innocent victims, they will be punished with the worst human punishment—excommunication from their native land. Since there are people to ask about this in more detail—the Russians of Harbin, who also by virtue of history were expelled from China—just what is it like when half of one's classmates live in Australia and the other half are scattered about the Soviet Union, when you can't show your grandchildren the bench from which—remember?—you fell as a child and bloodied

your nose, and then cried for a long time, buried in your mother's lap. That bench is far away in a foreign land, my friend.

It's getting harder to breathe, because we have all become prisoners. Not a day goes by without republics breaking away like petals from a chamomile, republics in which you used to be a desired guest, but where you can't go now because wars are being fought. Estonia is closing itself off with customs stations and border markers, and the Russian community is being scattered and broken into pieces. No one has died, they're all alive, but there's nobody to call any more.

But will Estonia itself make it through this? Those who do the dirty work can, of course, be replaced by Vietnamese, Chinese, and others—such proposals have already appeared in the press. But the first to leave here will be the best and brightest. The fact is that people have gone to Estonia in the 20th century not just for sausage and a better life, but also for the bracing air. Estonia drew those who were uncomfortable in Russia—those who were in disfavor, the aggrieved, the unacknowledged. They were drawn to a land that could give shelter and preserve for world literature and science Severyanin, Samoylov, Lotman, Dovlatov, and Solzhenitsyn, in search of understanding.

People who once fell in love with Estonia are now falling away—like the leaves of autumn, pale and disillusioned.

Supreme Council Faction Activities Reported

92UN1088A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 28 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Ilya Pobedonostsev: "From Fatherland to Cooperation"]

[Text] A factional struggle among coalitions, clashes, and appeals to various extraparliamentary political forces have long been characteristic features of the republic Supreme Council. Factions and Deputy groups have come and gone, united and parted ways. As a result of the recent March reorganization, this kaleidoscope has taken its final form, presenting a picture that will go down in history: In June, following the May referendum on the draft Basic Law of the Estonian Republic and the June elections, the parliament will be replaced by a State Assembly. Now we can talk only about the personal political fate of the Deputies who have cast their lot with various political parties. And, needless to say, about the electorate that will be formed as a result of the laws on elections and on putting the new Constitution into effect—laws that are being passionately debated today. Attempts to make amendments in the resolution on putting the Citizenship Law into effect are no less important.

Who's who in the Estonian parliament? The names here are not as important as the factions in which the parliamentarians are fighting for a place under the sun.

Following "demilitarization" of the Supreme Council (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, No 52), 98 Deputies

remain in the hall on Vyshgorod. Eighty of them have joined forces in eight Deputy groups, well aware of who holds compatible views. The oldest and most stable faction is the Independent Democrats group. Some of its members used to belong to the republic's communist establishment, the very establishment that, at the initial stage of the "singing revolution," ensured its ultimate victory but now finds itself in an exceedingly ambiguous position.

The largest faction is the Centrist faction, or, as it is sometimes called by habit, the National Front faction. Its nucleus is now the People's Centrist party and former Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar personally, under whose leadership Estonia attained independence. Lately, apparently on account of their common fate, the Centrists have acquired a mutual liking for the Independent Democrats. Members of both factions have joined in calling for an expansion of the citizenry by including Russian emigrants and allowing the latter to take part in the referendum and elections.

An almost opposite position is taken by the Fatherland faction. This faction brings together members of a multitude of minor parties, of which the Christian Democrats are especially energetic. Fatherland cooperates closely with the Estonian Congress, repeating its statements word for word. In this sense, the faction has an interest in making the citizenship and election laws as tough as possible, so as to allow no one but "legitimate Estonian Republic citizens" to participate in them, and in imposing, through the referendum, a ban on state office and so forth for the former nomenklatura.

The two agrarian factions—the United Farmers Union and the Association of Private Farmers—have demonstrated no special position of their own on major political issues, fighting more with each other for various agrarian reforms. But they are capable of showing both patriotism and moderation.

In mid-March of this year, the Social Democrats formed the Moderates faction. Now, realizing they can't get far on a platform of national revival alone and that they must maintain their image as democrats, they are leaning toward the view that, in order to avoid a social explosion, some concessions have to be made to the foreign-born residents.

The 22 Russian Deputies are split up roughly evenly between two factions that have been formed since the August putsch: They are Civic Accord, and Cooperation and Equal rights. On the issues of citizenship and human rights—the key issues for the Russian population—the factions' positions naturally coincide. But there is an almost insurmountable barrier between them. In the past, the Deputies from Cooperation and Equal Rights were closely linked with the Estonian Intermovement, and Lembit Annus is even a former member of the communists' Central Committee Politburo. People in Estonia will probably never forget the happy faces of the faction's members on August 19, 1991. Today, however, united by a common fate (they are all foreigners), the two

factions often vote in the same way. But Civic Accord is keeping its distance, hoping to find allies among Estonian Deputies as well.

Of the members of parliament who do not belong to any factions, most are individuals whose own political stature is extraordinarily great—precisely because they have always stood up for their own views. But if the electoral legislation—which calls for elections on the basis of party slates—passes, they too will have to sacrifice their individuality to the group.

LATVIA

Godmanis Resignation Seen as Unlikely Despite Disputes

92UN1124C Riga ATMODA in Latvian No 9,
10 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Maris Mednis: "Riding a White Horse to Supreme Council"]

[Text] Showing a fig to his opponents and critics at a February 26 press conference, prime minister Ivars Godmanis declared that the fortress of state will not be conquered in the near future: "Although the economic situation in Latvia is critical, I will not surrender to talk of the demise of Latvia's government before the Saeima [Parliament] elections. The same goes for talk of kicking out some minister from the government." Although deputies and those who wish to become deputies have begun "breaking in" the pre-election horses, the date for the election is known by no one. Optimists estimate that we will be heading for the ballot boxes around Christmas, but the more guarded seers point to spring or summer 1993. We will see who gets the ten spot for being the closest, but it is at least clear that preparations for the election will require at least eight to ten months, and during this time Ivars Godmanis hopes to hold onto to the helm of power.

In conformance with the law, the exit of Ministers from the building on Brivibas Street may only be asked by the deputies of the Supreme Council. Right now the passage of such a decree requires 66 votes in theory, but they would be practically impossible to gather, because the unified Fourth of May deputies rank and file has fragmented into tiny quarrelsome kingdoms. For example, if one of the fractions demands the resignation of Godmanis's cabinet, other fractions are presented with the opportunity to form a coalition and torpedo the demand. We were able to observe the functioning of this mechanism during the election of the SC first vice president, when the PFL [Popular Front of Latvia] faction, unexpectedly aligned with the "Lidztiesiba" [Equal Rights] faction, succeeded in overpowering the "Satversme" [Constitution] faction and achieved a favorable result. With such an organization of power existing it is easy to realize the "divide and rule" principle and, for at least a few months, Godmanis will be able to rest easily at night.

Last autumn dissatisfaction with work of the Council of Ministers roamed the halls of the Jekaba Street [Supreme

Council] building. Then, sacrificing the most unpopular ministers, J. Aboltins [economics minister] for instance, and forming a cabinet of ministers, Ivars Godmanis quite easily succeeded in extinguishing the smoldering embers. While the minds of the legislators were ruled by serenity, dissatisfaction trod in the cities and countryside, in apartments and offices. Angry words echoed not only from the mouths of the leaders of the not large right wing [Communist] party. Even leaders of such somnolent organizations such as the Union of Latvia's Farmers [ULF] admitted in their March 3 session that they had, until then, viewed the prime minister "as much wiser." But ULF co-chairman Juris Janeks characterized the situation's hopelessness in DIENA thus: "There is no reason for this meeting and for working out this concept because the government simply will not take it into their heads." Also announced the resignation of the competent banker, Bank of Latvia vice president A. Bergs-Bergmanis, is a symptom of the crisis of power. Sooner or later this dissatisfaction will be echoed in the SC chamber, and then Ivars Godmanis will have to rack his brain not only about the privatization of industry but also about staying on the ship of state. Realization of the "divide and rule" principle, as already mentioned, is now in its most favorable climate. Where two do battle the third will inherit. In his activities heretofore Ivars Godmanis has proven himself a clever political gamesman and, it seems, in this situation he will not let anything pass him by.

Notwithstanding the seemingly stable relationship between the dollar and the ruble, inflation in Latvia proceeds with gigantic strides. The moment may soon arrive when Godmanis, in the name of the nation's economic interests, will request special powers. Answering to the deputies' objections to authoritarianism, the prime minister will point to the chaos in legislation and the disorganization of SC work, thus trying to stifle the most garrulous. Professor G. Kenins-King, director of the Baltic Academic Center, also foresees such a direction of events. In an interview with DIENA he said: "The government's decree, freezing purchase prices paid by state processing enterprises for agricultural products, can only be effective for the short term.... In the worst case this decree could lead to ever greater state interference in the economy and even to—that it is not easily believed—dictatorship." Prime minister Godmanis's announcement at the February 26 news conference (shortly after Savisaar's resignation in Estonia) evidences great self-confidence. For the time being his positions are rather stable. Notwithstanding the deep economic crisis, the popularity of the prime minister is being preserved. He, utilizing his good orator's qualities, his skill in persuading people and his large capacity for work, has created the perception of a wise and knowledgeable person. It is with good reason that some opponents view as one element of the crisis not the activities of the prime minister heretofore, but his "incompetent team of advisors."

"Already during the time of the PFL Political Committee, it was characteristic of Ivars to listen to the

thoughts and views of others, to summarize them and later to offer them as his own." That is how a PFL activist from that time characterizes his former colleague.

Despite everything it seems that Godmanis has decided that this team is the right one and that he will stick with it to the end. How long? The prime minister himself hopes for at least a year.

Centrist Party, LDLP Role Analyzed

92UN1124F *Jurmala JURMALA in Latvian No 9, 12 Mar 92 p 8*

[Article by Ieva Sulce: "Who Are These Prophets of Democracy?"]

[Text] "You know, I am tired of speaking at all about a Latvian Latvia and the interests of the Latvian people. You know, if the Latvians themselves are shits, then they deserve what they deserve."—Dainis Ivans, SC [Supreme Council] deputy, Latvia's UNESCO representative

So said the late lover of all the Latvian people and the pampered PFL [Popular Front of Latvia] leader in an interview with *Radio Free Europe* at a meeting of "real" democrats on February 22 in the Congress building. What is that? Dilettantism, lack of couth? Or simply sneering at his people? Maybe all of the above? Maybe a person feels uncomfortable in his place? In an interview with DIENA (May 2, 1991), Dainis himself was convinced that "a politician starts where his responsibility for ideas and words cannot be doubted...." The quotation at the beginning of this article can remain for his own conscience, but there is one question I would like to pose, listening to Mr. Ivans's performance at the already mentioned meeting and the interview with *Radio Free Europe*. How long will the people believe the words of leaders who appear suddenly on a wave of popularity and then afterwards wonder in amazement at the laws, of which every third one must be corrected immediately after it is passed? What kind of people have we elected who now are deciding the people's fate.... Now the time to elect the new legislature—the Saeima [parliament]—is quickly approaching. And, in my opinion, that is the exact reason that the newly created Democratic Initiative Center is entering the political arena with a "new" panacea—a democratic Latvia—appearing on its flag.

Not too long ago the consolidating power in society was the PFL. At this moment it has "dangerously" radicalized, and, as Dainis Ivans expressed in his *Radio Free Europe* interview, "that is no longer the Popular Front which I joined. Since this (democratic powers alliance, party or something else.—I.S.) could be a certain alternative, that simply will go in a different direction." That same view is voiced also by Juris Rozenvalds (LDLP) [Latvian Democratic Labor Party], saying at the meeting that "the true perspective in Latvia can only be center and left-of-center politics." That, obviously, will also be the new party's or alliance's political course. The only question is whether the actual role played by the efforts of the "centrist" group was to shift the political alignments in

Latvia's spectrum of political groupings? Or perhaps they had their eyes on the upcoming Saeima elections? For what really unites politicians "who have been pushed from the top echelon of power," (Juris Bojars), representatives of the business world and extras who are destined to play the role of a participating intelligentsia? It is precisely representatives of these strata who gathered at the Democratic Initiative Center on February 22, the day it was established in the Congress building.

There is not just one dimension in normal politics. In discussions of various questions, divergent political powers allied, though on other questions they may be (and are) in opposition to one another. That is why it is more comfortable to sit around a "round" table, for, if someone absolutely insists on sitting in the center, it can be viewed as impolite. But if viewless chameleons now mask itself as centrism, are these the normal maneuverings of politics? Of democracy? But in its day democracy served Social Democrats only as a transition period to socialism. In the end it was destroyed.... But now again Vilis Seleckis in an interview with *Radio Latvia* is talking about "an absolutely democratic Latvia," and also Dainis Ivans does not view presidential democracy as sufficiently democratic, but in his "Call" we see meaningless phrases: "democratic values," "democratic ideals." In what way would the "Centrists" be more democratic than others, for example, the LDLP, which is willing (but was not invited) to sign below these slogans?

In my opinion, LDLP representatives were not invited to sign this "Call" for a completely simple reason: It would be immediately clear to the people what kind of political course they are dealing with and no support groups could be successfully formed in counties and cities. Juris Bojars is completely right that part of the "Call" appears to be borrowed from the LDLP program. Is it only the Democratic Initiative Center that has not intended to sit in a "chair," which is already occupied?

The famous Russian philologist Nikolai Berdiaev writes, in his work, *Unequal Philosophy*: "What a person wants is not important. What is important is that he have that which he wants.... Behold democracy, popular government's final formula.... The will of the people may be for the most horrible evil and the democratic principle cannot object to it. Within the democratic principle there is no guarantee against that which, once realized, will lower people's standard of living and will destroy greater values.... Right and truth may be in the minority, not the majority and always they will be in the minority.... Democracy is society's skeptical gnosiology. This gnosiology is recognized by those who have lost the source of their spiritual lives." That only attests to the fact that in establishing the foundation for a democratic state it is important to understand in what things and in what large measure democracy is realizable.

What might be the chief barriers to developing a democratic state? Here it would be useful to examine an article written by the US historian and political scientist Janis Penikis (*KULTURAS FONDA AVIZE* [NEWSPAPER

OF THE CULTURE FUND], March 1990): "The lower the educational level of a society, the more difficult it is to develop and consolidate a democratic order. The lower the level of economic welfare and the deeper the socio-economic cleavages, the lower the probability that it will be able to maintain a stable political democracy. The less active a people's members are in voluntarily participating in associations and other private organizations led by their own representatives, the lower the probability that it will strengthen the order of the democratic state." That such a characterization is real also in contemporary Latvia is attested to by many of the theses in the "Call," concerning the desire to liquidate the crises in the social, economic, and cultural spheres. The only thing missing is a concrete idea. Perhaps that will appear by March 15.

What prospects are there for an "absolute" democracy in Latvia? Maybe the centrist politicians will feel the invitation "to resolve ethnic politics in a balanced and consistent manner.... To harmonize ethnic relations, to reject the highhandedness of one people against other peoples." Yes, among both the initiators and the supporters were many non-Latvians, so we must mention here several important factors. "In Latvia," as Janis Peters said, "business structures are developing along ethnic lines. There can be nothing more dangerous for the Latvian state and the Latvian nation than this phenomenon, because for this very reason Latvia is threatened with a non-Latvian satellite state's existence."

Perhaps to involve the financial assistance of the business world at the February 22 meeting it was resolved to create a fund that will materially support a democratic Latvia? In accordance with common legal tradition, the activities of the fund will have to be open. Then after a while we will see who these patrons (who "call for music" or develop a lobby for themselves for the next Saeima) of democracy really are. Judging by the attendees in the hall, suspicions were aroused that they could be the same ones about whom Mr. Peters was speaking, but Dainis Ivans clarified, in the aforementioned interview, "that only by integrating the non-Latvians and drawing them into Latvian culture can we ensure a guarantee for the survival also of the Latvian people," and "I really do not know what is the 'zero option' and what is the 'non-zero option.' I simply hate to listen when I hear something about citizenship, I just want to say: 'Leave me in peace; I will go home and plant cabbages in the field.'"

The authors of the "Call," obviously "in accordance with the interests of the majority of Latvia's inhabitants," have divided Latvia's inhabitants into "the two largest national groups of inhabitants," neglecting to explain which of those includes the Latvian nation. The PFL's VEF [a large electronics enterprise] section council prepared its response to the "Call" on February 17, in which they wrote: "We view it as essential to remind the authors of the "Call" that the ideological basis of the majority of Popular Front members has always been and will be not just democratic, but also an independent

Latvia as a guarantor of the survival and blossoming of the Latvian nation." I will remind democrats of the thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi regarding ethnic relations, whom Dainis Ivans called in his interview in DIENA (May 2, 1991), "a tribune, a preacher, a prophet; he guided his many, many followers toward humane, humanitarian ideals. Is that not the most important thing really, the only criterion for politicians and politics?" So, behold what Gandhi wrote: "Let us avoid closeness to those who in their social customs differ from ours. It is not necessary to tangle your life with such a person or people's lives, whose ideals are not in concert with ours.... Every person is a brook. Every people is a river. They all must follow their own river bed, remaining clear and clean until they reach the sea of salvation, where everyone will mix." Gandhi, who has become so dear to our "democrats," battled against cosmopolitanism all his life. The only thing that is able to resist it is culture, the spiritual life of a people, but, as expressively explained by Eduard Pavuls, "the intelligentsia has gone underground, thrown its rifle into the bushes. None of us does anything any longer."

The intelligentsia will always be of two minds in politics. On the one hand, they will be independent, free, and wise in their thinking. On the other hand, those who serve the state live on the state's account.

In 1927 J. Akmentins wrote in his collection of works *The Crisis of Democracy*: "The egoism of the intelligentsia shows itself in two ways: the wills of the weak and of the strong egoists. The weak-willed egoists often have no definite political views and goals, for they have no faith in realizing them. Such individuals among the intelligentsia are not a minority, for they consist of people of mediocre abilities. Opposed to these stand the strong-willed. They are endowed with certain leadership abilities, and they are blessed with social activity." Which is our intelligentsia really, and will they long permit themselves to be speculated with?

In his article "Battling with Shadows," (NEATKARIGA CINA, February 26, 1992) Juris Bojars mentions the political science term "political actors." I would like to ask whether we will long have to watch, in place of "political theater," a "political circus," where jugglers swiftly toss word balls, illusionists turn black into white and clowns try to elicit the public's laughter with their crude jokes?

[Interview of SC deputy Peteris Lakis by Ieva Sulce; date and place not given: "I Can Only Do So Much"]

[Sulce] Why did you sign this "Call"? Is a new party tempting you?

[Lakis] My sense is that right now is not only a hard, but a bad time. That things are hard was to be expected, but that they are bad, that is no longer comprehensible. The objectives were difficult, due to our independent circumstances. We could not hope for a normal situation in economics, in politics, nor in our spiritual life. We

ourselves added corruption, conditions complicated the situation, and we do not see the escape to many questions.

I am not thinking about a party. I am thinking that it might be some sort of alliance. Although there are still different orientations: Some want to develop a party, others simply want to change things in the economy and politics. I am here for one reason. Until I was thirty years old they have attempted to decide everything for me: how to think, what to do. Since 1987-88 I hoped that it would no longer be that way, but now I fear that these processes will repeat themselves.

[Sulce] The text of the "Call" reads, "with the division of power between nationalist radicals and conservatives, there appears a need to develop a political center in society and the parliament." That center's "ideological basis has been and continues to be the ideals of democracy." What are these democratic ideals today?

[Lakis] They are hard to conceive of right now. We have a material and spiritual poverty today. In my conception of democracy, it is a broad spectrum of choice that is given to the individual and to the individual who is able to make choices. Society provides this democracy and the individual utilizes it.

[Sulce] In reading the "Call," we find: "tensions in society are deepened also by the attempts of a few radical parties and groupings in developing the idea of the contemporary democratic state to replace it with attempts to reinstate the first republic formally and literally." What are your comments on this statement?

[Lakis] That is very interesting. For example, that the year 1918 is still being invoked, we may term fundamentalism. If we are talking in a legal aspect, then I have no doubt that the 1922 Constitution must be reinstated. We are reinstating also all of the rest of the Latvia-era legislation. So, here a question arises: What will our newly elected Saeima [parliament] do with the 1919 citizenship law, which also will have to be reinstated as one of the legal basic documents? This law requires only five years residency in Latvia and there is no language proficiency requirement. Such a law would be very useful for the Supreme Council today: Citizens and the circle of their descendants are now reinstated; they should elect a Saeima and that, in turn, can do as it pleases with this citizenship law. This position is developing in practice. The 1937 Civil Code also presents many problems. In terms of political orientation it is the 15th of May republic that is being popularized, not the 18th of November republic. There is a reason that we mention Ulmanis more often than Chaksts or Zemgals. That is in conformance with law. But in his time Zemgals represented the democratic center....

[Sulce] The "Call" was also signed by many representatives of the intelligentsia. And yet all in all they have largely gone silent. Why?

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[Lakis] There are many causes. Still, I think that the intelligentsia at this moment are those who largely maintains us, not materially, but spiritually. The circulation of culture has not stopped, it has been preserved. The boundaries of opportunity are functioning also in the other spheres.

[Sulce] Here I would like to make an observation. Forgetting culture at the level of state politics, wrecking the balance between social strata, many soul workers drop their hands. Then they search for any other area, often even areas unrelated to culture, to ensure the survival of oneself and one's family. Actually, as Albert Schweitzer wrote, cultural suicide takes place, the cultural abilities of contemporary people shrink, because the relations into which he is drawn, more often degrade and psychologically traumatize than positively charge....

[Lakis] That is a question about the general crisis of Western culture. That is a reality. Also in the West right now there is no philosophical or ethical system which the intelligentsia could take as a model. They in the West are also searching. I think that in the West at the end of the century there will develop something new, based on the traditions of Schweitzer and others. In any case, it will be anti-imperial, opposed to the pretensions of great powers. Most likely it will develop in Slovenia.

[Sulce] So, there will be a rebirth of small nations?

[Lakis] Yes, this process at the moment is the most progressive. Latvia, too, may go down this path. That is why it is essential that something be done.

Peteris Lakis is one of the authors of the "Call," a SC deputy, and the Rector of the Academy of Culture.

Voter Registration for 'Saeima' Discussed

92UN1124D Riga ATMODA in Latvian No 10,
17 Mar 92 p 2

[Interview of Supreme Council deputy Aleksandrs Kirsteins by E. Grandavas; time and place not given: "If We Will Delay And Delay, Then..."]

[Text] With this summary of the views of SC [Supreme Council] deputy Aleksandrs Kirsteins on the very real present tendency to put the brakes on Latvia's democratization and political process, we begin the interview with the SC deputy and political party leader about these complex questions—the election of the Saeima [parliament] and the preconditions for it. The proposals and arguments expressed will certainly be summarized in a separate article.

[Kirsteins] The distribution of power in the SC makes clear that, if we examine results of votes, all the most important decrees have been passed most recently by a coalition of the PFL [Popular Front of Latvia] faction and Interfront [the neo-Bolshevik faction]. Without the help of Interfront on such decrees as the fundamental conditions for the law on citizenship, we would not have been able to elect a vice chairman. In fact, all the main questions connected to property rights were passed with the voting help of Interfront. Even the establishment of

an innocent commission that would hear out those who cooperated with the Chekha [KGB], could not collect up more than fifty votes.

On August 21, 1991, when the constitutional law was passed, a decree on the terms of a Saeima election could have been passed. Now this question is being made artificially complex. All those powers that are from the left of the center of the political spectrum are blatantly interested in not holding a Saeima election. Why? They and also the SC PFL faction believe that the Supreme Council may resolve all constitutional questions. They have forgotten that which we ourselves have said: the SC is only a temporary legislative institution. If we have renewed functioning of the Constitution, then we should concentrate on ending the authority of the SC and on electing a Saeima. For their part the leftists, who are in the majority, have announced that the [Soviet] army has not been withdrawn and so elections cannot be held. The Latvia Committee votes with the leftists. All constitutional questions—property rights, privatization, the citizenship question—will not be resolved by the end of 1993.

[Grandavas] In that case the situation has now developed—the terms have not been defined, because the election does not have the necessary preconditions and in turn the creation of these preconditions may drag on for the foreseeable future. What, in your opinion, is the answer?

[Kirsteins] The answer is simple. First of all, it would only take a couple weeks to determine who may and who may not participate in the election. All residents do not have to be completely registered in order to hold the Saeima election. First, there are certain people who were born in Latvia during the time of the [pre-World War II] Republic of Latvia. Second, we have registers for Saeima elections. We could proceed more simply: A person completes a form which attests that he or his parents were RL [Republic of Latvia] citizens. In the event that he gives false information he loses certain rights. But if we proceed as we have been, developing extremely detailed registers of residents based on archival research, then it may take 3-4 years. As Mr. Baltacs explained, it will require five years to exchange USSR passports for new ones. That was a clear indication that this process could drag on for many years. We should proceed as in all normal states, where any sort of personal certificate is accepted. For example, the resident registration stamp of the immigration department must appear in a Russian passport, indicating that this person has the right to participate in elections and so forth.

The LNIM [Latvian National Independence Movement] council plans to call an enlarged session, in which the largest parties will be invited to participate, to discuss only one question: When will the Saeima election take place? If that will take place at the end of this year, then it is logical, that the Saeima will resolve the above-mentioned constitutional questions. In the time from 1992 to 1995 the Saeima would resolve these questions.

If we delay and delay, then we will entangle property rights to the point where no one will be able to untangle them.

Bank of Latvia To Be Noncommercial

92UN1124B Riga DIENA in Latvian 12 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Una Andersone: "Bank of Latvia Will Not Be Commercial Bank"]

[Text] On their first reading today the SC [Supreme Council] accepted two draft laws to regulate the activities of the Bank of Latvia [BL] and defines its functions. The Bank of Latvia is Latvia's central bank and it will not carry out commercial functions (presently the BL does deal in commercial functions, but that will cease with the completion of the currency reform); the BL is the only entity with monopoly rights to issue lats [money]; the BL is the inter-bank reconciliation center, and is also responsible for supervising and reviewing the activities of all commercial banks and other credit institutions; the BL is not dependent on the state administrative system in monetary policy; the administrative system is bifurcated; the BL's fixed capital is 500 million rubles. These are the principal theses of the draft laws "On Banks" and "On the Bank of Latvia." The chief author of both draft laws, consultant to the president of the Bank of Latvia, E. Veicins, speaking as a BL spokesman, explained that they were worked out based on the laws of the first Republic of Latvia, BL statutes, former credit laws which included BL and commercial bank fundamental statutes, and also suggestions offered by Bank of Germany and US experts. The agitation of deputies considering the draft law "On the Bank of Latvia" was related to possible BL hopes to continue to engage in commercial activities. BL president E. Repse sought to dispel any doubts, explaining: "Presently freeing 48 sections of the BL from commercial functions would surely quickly bankrupt them. Hence, the answer is unambiguous and certain: the BL will cease to engage in commercial activity with the completion of the currency reform in Latvia. The Bank's sections will be able to become autonomous commercial banks." "I completely reject suspicions that the BL could play a dictatorial role. Supervision and control are obligatory prerogatives, because we cannot permit some banks to go bankrupt," declared E. Veicins. Some concluded that these draft laws will create favorable circumstances for the creation and operation of new banks, for example, a mortgage or land bank. Currently more than twenty commercial banks are operating in Latvia.

LITHUANIA

Landsbergis On Current Conditions in Republic
92UN1227A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Apr 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with V. Landsbergis by I. Zotov: "It Is Important to Concentrate on What Is Happening in Lithuania"]

[Text] [Zotov] Lithuania has been independent for two years now. You have achieved much over this time. Does it not seem to you now that the "romantic" period is already behind in your activity?

[Landsbergis] At that time we had to act in a new manner and that was effective and, only in acting in that way, was it possible to achieve something. For this reason it appeared as something of a fantasy and this was defined by the word "romantic." But anything romantic is more effective and vital when it derives from human existence. When someone thought something up or fantasized, that was not romanticism. Romanticism is when there is an outburst of spiritual forces. At a certain time this outburst occurs as historical necessity.

[Zotov] Now, when the romantic zeal has gone into decline, has it become harder for you to work?

[Landsbergis] In a certain sense, yes. At that time there were conditions for making maximalist decisions. Then any half-hearted decision would have been a surrender. Everything was clear, as in a war. Now it is the postwar period.

[Zotov] Now are you capable of making compromises?

[Landsbergis] At present everything has multiple levels, but somewhere there is a limit beyond which the abandoning of basic positions involves danger. It is not a question of compromises. A compromise is possible as this is the way to agreement.

[Zotov] Was your recent trip through the regions of Lithuania a unique preparation for the election campaign?

[Landsbergis] This is work, work of activating the reforms, economic reforms and hence social and hence political. We have set out to implement those programs which were announced after the election victory. At those meetings we were deciding just what our society would be. At present it is not enough to be concerned with foreign policy, now we must concentrate on what is happening in Lithuania. Successfully or not, the reforms are being carried out. People who do not understand the laws, ukases and decrees easily become the subject of all sorts of manipulations and machinations in the hands of the more adroit, who are working for other aims. Life always raises its own questions regardless of the fact that various laws have been passed. Here we might even recall Lenin who said that "truth is always concrete." We will endeavor to have less resentment among the people. And regardless of all the problems and concerns, it is clear that the people are moving forward and that they want to take the land and work it.

[Zotov] Your opponents say that the incident with Col Chernykh was provoked by the Lithuanian leadership in order to again draw attention to the problem of withdrawing the troops of the former Soviet Army from the republic...

[Landsbergis] If some think that we supposedly were after Col Chernykh and were estimating when to put this

into action, they are wrong. But I find it a little strange that they held this colonel, knowing that a criminal case had been initiated against him. I would not say that this was a provocation on their behalf; this rather was neglect and possibly this agreed with the view still held among the military present on our territory that supposedly Lithuania is not worth bothering about. It is being suggested to them that they almost have diplomatic immunity. However, Yeltsin and I agreed completely upon the positions in the documents and this stipulated that the troops were responsible to the laws of Lithuania. We are waiting and when the congress is over, we shall meet and sign the documents which have already been approved. We also intend to discuss interstate relations. We are constantly waiting. We are waiting for some representative, ambassador or consul. We have our representative in Moscow, but there is no Moscow representative in Vilnius.

[Zotov] At present Parliament is discussing a law on the desovietization of the leading Lithuanian bodies. The ranking of the leader of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party Algirdas Brazauskas at present is just a little behind yours. Would it be just if after the passage of the law Brazauskas would be deprived to the opportunity to run for President?

[Landsbergis] This depends in what form this law is passed. Of course, Brazauskas held a very high position in the Communist Party and he certainly would fall under the provisions of the law.

[Zotov] Thus your main competitor would be eliminated...

[Landsbergis] I do not know, actually, whether he is now a competitor or not, it is hard to say. They in the Labor Party are all rushing about. Brazauskas seemingly announced his candidacy, but now they are against a referendum and against presidential elections. But this, in my opinion, is just an ancillary motive for the main problem. It is not only the leaders of the Labor Party who would come under the effect of the law. This would also threaten many even from Sajudis.

[Zotov] Recently Vilnius University conducted a poll of the inhabitants of Lithuania. There was the question: With what states do you feel that Lithuania should develop relations first? In the replies, immediately after the Scandinavian countries was Russia and followed by the republics of the former Union. How would you comment on this answer?

[Landsbergis] That is common sense.

[Zotov] Are you content now with the relations with Russia. Is Lithuania now experiencing economic pressure from Russia?

[Landsbergis] There is such pressure. We cannot say confidently whether this pressure has been caused by political motives or by the economic crisis in Russia itself. In the latter instance pressure on the neighbor is chosen as a method for resolving this crisis as the neighbor finds it difficult to adapt to the condition

imposed on it and he has no choice. This neighbor simply is unable to create a situation where he would have a choice—Russia or the West. After so many decades of being tethered to Russia, we remain very tied. We are not against being economically interrelated but we do not want to be an appendage.

[Zotov] How would you view the situation of the national minorities residing on the territory of Lithuania and in particular the Polish minority?

[Landsbergis] In the sense of cultural autonomy, there are no problems. Even our smallest minorities have their cultural autonomy and societies and schools are being established... This has been reinforced in the legislation and is actually being implemented. But here there is also the question of territorial autonomy and of creating a small state in the Lithuanian state. This is not to be anticipated.

Commission Outlines Preparatory Steps for Constitution

*92UN1176B Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian
14 Feb 92 p 1*

[Article by Arunas Godunavicius: "Will We Have a Constitution This Year?"]

[Text] Supreme Council Deputy K. Lapinskas, the new chairman of the Commission to Draft a Lithuanian Constitution, described to journalists yesterday the work of this commission as it prepares the Basic Law.

The commission has 14 members, who represent all factions in the Parliament; several commission members are not members of any faction. This, according to K. Lapinskas, should guarantee that the commission works in a constructive fashion.

K. Lapinskas acquainted the journalists with a Supreme Council decision regarding the stages that will be followed in the preparation of the constitution. In the first stage, lasting until 15 March, the commission is charged with preparing a first draft. During the second stage, 15 to 31 March, there will be a general debate in the Supreme Council. The commission hopes to receive the approval of the Supreme Council and guidelines for changes of the draft at this time.

Then, on 1 May, the constitutional draft will be submitted to the public for debate. In September, the commission will summarize all the comments and it is determined to submit the final draft of the constitution by 15 October, for debate by the Supreme Council.

The final stage is a general referendum, at which time the Lithuanian people would have to approve the new Basic Law. K. Lapinskas was hopeful that Lithuania would have its constitution this year. The commission chairman said that the commission is not using any of the drafts prepared by the various political parties as the basis for the new constitution. This is being done to avoid giving a preference to any political grouping.

When K. Lapinskas was asked by RESPUBLIKA about the introduction of the institution of a presidency, he said that all members of the commission approved of this idea; however, there were ongoing discussions on presidential powers, and there was active deliberation on the issue of the relationship between the legislative and executive branches.

K. Lapinskas also indicated that it has still not been decided, whether, under the new constitution, Supreme Council deputies will have the right to work in bodies of the executive branch. According to the commission chairman, this is an issue of political maturity.

It is essential that Lithuania, which wants to integrate itself into the political and economic structures of Europe, adopt its constitution by 1 January 1993, when the countries of Western Europe open their borders. The type of constitution that is required, of course, is one that would be democratic and would guarantee human rights.

Government Social Protection Policies Scored

92UN1176A Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian
13 Feb 92 p 5

[Article by Ausra Maldekiene: "Let's help ourselves, because the Government is not ensuring the citizen's social security"]

[Text] Lithuania's Office of Employment has announced the official forecast of the number of unemployed workers for 1992. And, truth be told, an unusually large number of unemployed is expected this year: 618,000!. This is especially startling given that there are 1,800,000 people in Lithuania who are able to work. This means that virtually one of every three working-age Lithuanians may have to look for a new job this year.

The situation seems even more ominous when you read the conclusions drawn by World Bank experts, who recently worked in Lithuania. In their opinion, "there is a real possibility that unemployment will increase more than is expected." This, according to them, is also borne out by an analysis of the current situation—above all else, economic relations with the East are breaking off—and the experience of other former socialist countries. The experts also maintain that existing employment offices have thus far not been given the means that would allow them to provide concrete assistance to those seeking employment. The experts especially stress that only very small amounts of money are currently earmarked for the purpose of having people who have lost their jobs start their own businesses; and there are no signs that an increase in this level of expenditure is planned.

But the fact that the experts believe that the country will hardly be able to devote sufficient attention and resources to solving the problems associated with unemployment is only one difficulty. Another is: isn't the country hindering us from helping ourselves if the sad day comes and you get up in the morning not to go to work, but to look for work?

Of course, not very long ago at all, we were members of one trade union or another. The majority of people are still paying membership dues; about 80 percent of the amount collected remains at the particular enterprise, 10 percent goes to the federation, and the remaining 10 percent ends up in relief funds. (At present, those who lose their jobs have priority in receiving these relief funds).

As far back as last November, the committee representing the federation of the trade union for workers in local economic units and that of general services workers turned to A. Dobravolskas, requesting that the Government index the assets of social relief funds, accumulated prior to 26 February 1991, that were held by the trade unions. (You will recall that residents' deposits, held in branches of the Lithuanian state bank, were compensated on the basis of Government Decision No. 106 of 28 March 1991: "Regarding the Protection from Devaluation—of Residents' Deposits and State Insurance Fees—Related to the One-time Increase in Prices"). Remembering that the moneys accumulated in the relief funds of the trade unions are not the result of any rich benefactor's charity, but rather the money of those same residents, one might have thought that the Government would at least devote sufficient attention to an analysis of this problem. Even more so since it knows that in next year's budget, the funds slated for employment are much too modest. (These are the conclusions of those same World Bank experts whom, by the way, the Government likes to quote so much when it finds it useful to do so). On the other hand, if anyone believes that such an indexing is impossible due to the shortage of funds, I can refer to some numbers: somewhat more than one million rubles would have to be indexed. And this amount, it seems, is not very great as far as the Government is concerned, which is giving financial support to various movements and political parties on the left as well as on the right. Thus, in the draft budget for next year, at least 7,600,000 rubles are earmarked for support to political parties.

How did the Government react?

On 22 November, the committee representing the federation of the aforementioned trade unions received a letter from Deputy Finance Minister R. Sarkinas, in which he imparted the obvious truth: "The relief funds composed of moneys of trade union members are not being indexed" (as per Decision No. 106—A.M.). A factual response which any lawyer or financial specialist can give. To all appearances, ministers (and their deputies), exist for another—more important—purpose: to grasp the essence of problems and to solve them (or at least to try!).

Then the chairman of the federation's committee wrote again, now to Mrs. Kuneviciene herself. He wrote in the belief that the Minister understood that "these funds, too, are one of the social guarantees for the citizens of Lithuania and are made up of wages, i.e. from the same funds as deposits in savings banks.

The answer was essentially the same as before: "Relief funds made up of financial assets of trade union members are not being indexed." True, there was a supplementary explanation given: "In accordance with the laws of the Republic of Lithuania, the requisite funds for the social guarantees foreseen in the law are provided for in the national budget as well as in the budget for National Social Insurance" (Are we to understand, perhaps, that we may no longer take care of ourselves with our own money?). Besides, according to the Minister, it is also not possible to index the relief funds because the budget for 1992 is finalized, although it includes a large deficit. Be this as it may, the budget deficit problem is not the problem of the worker who wants to rely on himself (!) for help. Strange, too, is the entire notion that trade unions are required to index their own funds because, according to the law, "trade unions manage their funds and assets on their own." The logic here is truly odd: the Finance Minister, having confused independence and indexing, will next suggest that we also index our family budgets ourselves, since they, just like those relief funds, are formed from wages.

The experience of the Western European countries shows that a system of social guarantees works most effectively when the Government and the trade unions pool resources to provide social protection of the country's inhabitants. For this reason, too, the Government ought to tackle these problems in a similar fashion. After all, it is not the fault of the members of the trade union that the Government is decreasing, through inflation, the possibilities of having such social guarantees.

It is true that the finance minister proposed another way for indexing those funds: "You could have put them into savings accounts—and you would have gotten interest." Mrs. E. Kuneviciene—and this, regrettably, is nothing new—is not thinking professionally this time either, because trade unions cannot put resources into those accounts. The incompetence of the finance minister has been revealed yet again. And one wants to ask the Government: will he have to listen to Mrs. Kuneviciene's economic nonsense much longer?

In this way a single, and seemingly small problem, apparently affecting only a few trade unions, raises a serious issue: will we be able to organize our social security independently of the Government's beneficence and deficit budgets?

Controversy Over Officials' Past KGB Connections Continues

92UN1220A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 20 Apr 92
Morning Edition p 2

[Article by *IZVESTIYA* correspondent Nikolay Lashkevich: "Witch Hunt Lithuanian Style. What is Behind the Campaign to Expose KGB Agents"]

[Text] It would seem that after the well-known case of Virgilijus Cepaitis, deputy of the Lithuanian supreme council, the wave of sensational exposures about the involvement of some influential Lithuanian politicians

in the KGB secret service would start to subside. Cooperation with the state security agency was proven, period. But now we find that other very well known people have fallen under the wheels of the "Lithuanian KGBate" locomotive.

In a recent interview with the newspaper *LIETUVOS AIDAS* two members of the Lithuanian parliamentarian commission for investigating KGB activity, B. Gajauskas and S. Slicyte, declared that deputy Kazimiera Prunskiene, former prime-minister, and deputy Jokubas Minkevicius, a well-known philosopher, had also, it seems, collaborated with the Soviet state security agency.

To be sure, the news can hardly be called sensational. It was openly bandied about in the halls of parliament, and newspapers had unequivocally indicated the possibility of such a scenario. Neither Prunskiene nor Minkevicius signed the findings of the commission of deputies which had delivered the collaboration verdict. Nevertheless, Minkevicius's case was submitted to court for a legal assessment of the fact of involvement in the KGB secret service and materials on Prunskiene will also be handed over to lawyers. True, Minkevicius did not appear in court, citing objective reasons, while the former prime-minister left for Germany immediately after the statement was made.

But the egregious case of Cepaitis, the first victim of the "Lithuanian KGBate," did go to court. The trial lasted only two days, or rather a day and a half, and I witnessed the final verdict against the former chairman of the parliamentary commission on human rights and ethnic affairs. The court, in particular, confirmed the legal justification of the facts cited in the commission's conclusions and found that deputy V. Cepaitis had consciously collaborated with the KGB. This harsh verdict was based on the testimony of witnesses, confirmed facts of visits to secret addresses, regular meetings with KGB associates, and other materials and documents.

The interesting thing is that no file on Cepaitis was found in the KGB archives. It could have been removed, if, of course, it ever existed. There is only indirect indication of his involvement in KGB actions in the files of well-known Lithuanian dissidents A. Stromas, nicknamed "Piton" by the KGB, and T. Venclova ("Dekadent"). As for the "defendant" himself, Cepaitis continues to claim that he had not collaborated with the KGB, simply since 1963 he had occasional contacts with the agency's representatives. In court he confessed that his last meeting occurred in the summer of 1988, when he already was a member of the Sajudis leadership. According to him, that summer a KGB official visited him in the country, where he was on vacation, and asked him to write a report on ethnic relations in Lithuania. Upon reflection, Cepaitis decided, "out of patriotic considerations," to write the report so as to "state the truth," which the KGB could then bring to the attention of CC CPSU secretary A. Yakovlev, who was visiting Lithuania at the time.

The Lithuanian parliament has now suspended Cepaitis's membership rights. Whether he remains a deputy will have to be decided by his constituents. As Vaclovas Litvinas, deputy chairman of the Republican election commission, told the IZVESTIYA correspondent, a law will soon be passed requiring a review of the credentials of all deputies suspected of collaborating with special services. If a majority of the constituents express no confidence in their representative and vote for a recall, then the Supreme Council will unseat him. On the whole, however, it is still too early to close the "Lithuanian KGBate." Besides Prunskiene, Minkevicius and other prominent Lithuanian political figures the suspects include, for example, Rita Dapkute, head of the parliament's information bureau. A new "KGB star" has risen on the Lithuanian political horizon!

This time the MAZIOJI LIETUVA daily published an interview with this American Lithuanian, who has been working actively in the republican supreme council. The confession of the parliamentary functionary, who had worked with the mass media and instructed journalists how to write, has shocked many in Lithuania. Dapkute has openly confessed that when she was in Lithuania in 1986 she "felt or someone made it known" that KGB agents had expressed interest in her. Subsequent events developed like a real spy thriller. Upon returning to the United States she told an acquaintance who worked in the FBI about the possible attempt to recruit her. Shortly afterwards she met with some woman from the organization. She said that it would be very interesting to learn what could interest state security officials, for example, how they recruited US citizens, etc. Dapkute agreed. Then one day, when she was already taking a residence course at Vilnius University, a person "who had frequently accompanied Lithuanians from the West" came to her dormitory. It was then that she decided to so to say kill two birds. Contacts were set up. She returned to Chicago several times and reported her KGB contacts to the FBI. Bureau associates were mainly interested in methods of recruiting foreigners. Contacts with the FBI ended in 1989 but continued with the KGB. She then visited the newly established department of state security, and the new counterintelligence people suggested that she continue her contacts with the KGB... They were finally broken in the spring of 1990.

Such is one more instructive story. Dapkute no longer works in the parliamentary information bureau. She plans to translate Lithuanian books into English. But how many such agents, informers, associates, both real and imaginary, are there in Lithuania? It looks like the authorities have decided to drain the KGB cup to the bottom, and now nothing can halt Lithuanian style deKGBization.

Many Lithuanian politicians fully realize the pitfalls on the road of universal exposure, but they are no longer able to stop the avalanche of suspicions and a new wave of informers. Dapkute, who went through the school of "soft" KGB recruitment, thinks that "all KGB archives should be burned or sealed for a hundred years..." But the politicians are hardly likely to heed this or many other voices. The temptation of using the KGB card to settle scores with political rivals is too great. Besides, thanks to the law on reviewing the credentials of deputies suspected of collaborating with the secret services of other countries, if one really tries, any deputy can easily be listed as a "collaborator." Even those who may have been entered in the KGB's lists without ever having been told...

And so, having recovered from the stress caused by the exposure of their leader V. Cepaitis, the right-wing National-Radicals have fired a retaliatory salvo. Minkevicius, it will be recalled, is a member of a left-wing faction, the Democratic Party of Labor [DPL], and Prunskiene, although she does not belong to any faction, clearly sympathizes with the left. Incidentally, the aforementioned members of the parliamentary commission say that they also have materials involving A. Matulionis, former director of the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law, also a left-winger and DPL member. In short, the KGB topic has again become an arena of acute political struggle in Lithuania.

And what about K. Prunskiene? She denies any links with the KGB secret service. According to her, the accusations against her are contrived and a reaction to frank evaluations of some Lithuanian political leaders in her book "Behind the Scenes," recently published in Lithuania. However, it seems that the "Amber Lady" will not avoid trial. Who of the deputies and politicians is next?

Watching the sword of mass deKGBization decapitate people, one can't help coming to the conclusion: The KGB itself could hardly have come up with a better scenario for the development of the political situation...

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8 May 1992